

95TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. J. RES. 740

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 15, 1978

Mr. RUDD (for himself, Mr. DEL CLAWSON, Mr. BAUMAN, Mr. BURGNER, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. BUTLER, Mr. LOTT, Mr. ROUSSELOT, Mr. ASHBROOK, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. DEVINE, Mr. TREEN, Mr. WAMPLER, and Mr. JOHN T. MYERS) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

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## JOINT RESOLUTION

Expressing the determination of the United States with respect  
to the situation in Cuba.

Whereas the Soviet Union has deployed military personnel to  
Cuba for the purpose of piloting and maintaining Cuban  
Mig-22 fighter aircraft, to operate Cuban radar installa-  
tions, and for other military purposes; and

Whereas this Soviet deployment of military personnel into this  
hemisphere has occurred in conjunction with the depletion  
of Cuban military forces through the intervention of tens of  
thousands of Cuban troops in Africa in support of various  
Communist-supported military actions on that continent; and

Whereas such deployment of Soviet military personnel to Cuba,  
and Soviet and Cuban military personnel, arms, and support

to Communist forces in Africa, is in the interests only of Communist expansionism and not in the interests of world peace; and

Whereas such Soviet military presence and buildup in Cuba is in violation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which termed any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements of 1962, which assured no deployment of Soviet forces or offensive arms in Cuba; and

Whereas in the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Punta del Este Resolution II of the Organization of American States of January 1962 agreed "to urge the Member States to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance": Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*  
2       *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*  
3       That the United States is determined—

4               (a) to prevent by whatever means may be neces-  
5       sary, including the use of arms, the Communist regimes  
6       of the Soviet Union and Cuba, acting individually or  
7       collectively, from extending by force or threat of force  
8       their aggressive or subversive activities to any part of  
9       this hemisphere;

10              (b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an  
11       externally supported military capability, or the deploy-  
12       ment in Cuba of military forces from another nation, for  
13       the purpose of establishing a stronger base for Com-  
14       munist expansionism in this hemisphere, thus endanger-  
15       ing the security of the United States and other non-  
16       Communist nations; and

17              (c) to work with the Organization of American  
18       States and with freedom-loving people of all nations to  
19       implement collective security agreements and to support  
20       the aspirations of all people in this hemisphere for free-  
21       dom and self-determination; and be it further

22       *Resolved, That the President of the United States take*  
23       every possible action to carry out the intent of this resolution.

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## H. J. RES. 740

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### JOINT RESOLUTION

Expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba.

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By Mr. RUDD, Mr. DEL CLAWSON, Mr. BAUMAN,  
Mr. BURGNER, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. YOUNG  
of Florida, Mr. BUTLER, Mr. LOTT, Mr. ROUS-  
SELOT, Mr. ASHBROOK, Mr. CUNNINGHAM,  
Mr. DEVINE, Mr. TREEN, Mr. WAMPLER, and  
Mr. JOHN T. MYERS

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FEBRUARY 15, 1978

Referred to the Committee on International Relations



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other purposes, it would be necessary for the United States to devote a sizable part of our strategic resources and power to offset or stop these threats to our own security, and that of other non-Communist nations.

Hanson Baldwin stated this aspect of the Cuban equation most succinctly:

The most discouraging and ominous part of this military equation from the American point of view is that Russia, with very little additional effort (perhaps even feigned effort), can force the United States to raise the ante considerably. A sudden increase in the number of Soviet ships sent to Cuba, unusual engineering work in Cuba's mountains, overt displays of strengthened military power, the threat of new missiles, and the eruption of trouble fostered by infiltrators trained in Cuba, in other Caribbean islands or in Central America would necessitate the immediate allocation of additional United States military power to the Caribbean area. In this game Russia holds the cards. Moscow can play it hard or soft and force our effort to ebb or flow with her actions. We cannot—and must not—forget that in the fall of 1962 some forty-odd missiles and perhaps (at a maximum) 40,000 Russians forced the mobilization and concentration by the United States of more than half a million soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen. All this suggests that the island of Cuba, by virtue of geography (and recently by virtue of the Russian transfusions of military power), is of long-term and continuing importance in Caribbean, hemispheric and global strategy.

Cuba is not vital to us as a base. But unless future U.S. security is to suffer a continuous and unpredictable series of alarms and retreats, it should be denied as a base to any potential enemy.

### A CRUCIAL TEST

Mr. Speaker, the recent Soviet military build-up in Cuba, while Castro's armed forces are fighting to spread communism in Africa, is a crucial test of this administration's willingness to stand firm.

The Soviet Union wants to know if President Carter will allow this buildup to continue—maybe even offer some justification for it in order to avoid taking any action himself to stop it—or whether he will take resolute action, issuing strong representations for an immediate Soviet withdrawal from our hemisphere.

I believe it is the duty of Congress to ask President Carter to stand strongly and resolutely for an immediate Soviet withdrawal of military personnel and other Soviet agents from Cuba. Any vacillation on this question by our Government will lead to other actions implementing the Soviet agenda for Communist expansionism in this hemisphere, which will seriously "breach the ramparts" of continental U.S. defense and security.

The resolution that I introduced yesterday with 14 cosponsors will express the clear determination of Congress in this matter. The resolution is based upon collective security agreements between the United States and other hemispheric nations, which require the United States to take action to prevent a Soviet presence that might permit a Soviet or Cuban strike against any nation in the hemisphere.

I would like to include the text of House Joint Resolution 740 at this point in the RECORD:

### HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 740

(Mr. Rudd, for himself, Mr. Del Clawson, Mr. Bauman, Mr. Burgener, Mr. Livingston, Mr. Young of Florida, Mr. Butler, Mr. Lott, Mr. Rousselot, Mr. Ashbrook, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Devine, Mr. Treen, Mr. Wampler, and Mr. John T. Myers introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations.)

Joint resolution expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba

Whereas the Soviet Union has deployed military personnel to Cuba for the purpose of piloting and maintaining Cuban MIG-21 fighter aircraft, to operate Cuban radar installations, and for other military purposes; and

Whereas this Soviet deployment of military personnel into this hemisphere has occurred in conjunction with the depletion of Cuban military forces through the intervention of tens of thousands of Cuban troops in Africa in support of various Communist-supported military actions on that continent; and

Whereas such deployment of Soviet military personnel to Cuba, and Soviet and Cuban military personnel, arms, and support to Communist forces in Africa, is in the interests only of Communist expansionism and not in the interests of world peace; and

Whereas such Soviet military presence and build-up in Cuba is in violation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which termed any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements of 1962, which assured no deployment of Soviet forces or offensive arms in Cuba; and

Whereas in the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Punta del Este Resolution II of the Organization of American States of January, 1962, agreed "To urge the Member States to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance"; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Cuba, acting individually or collectively, from extending by force or threat of force their aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability, or the deployment in Cuba of military forces from another Nation, for the purpose of establishing a stronger base for Communist expansionism in this hemisphere, thus

endangering the security of the United States and other non-Communist Nations; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving people of all Nations to implement collective security agreements and to support the aspirations of all people in this hemisphere for freedom and self-determination; be it further

Resolved, That the President of the United States take every possible action to carry out the intent of this resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) is recognized for 15 minutes.

[Mr. SIKES addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

### UKRAINIAN NATIONAL DAY

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, January 22 marked the 60th anniversary of Ukrainian independence. I take my time today, even belatedly, to join in expressing hearty congratulations to the Ukrainian people on this important anniversary and to salute them for having courageously kept alive the spirit of freedom in the midst of over a half century of brutal Soviet repression.

Having enjoyed ourselves the benefits of one of the most liberal governments known to history for over 200 years, it is especially important that we Americans take this occasion to reflect seriously on what it means to people who have known, ever so briefly, these same freedoms, and then thereafter have been subjected to the terrors and persecution of totalitarianism.

Of all the people enslaved by the Soviet system, the Ukrainian people have been among the chief victims. In 1933 alone, the Ukraine, which for centuries had been known as the breadbasket for Russia, lost over 6 million people because of deliberate starvation. The famine was artificially created by the Soviet Government who confiscated the last grain of wheat from the Ukrainian peasant farmers. At this same time millions of Ukrainians were deported with their families to Siberia, where, as intended, they subsequently perished.

The persecution has not lessened in recent years, but merely changed its form. In place of planned starvation and mass deportation, the Soviet regime has employed new tactics. In the 1960's the most talented members of the young Ukrainian intelligentsia were thrown into prisons and concentration camps. Today, poets, writers, students—any individuals giving expression to the natural Ukrainian longing for national freedom—find themselves tried and convicted for the alleged crime of anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation.

The fact that the emphasis of the Ukrainian protest is not so much on their



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lives, belong to the Government and should be accessible to the American people, with some narrowly defined exceptions.

Guided by the recommendations of the Public Documents Commission and the Court's ruling on the custody of the Nixon papers, I have introduced H.R. 9130, the Presidential Papers Act of 1977. This act would correct the current situation whereby the President can, upon leaving office, restrict access to the records of the White House, virtually as he or she chooses. This places Congress in the awkward position of having to resort to special legislation each time it determines that such restrictions are contrary to public interest. H.R. 9130 would establish a general policy for the preservation of, and public access to, the official records of the President. I am today introducing a revised version of my earlier bill to clarify that its public access provisions would extend to the records of a President only after he or she has left office.

I believe that this legislation will help resolve the ownership and access problems associated with Presidential papers—but what of our own records? The National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials pointed to a number of shortcomings in the current rules regulating congressional papers. In its final report, for example, the Commission concluded that—

The institutional records of Congress are an invaluable source of information about the legislative process, yet the rules concerning access are so varied and inconsistent that the records themselves often go unused.

The Commission also noted that the Congress has exempted itself from those provisions of Federal law that relate to archival administration and records disposition. Consequently, there is no comprehensive system to identify those records of Congress which have continuing value, or are outdated and should not be retained.

I recognize that this is a sensitive matter involving a mix of privacy confidentiality, privilege, and security concerns. Nevertheless, a most considered approach to the subject can be pursued.

I have requested that the Select Committee on Congressional Operations examine the adequacy of existing House rules for preserving and providing public access to the institutional records of the House of Representatives, and consider the advisability of moving forward with the recommendations of the Federal Documents Commission. It is the underlying intent of this request that any recommendations that the select committee makes will reflect an increased sensitivity to preservation of the institutional records of the House as property of the United States. In addition, it is hoped that the committee will examine procedures akin to those of the Freedom of Information Act, to foster greater public access to the institutional records of the House.

The chairman of the select committee, JACK BROOKS, recognizes the importance of this proposal and has agreed to urge its adoption by the committee. He has advised me that any study by the com-

mittee would include an evaluation of the current archival holdings of the House, scrutiny of both stored and operative files, and consideration of the need for permanent arrangements for the management and archiving of House records. I anticipate that, after completing its studies, the select committee will make recommendations to the Speaker and appropriate House committees.

I hope my colleagues will indicate their support for action by the select committee and will contribute to the panel's deliberations. I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for this opportunity to speak on this important matter and offer for the Record the following exchange of correspondence with Chairman Brooks.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,  
Washington, D.C., February 13, 1978.

Hon. JACK BROOKS,  
Chairman, Select Committee on Congressional Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know, the Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee which I chair will hold hearings beginning next week on the ownership and disposition of presidential papers. A related matter with which I have become increasingly concerned during my review of issues involved with the questions of presidential documents, is the manner in which the Congress' own files are handled.

I recognize that the handling of congressional documents is a complex matter involving privacy, confidentiality, and security concerns. For a thoughtful discussion of these concerns, I commend to your attention the final report of the National Commission on the Records and Documents of Public Officials. The Commission, which was established by Congress to examine the problem of presidential records, also made a number of recommendations dealing with the preservation, and public access to, congressional papers.

I believe that it is the time to re-examine the adequacy of existing House rules and to explore the advisability of moving forward with the Documents Commission's recommendations in this area. The Constitution, of course, prescribes that each House of Congress shall make its own rules. The Select Committee on Congressional Operations is in a unique position to undertake such a study, and I would respectfully request that such an examination be undertaken by the committee.

This study should include consideration of measures to increase sensitivity toward the preservation of the institutional records of the House as property of the United States, and procedures akin to those of the Freedom of Information Act to foster public access to these records.

I would hope that you will find this proposal an appropriate matter for the Select Committee's agenda, and will assign it a high priority.

Sincerely,

RICHARDSON PREYER,  
Chairman.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, D.C., February 14, 1978.

Hon. RICHARDSON PREYER,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, Committee on Government Operations, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your request that the Select Committee on Congressional Operations examine the adequacy of exist-

ing House rules for preserving and providing public access to the institutional records of the House of Representatives will be given active consideration by the Select Committee at its next meeting on February 28. The proposed study will have my very strong support, and I feel confident that my colleagues on the Select Committee will recognize the importance of the subject and the appropriateness of a study by our committee whose specific responsibility includes addressing such institutional questions.

In carrying out this study, it would be my recommendation that the Select Committee examine the quantity and quality of the archival holdings of the House, to inspect representative examples of files as they exist both in stored form and in operational use, to find practicable ways of distinguishing between public records and personal files, and to consider the need for establishing permanent arrangements for storing, managing, and accessing the public records of the House.

Will keep you informed of the Select Committee's activities in the area and look forward to close and fruitful cooperation with you and other interested colleagues.

Sincerely,

JACK BROOKS.

SOVIET BUILDUP IN CUBA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. RUDD) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I introduced with cosponsors House Joint Resolution 740, which calls upon the President to take every possible action to secure the removal of all Soviet military personnel from Cuba.

This may indeed be the most crucial foreign policy test facing the President and our Nation today.

Over the past few weeks, the Soviet Union has sent fighter pilots and air force ground crews into Cuba to take over Mig-21 missions, aircraft ground maintenance, and radar operations.

The implications of this quiet Soviet military buildup at a Communist base just 90 miles from our own borders are ominous, and constitute a serious threat to our national security. The Soviet timing, while the administration campaigns to give away the Panama Canal to a dictatorship friendly to both Cuba and the Soviet Union, suggests a stepped-up Soviet plan for penetration and Communist expansion throughout our hemisphere.

The presumed justification offered for this recent Soviet deployment of their best fighter pilots and other military personnel to Cuba is that Cuba's own air force has been severely depleted by Fidel Castro's intervention in Communist guerrilla wars in Africa. This line that the Soviets are therefore justified in helping to "defend" Cuba while Castro's own armed forces are away has even been picked up by our own State Department and news media.

But rather than being a justification for the Soviet and Cuban action, this Cuban military adventurism leading to a Soviet military buildup in Cuba is an even more pressing reason for the administration to take the firmest possible stand demanding the immediate removal of all Soviet military personnel from Cuba.

Not to do so will show the clearest kind



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of weakness that the Soviets are looking for, and invite further Soviet and Cuban military adventurism around the world and even in this hemisphere.

Let us look at the facts. What are the Cubans really doing in Africa? Why are they there? And what are the Soviet intentions in this hemisphere, in the Caribbean, in Latin America? Is it possible that they are getting on a "war footing"?

According to estimates of U.S. officials, Castro currently has between 25,000 to 30,000 military troops in Africa. Other estimates put the number of Cuban forces at 43,000.

U.S. officials report that there are 3,000 Cubans fighting on the ground and flying Soviet Mig-23 fighter jets in Ethiopia in the current war against Somalia. Somali officials report that 18,000 to 20,000 Cubans are taking part in the Ethiopian offensive. The Cubans are bombing Somali villages and conducting air strikes and guerrilla assaults against Somali-held territory in the Ogaden Desert of Ethiopia.

There are also 19,000 Cuban military troops in Angola, and an additional 4,000 in nine other African states, fighting with Communist forces to bring about Communist rule throughout Africa under Soviet domination.

The Cubans can only be in Africa principally as a training experience, to help them become seasoned by actual combat for Communist military offensives in other parts of the world, especially Latin America.

Likewise, the Soviets have sent their own experienced military forces to Cuba, as replacements for the absent Cuban troops, to become seasoned in our own hemisphere—conducting Mig-21 tactical air missions over the Bermuda triangle, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean, where they can get used to the weather and the terrain, collect intelligence for the Soviets, and assist with Cuban training of other Communist insurgent forces from other countries.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

What are the Soviet and Cuban geopolitical/military objectives in this hemisphere? They have not changed since Castro grabbed power in a bloody revolution 18 years ago. The objectives are simply to penetrate the "heartland" of the U.S. defense and commerce.

To the United States, the Caribbean Sea-Gulf of Mexico-Panama Canal area, with its vital strategic sealanes, its important archipelagoes, and its great agricultural and mineral resources, is of primary concern to our continental defense and trade.

It is the nexus—the connecting point—of the shipping lanes of the world. Through these vital waters pass U.S. military vessels. On their way to U.S. ports pass oil from Venezuela, bauxite from Jamaica, manganese from Brazil, tin, iron ore, and other mineral resources from Latin American countries, as well as other important commercial goods.

The Caribbean Sea-Gulf of Mexico-Panama Canal waters dominate not only north-south trade with Latin America, but east-west trade from Western Europe

and the eastern coastal ports of the States to Western ports and the Pacific.

They constitute a vital direct east-west sea route for U.S. submarines and other military vessels on their way to and from all parts of the world.

In the words of Hanson W. Baldwin, the respected former military editor of the New York Times—

The Caribbean Sea and its fringing islands command the Atlantic approaches to any Central American canal, to the Gulf of Mexico and to the Southeastern coast of the United States. If any of its islands or surrounding land masses should come under the domination of a major hostile power, the continental ramparts would be breached and, under certain conditions—as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 demonstrated—a deadly, indeed a vital, danger to the security of the United States might develop. Alternatively, a Communist-dominated Caribbean nation posits the threat of creeping conquest; it could be a focal infection spot used for the export of Communism to Latin America.

It is the principle objective of the Soviet Union in this hemisphere to use its Communist client regime in Cuba as that base for "creeping conquest." Castro Cuba is the Soviet Union's "focal infection spot . . . for the export of Communism to Latin America."

The current Soviet military buildup in Cuba, even if only temporary, is part of that objective. The authoritative Baldwin has cited a six-point Soviet agenda for control of the Caribbean Sea-Gulf of Mexico-Panama Canal area, which includes the following:

GUANTANAMO BAY

First, takeover and control of what is now the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo Bay on the southern end of Cuba, for use by the Soviets as a staging ground for its naval fleet in this part of the world.

Guantanamo is a 45-square-mile, 76 million U.S. facility with 1,400 buildings and two airstrips, including an 8,000-foot strip for jet aircraft. It is one of the best naval anchorages in the Caribbean. Normally, about 4,000 to 6,000 Americans are stationed at the base, including about 1,600 civilians, and another 4,000 to 5,000 military personnel are aboard ships of our naval fleet that operate out of Guantanamo.

Since the Spanish-American war, the base at Guantanamo has been developed into perhaps the most important U.S. naval facility outside our own shores in the Western Hemisphere.

The base has great strategic value for fleet support, training by all ships in the Atlantic, logistical and supply importance. It has naval and air supply and repair facilities unavailable at any other Caribbean base, and can be a staging base for fighter, troop-carrying, or cargo aircraft enroute from the United States to Latin America.

It is a key part of the Soviet-Cuban Caribbean objective to get the United States out of Guantanamo, and to use it themselves for their own Communist expansionist objectives throughout the hemisphere.

MISSILE BASE

Second, Cuba is viewed by the Soviets as an important missile base—and there is still no guarantee, despite the supposed

withdrawal of Soviet missiles in 1962, that Cuba is not being used to base Soviet medium range ballistic missiles to threaten large populations areas on the U.S. mainland.

Cuban missile sites would increase Soviet dispersion of Communist missile bases, and force the United States to allocate some of our nuclear-deterrent forces to neutralize them close to our own borders in the event of war.

INTELLIGENCE AND SUBVERSION

Third, Cuba is important to the Soviets as an intelligence base or center for the open and covert collection of information about the United States and South American countries. Electronic monitoring of the extensive radio and radar transmissions from all parts of this hemisphere have undoubtedly been conducted by the Soviets from Cuba for some time.

It is reported that the Soviets would like to build a much larger facility in Cuba for monitoring radio and radar.

Fourth, the Soviets also want to step up their use of Cuba as a base for subversion. The island has already been used extensively for the infiltration of Soviet agents or spies of various kinds—including some mixed in with legitimate refugees—to the U.S. mainland, Puerto Rico, to other Caribbean islands, or to Central and South America.

Both the Soviets and Castro have used Cuba to export subversion, propaganda, sabotage, and guerrillas throughout Central and South America. The troubles in Venezuela, and to some extent in Chile, Bolivia, and Panama, can be traced to influences or direct involvement emanating from Cuba.

In fact, during my own tenure as a special agent with the FBI, on diplomatic assignment in South America, I was personally involved in the identification of Che Guevara after he had been shot and killed in the Bolivian forests where he was leading Communist guerrilla activities in that country.

As a base for Soviet-inspired Communist subversion, Cuba is a threat to the unstable regimes and poverty-stricken volatile masses of the Caribbean islands and Central and South America.

The Soviets and Castro Cubans hope to step up such subversion throughout the hemisphere, using propaganda and guerrilla war to incite revolution and the overthrow of non-Communist governments.

SPACE TRACKING STATION

Fifth, Cuba can be used by the Soviets as a tracking station for Soviet space shots, including communications and reconnaissance satellites and space weapons.

The island is ideal for instrumentation, control, and communications equipment for such space projects and weaponry, which the Soviets have had to operate from their own mainland or seagoing ships.

MILITARY DIVERSION

Finally, there is for the Soviets the military diversionary value of Cuba. If Cuba becomes a full-scale Soviet base for naval operations, missiles, infiltration and subversion of other nations, and for