force, actual military force through NATO, with the United States being involved, then I feel strongly that we need to get U.N. approval and we also need to get congressional approval before military action is taken.

I also believe that President Clinton and our military leaders should have a clear military goal in mind. It's not enough simply to use military force with some kind of vague concept. There has to be a clear military goal. I would suggest that one way of viewing a military goal would be to use the military to commence action that would be aimed towards stopping all offensive military actions by the various parties, allowing humanitarian relief to take place and creating a climate where a long-term political solution can take root.

And finally, I would say if we do have to go to the use of force, there ought to be a clear exit point. We have to know how we're going to get out and when we're going to declare success.

I also think we have to know that under phase one, when we commit ground troops there. The peace process can break down and I think we have to think in advance before we commit large numbers of U.S. military forces on the ground: what happens if we commit those forces in a cease-fire atmosphere but the cease-fire is breached and we end up having them there in the middle of a conflict? That has to be contemplated and thought through.

So let me stop at this point and defer to Senator Lugar, who cochaired this delegation. And again I would hope that most of these points people would agree with but every individual member here will have differing views and I want everyone to be able to say what they think. Thank you.

+++++

SENIOR RICHARD LUGAR (R-Indiana): Thank you, Senator Nunn. Indeed I do agree with the points that Sam Nunn has made. I think I should say that at the outset, and I think that his analysis has been thoughtful and thorough.

I would just underline certain aspects and carry this argument a little bit further. We had two objectives, one of which was to advance the START II process and to find out whether there are hopes really for START II in Russia this year. I think that the answer is still undefined because we're not certain, frankly, how the parliamentary struggle will go with regard to the constitutional dilemma there. It may or may not be that the parliamentarians, with whom we met, will be voting ever on START II, but some may, and some may be a part of a government now or in the future.

What I think is significant in terms of our trip to Russia was the very strong affirmation by Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and that was manifested clearly in his meeting with Secretary Christopher and with President Boris Yeltsin, that Russia wants to stick tight to the United States in terms of diplomacy. Very important that in the second paragraph of the communique, Russia was prepared to send military forces to Bosnia, albeit in what they hoped would be a peacekeeping venture.

The third paragraph says that if cease-fire does not occur
or Vance-Owen or whatever, then there will have to be more consultation. But Kozyrev deliberately did not rule out various steps that Russia might take. That might especially significant given the fact that in Russia it is apparent they are not seeing the same television pictures of Bosnia that we are seeing in the United States. And indeed, I begin to wonder whether the view of Bosnia that we have been seeing night by night is being seen by very many people around the earth.

There is a substantial information and education problem if all of the allies in the rest of the world would come up to speed to manage the problem.

Now, I see the question first of all as management. It is the same question that will often be asked in the world. We see evil but having seen evil, what do you do about it? Or you see instability or potential for domino theory, all the rest.

At this particular point, the president of the United States has stepped up to the plate and said I'm not doing it by myself. We have the United Nations. We have NATO. We have allies. But somebody must lead, and that person is the president of the United States. That is significant.

The president called me, he called Senator Nunn on Friday night, prior to our all-night travels to Naples and asked us some very specific questions about the course of action and asked us to report back, which we did, by telephone from Naples. And Senator Nunn has indicated some of the advice, and I would testify that that's precisely what he told the president.

I think that was important that the president knows in a bipartisan sense there are people thinking along with him.

My own view, having heard Admiral Borda and the NATO South people, is that there are a raft of options available. The president has been entertaining some of them and some have been publicly reported. A great many have not been. I will not go into the classified portions of those options but when Senator Nunn says the U.N. ought to be changing its mission, its force structure, its ability to deal with things, I think this is a very important area to explore. There are thousands of people in Bosnia now.

And secondly, it seems to me important that the president knows that there are a lot of options militarily in terms of signals that could be sent in this so-called warning phase—a lot of them. And to the extent that he is able to utilize this, he may be able to move towards the objective, which Senator Nunn has discussed correctly, as cease-fire, peace, an opportunity for diplomacy to work as these people work out whatever their borderlines may be and their political peace but with a Bosnia that continues, a country we have recognized and that most nations have under international law and that it is not something put asunder.

Finally, I would say that the basic question will come back: are the American people prepared for this activity? Do they understand the goal? Perhaps, but perhaps not. The president must speak to that question, but so must some of us, in a bipartisan way.
The goal is peace in Europe. The goal is stability. The goal is diversity, people to be able to live together without ethnic cleansing, which is a vicious disease that could spread, without the warfare that clearly is killing innocent people, as well as the militants presently.

The failure to manage that situation is to bring about an instability in Europe that will be extremely costly in many ways. Obviously in a humanitarian way we were shocked by it, and the conscience of the world is shocked. But let me just say in terms of the pocketbook issues, our hopes of exporting to an unstable Europe are going to go down very rapidly. The effect of war in Europe will be felt in terms of cash at home in the pocket, more unemployment, less opportunity for any upside potential of growth. It's not an academic issue if one just simply wants to discuss the dollars and cents, and I don't think that has been discussed. And I don't want to suggest in a crass way that that is the purpose of intervention, but we ought to understand the consequence of a Europe in recession facing a general war.

When we went to Macedonia we saw a country that is going to be run over by refugees coming out of Kosovo, who will be rejected by Greece. That's the reason the Greek prime minister went to Bosnia yesterday, along with Milosevic, and demanded they stop it, because Greece will be unstable. The Bulgarians will come in to assist people in Macedonia who they have historical affinity for and they will be involved.

President Tudjman in Croatia had told us of a summit conference he'd had in the last few days with the Turkish people. They're trying to form alliances and ties there.

This is a situation that is not going to stay in its present status. And the effect upon Germany of the refugees, the effect upon Hungary, Rumania, Poland, of millions of people streaming in various ways being rejected and lost or so forth. It's either managed now at a point in which in my judgment it can be managed, or on down the trail in a very different situation, the world will be looking at horrendous prospects.

I commend the president. I told him publicly the other day at the meeting we had at the White House that I would join with responsible Democratic senators in a motion to give him authority to conduct the foreign policy of the country appropriately in this instance. And I repeat that pledge. And I think it's very, very important at this point just to reiterate the gist of what we're saying today: the U.N. move, that the president move to do something, that diplomacy continue in an intense way, that it be apparent that the situation is going to be managed.

END COVERAGE
+++++
+++++
The Reuter Transcript Report
Senators/Bosnia (first and final add)
May 6, 1993
REUTER
SEN. SAM NUNN (D-GA.) AND SEN. RICHARD LUGAR (R-IND.) NEWS CONFERENCE

Topic: The situation in Bosnia
Time: Noon
Location: Russell Building, room 232A
May 6, 1993

The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric Beech, Melissa Bland, Will Dunham, Peter Ramjag and Paul Schomer also are available to help you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For service problems call 1-800-435-0101.

SENIOR SAM NUNN (D-Georgia) (CNN cuts in while in progress): --and we also visited with President Tudjman in Croatia. We also visited with the U.N. leadership in Croatia and former Yugoslavia. General Morillon ventured from Sarajevo, where he normally has been using as his headquarters, and spent a couple hours with us, so we had a good briefing there.

We also were briefed by the head of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, which was also very helpful.

Let me say a couple of words about the START process, and then I'll get into Bosnia. We had extensive meetings with the Russian parliament on START. We were invited there by the members of the Defense and Security Committee and also by the members of the Foreign Relations Committee. We were also urged, as an arms control observer group cutting across various committee lines in the Senate, Armed Services and Intelligence and Foreign Relations and Appropriations, all represented in this group of six.

We were also invited by President Clinton to make this kind of trip about a month or six weeks ago because he places a very high priority on START, and President Clinton said very clearly and very forcefully in his Annapolis speech that he hopes the START treaty and the non-proliferation treaties can be ratified by all of the formal Soviet republics. So it's a high priority on his list and of course on ours.

We had extensive discussions with members of the government, including the foreign minister and including members of the defense group, and also General Shaposhnikov and his CIS staff.

The overall concerns about START II I would divide into three categories. Number one, concerns about what is not happening in the Ukraine in terms of the Ukraine not, at this stage at least, making much progress towards ratifying START I and towards signing up as a non-nuclear state to the non-proliferation treaty as they have agreed to do, very specifically in the Lisbon protocol.

So that's one whole host of concerns, and I would place that one at the top of the list.

Number two is the cost. The cost of moving to the ceilings
in START II after substantial restructuring of the heavy ICBM forces as called for in START II is of considerable importance to the members of the Supreme Soviet. I think that that is a matter that has grown over the months and we have reached the stage where the details of arms control, at least in the minds of many people in Russia, are probably not as important as the economics of arms control. So it's a new era in the arms control area.

And number three, there is a continuing contest, as all of you know, between President Yeltsin and members of the parliament, and most notably between some of the members of the parliament, notably the speaker and the foreign minister, Mr. Kozyrev. So the personalities have gotten very much involved in this.

Moving on to Bosnia, we did have very good briefings with Admiral Borda. We had extensive briefings with him, and then we also met with him again after we visited Croatia, and debriefed him and got his reaction to what we learned in Croatia and Macedonia.

I'm not going to try to speak for everyone here. I think that what I will say in the next three or four minutes represents the views of some of the people here, but I want each one of them to be able to add their own caveats or nuances or disagreements with what I say.

Looking at this in what I would call two phases, phase one being the phase that after the action taken yesterday, which is the Bosnian Serb parliament, as I understand it, has referred this back to the people for a referendum, I would call the Athens agreement somewhat in limbo. So let's call this phase one, the limbo stage of the Athens agreement, hoping that it's going to be ratified but not knowing that it's going to be ratified.

First, the Bosnian Serb leadership in the parliament clearly indicate to me--personal view--they are willing to take a strong lead when it comes to war, but not when it comes to peace. And that's very disappointing that they in effect seem to be hiding behind a referendum. So we'll see what happens there. I hope the people, the Bosnian Serbs, will be willing to grasp the--perhaps the last chance of bringing about some kind of peaceful settlement there.

In the meantime, while we're in this phase one, the limbo phase of the Athens agreement, I think it's very important that the international community continue to send the signal that President Clinton has forcefully done in the last two or three weeks, and that is that the international community's patience is exhausted, that the siege of the villages has to be stopped, and that there must be an open access for the transportation by the United Nations of both food and medicine to the areas where there is so much suffering going on.

And I also think that the international community should insist on a cease-fire while this referendum is taking place. It seems to me to allow the shelling to continue to go on while people are deciding on the vote is simply not acceptable, and that ought to be made clear.
The second point I would make is that while this is going on, not waiting until it's concluded, I think the United Nations forces should be restructured in Yugoslavia, not simply in Bosnia, but in the other areas of Yugoslavia. Clearly I believe it's time to put the forces under military leadership rather than under humanitarian leadership. The humanitarian effort will continue to be very important. We have extremely brave people, courageous people that ought to be highly commended involved in that, but right now I think that, given the situation, the military forces, the U.N. military forces should be placed in charge.

I also would say, point three, that these forces need to be beefed up. They are so lightly armed now that they are in effect hostages to any renegade element, let alone organized element that would like to take any kind of action or intimidate them in any way. So beefing up these forces on the ground that are already there, the United Nations forces that are already there, I think is absolutely essential. They should be given the wherewithal to be able to defend themselves and to take defensive action, and particularly if we have to move to another phase, that is, a phase actually using force, it's essential that they have the ability to protect themselves. Otherwise we could have a real problem.

The next point I would make is that the president and the secretary of state need to continue what they are doing now in terms of preparing the allies and trying to build a consensus for the allies to be able to take more decisive action through the United Nations and through NATO if this Athens agreement breaks down.

I also believe that in addition to political and diplomatic steps to try to build a consensus with the allies, that we all, particularly NATO, needs to move forces to the area that would prepare us to take action under either phase one, that is, beefing up the forces on the ground to carry out a cease-fire agreement, or under what I would call phase two, which is actually moving to the use of force, which all of us hope will not be necessary, but certainly to prepare for it is absolutely essential if we're going to have any chance of avoiding it.

Finally, if we do have to move as an international community, through the U.N. and through NATO to the use of force and to the lifting of the embargo, and I think the embargo lifting, to me, has always been something that should have been done long ago because right now, in effect, what we've done is we have intervened—the United Nations has intervened on behalf of the side that has ready access to arms, that is, the Bosnian Serbs. When you have an embargo on three different groups and one of them can get arms and one of them can't, then what you've got is an inadvertent kind of intervention on behalf of the side that really can get arms. So right now the embargo is working very much in favor of the Bosnian Serbs.

But if we move to that stage, if we move to the stage of lifting the embargo, since it is a U.N. embargo, of course that would require U.N. approval. If we move to the stage of using