

THE PRESIDENT & CHINA

Q. Sir: When do you think your visit to China will take place, and are there any other countries on the agenda?

A. The date for the trip has not yet been set, but it will be before May 1972. No other countries are on the agenda at this time.

Q. Sir: Are we negotiating the specifics of the trip through the Chinese Embassy in Canada?

A. No useful purpose would be served by indicating how we are doing this.

Q. Sir: Can you tell us what your hopes are for this meeting with the Chinese. Do you think the meeting will produce a significant advance for world peace?

A. This sort of speculation serves no good purpose. It only elevates hopes where those hopes might not be justified. The meetings between the principals of the two Governments are important because after 22 years of isolation new departures have to be sought at the highest level. At this stage elaborating the directions is more important than even detailed agreements. For its part, the United States has entered neither to collude against any third country, nor to abandon old friends. We made no conditions, we accepted none. We were not asked for any deals, we made none.

- Q. Sir: Why do you think this most hostile of governments has agreed to meet with an old antagonist and mortal foe like Richard M. Nixon?
- A. Because they concluded such a meeting was in their national interest. Beyond that I would not want to speculate.
- Q. Sir: What do you think will be the reaction to your proposed visit in Moscow and Hanoi?
- A. No useful purpose is served by speculating about the speculation in other capitals about this visit. Hopefully, they will see this visit as we do -- an opportunity to take a couple of constructive steps toward a reduction of tensions and an improvement of the prospects for peace in the Pacific and throughout the world.
- Q. Sir: Any comment on the Foreign Relations Committee vote to repeal the 1955 Formosa Resolution? What would the Administration do in the event of a Chinese attack on Formosa?
- A. The United States stands behind the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. The 1955 Formosa Resolution did not create our basic commitment; its repeal would not offset the commitment.
- Q. Any truth to report that you would like to have the trip completed as early as possible -- lest some incident force a cancellation?
- A. When the joint announcement was made, both the Government in Peking and the Government in Washington were fully aware of the import of the meeting arranged. Both felt a dialogue should begin as

soon as arrangements could be made. The 10 months between July and May was thought by both to be the outside limit to plan, prepare and conclude this historic meeting between the heads of Government. For our part, I did not want a subject as important as improved relations with China confused with the election campaign. In my judgment, neither Government entered into this agreement lightly and I do not believe either Government would lightly reverse the decision or cancel the agreement taken after such serious consideration.

- Q. Sir: You have said that your China visit is not directed against any other country, and will not be taken at the expense of old friends. How can you normalize relations with Peking without damaging or destroying our relations with Nationalist China?
- A. Briefly, this is our view. Our bonds of friendship and respect for Taiwan remain the same. We will maintain our commitments to Taiwan and our opposition to expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations. We believe, however, that a move toward normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interest of peace in the Pacific, a peace that is itself in the interest of all of the nations in that region of the world. That is why we have acted as we have -- again, not against any nation's interest, but on behalf of a more peaceful Pacific.

Q. Sir: Do you think there is a danger that the Soviets could construe this meeting as directed against them, and could react against the United States?

A. That would be a serious error in judgment for the Soviet Union.

Basically, the United States is moving toward a "normalization of relations" with China for the same fundamental reason we are negotiating at Helsinki -- to play an informed, active role in building the foundation of a more durable peace. The Soviets should no more fear anti-Soviet collusion in Peking than the Chinese should assume anti-Chinese collusion in Helsinki.

Q. Sir: Do you think your visit to China will enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam?

A. An improvement in relations between Peking and Washington is desirable in and of itself. Such an improvement cannot but contribute to general peace and stability in Asia. But speculation on the subject of our discussions, let alone the outcome, is premature and counter-productive.

Q. Sir: Do you really think it realistic to ask for a moratorium on speculation about the visit?

A. What we have sought to do is to dampen public speculation on the part of the President's official family, speculation that might be wholly uninformed -- but speculation that might be construed abroad as a signal from the White House. We believe that it is important that

premature speculation not reduce flexibility or harden the positions of either side as we enter these sensitive and critical negotiations.

Q. Sir: Have you any announcement yet on the United States position on Peking's entry into the United Nations?

A. The Secretary of State announced a position on Monday. I have nothing to add to that.

Q. Sir: How do you think the friends of the United States overall will view this rather abrupt departure from 22 years of established policy?

A. If you will inspect the record closely you will see that this is not an abrupt departure from Nixon policy on China; it is not a "leap in the dark;" rather, it is the logical extension of a long-range policy the United States has pursued for 30 months -- a policy marked along the way with gradual relaxations of trade and travel restrictions toward the People's Republic of China, and statements that we were seeking improved relations.

Q. Sir: Was there any secret agreement made, were there any preconditions established, before you could visit Peking?

A. My visit has been arranged without any conditions on either side.

Q. Sir: Would you comment on reports from Taipei that indicate the Governments of the ROC feels the US has reneged on its commitments?

A. The United States Government will stand by its commitments to the

Republic of China on Taiwan. * We are not seeking improved relations
with the Peoples Republic of China at the expense of others.



BRUCE, PARIS & THE SEVEN POINTS

- Q. Sir: Does Ambassador Bruce's resignation, LeDuc Tho's departure, and Porter's arrival to replace a diplomat of Bruce's caliber indicate a down-grading by both sides of the Paris peace talks? What kind of hopes do you retain for the Paris negotiations. Have we any official response yet to the offer of the other side?
- A. First, I cannot interpret what Le Duc Tho's departure means. As for our side, Ambassador Bruce has left largely for reasons of health; he is one of our most able, dedicated foreign service professionals. I would hope that he would remain available for future assignments. Ambassador Porter, however, enjoys the same confidence and authority as Ambassador Bruce; he is a senior Ambassador in the Foreign Service with experience in Korea, Algeria as well as having been Deputy Ambassador in Vietnam. His appointment should not be taken by anyone as an American down-grading of the talks at Paris.
- As for the seven-point Viet Cong peace offer, while it seems more positive than earlier proposals, it remains unclear in several regards. We have asked for clarification. Further, we are responding at each session at Avenue Klebee. Hanoi is aware of our position and what we believe is the proper forum for discussion.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS

Q. Sir: Considering the enormous sacrifices in lives of the United States to bring representative government to Vietnam, how does this Government view recent actions taken by President Thieu which seem to inhibit effective democratic opposition to his candidacy for President?

A. As you know, this Administration has adopted a deliberately impartial stance in the upcoming presidential elections in South Vietnam. We believe it important that this election be held in a manner that will give the South Vietnamese people the chance to express their political will. We are confident that will be the case. However, as a matter of principle, I do not wish to comment in a news conference on the internal affairs of other countries.

Q. Sir: Do we intend to send observers?

A. President Thieu has invited foreign nations to send observers to the South Vietnamese elections and we are considering the advisability of designating a delegation for that purpose.

(Note: Thieu and Minh have qualified; but Thieu is pressuring province chiefs not to sign for Ky, who is having trouble getting nomination signatures. We should know more in one or two days, since nominations must be in by Wednesday)

WITHDRAWAL DATE FOR PRISONERS?

Q. Sir: Why not simply agree to a conditional deadline for withdrawal of U.S. forces in exchange for return of our prisoners. Wouldn't that be a way out of the deadlock at Paris?

A. As I have said before, there is more at stake in Southeast Asia than the fate of our prisoners -- as important as that fate is, to all of us. There is at stake the solemn pledge of the American Government to leave South Vietnam with a reasonable chance to defend itself.

For us to set a unilateral unconditional deadline would give Hanoi a guarantee that we were pulling out -- without regard to the consequences.

Let me emphasize what I stated on October 7 last year. We want a cease-fire to stop the killing. We want an early release of our men and of all prisoners; we are prepared to withdraw all our forces. We are prepared to negotiate a genuine peace in Vietnam and Indochina; but we want to negotiate it with Hanoi, not the press.

DRUGS IN VIETNAM

- Q. Sir: Congressman Steele has charged that a Vietnamese General Dzu is involved in the drug traffic in Vietnam; and an NBC reporter has alleged that both Ky and Thieu have profited. Can we confirm official involvement in the illicit drug traffic -- and what are we doing about it?
- A. Well, as you gentlemen know, organized crime would never flourish in the United States without corrupt officials. I am sure the same situation exists in Southeast Asia. However, we have seen no hard evidence whatsoever to indicate that any of the officials you have named are implicated in the drug traffic. In the absence of such hard evidence, it seems wrong to suggest to millions of people that they are. Of Congressman Steele, let me say that I admire his energy, his industry, his enterprise. As in the United States, the drug problem is a serious one in Vietnam, and there is enough work for every willing hand. We think, I might add, that with the crash programs initiated, we are making progress. President Thieu and Ambassador Bunker are in close touch on the issues. The GVN has introduced stronger customs control measures at borders and ports. A crackdown is underway among drug peddlers within Vietnam. Record hauls of heroin are being seized. Laos is moving toward passage of legislation to

outlaw all forms of drug traffic. We are working at the highest level with Thai officials.

There has also been broad media coverage here in the United States of the drug control centers established throughout Vietnam -- to screen returning GI's.

Further, the precedent in Turkey -- their decree to ban poppy cultivation -- will help alleviate the whole free world problem. Other nations in Southeast Asia are making similar strides toward eliminating the scourge.

This is a tremendous problem for the United States -- but we have pulled out all the stops -- and the progress has been truly remarkable in recent months.



PAKISTAN

Q. Sir: With the slaughter now taking place in East Pakistan, why does not the United States stop further shipments of arms to the Government there? Is their cooperation in the Kissinger visit to Peking the reason for continued US assistance to that Government?

A. Let me say this. No outside nation is more concerned than the United States with the bloodshed and loss of life and property of the people of East Pakistan. No outside Government has sought to do more to end the suffering brought by the flood of refugees in India. We have provided more than \$70 million so far and will do more.

One of the primary tasks is to avert starvation in the East -- which would create yet another wave of refugees. Thus we are assisting Pakistan in improving the distribution system by supplying grain-carrying boats. Cargo is now moving through their ports again. Grain shipments from the United States have been resumed. Restoration of normal economic activity is essential to establish a return flow of refugees -- and we have indicated to the Government of Pakistan that we are prepared to assist with that.

As we have seen in this nation in the last century, and in Vietnam, Spain, Biafra and Russia in this century -- civil conflict can be among the most tragic of wars.

But nothing can be accomplished if the United States simply washes its hands and walks away in a huff, refusing to deal with the Government of Pakistan. To help the people of Pakistan resolve some of these grave political and social problems, the United States must maintain a posture to exert an impartial, humanitarian and constructive influence on the situation. That is what we are doing.

With regard to arms, when the situation in Pakistan developed, I reviewed our military shipment policy. We instituted a number of additional Administrative controls. No new licenses for military exports are being issued.

But there have been shipments of materials, licensed before the outbreak, which Pakistan has already purchased, paid for, and possessed. We share the hopes of all men of good will that the suffering will end. And we are making every effort to remain in a position where we can help with its ending.

SALT

Q. Sir: Can you tell us when you expect final agreement at SALT, what you think it will contain; and whether there are any plans for you to go to the Summit to sign such an agreement with the Soviets?

A. With regard to a summit with the Soviets, none is currently planned. My position, however, remains the same. Whenever negotiations at a lower level reach a point where something fruitful and significant for peace can be accomplished at the summit -- I would consider such a meeting; I would go.

At Helsinki, we are moving forward at a good pace. However, as many details remain to be worked out, I will not speculate on a time table. The May 20 announcement set the framework and within it the specifics are being negotiated now. As for the final agreement, one part will place limits upon developments of ABMs; the other will involve measures that limit offensive weapons. The two parts will be negotiated in parallel and completed together.

THE McNAMARA PAPERS

Q. Sir: Will the Administration prosecute reporters and editors?

A. The Justice Department has the matter under investigation.

It would be inappropriate for me to anticipate or suggest what conclusions they should or will arrive at.

Q. Sir: Does the President feel the Government made a mistake in attempting to suppress the papers -- especially in light of the Court decision? If the President had it to do over again, would he have done it differently?

A. No, the Government was confronted with a necessary duty -- and we carried out that duty. We would do so again. What was involved here was a conflict in rights -- the right of the press to publish and the responsibility of government to protect the security interest of the United States. We went into Federal Court to have that conflict resolved. If the Department of Justice had sat on its hands while the New York Times published at its whim whatever it chose -- from hundreds of top secret documents -- we would have been negligent in our duty to uphold the law.

The Attorney General had no way of knowing precisely what the Times had in its possession, no way of knowing precisely what it intended to publish -- and in acting to protect the national security, the Attorney General acted with my concurrence, and he acted rightly in my judgment.

Q. Sir: Does the President believe the Times and the Post erred in publishing those papers?

A. That is a subjective judgment, but, yes, I believe they were wrong. By failing to either inform or consult with the Federal Government, the newspapers were not serving the national interest and they were unnecessarily jeopardizing the national security. They were exercising a right - the right to de-classify top secret documents - that Congress does not grant to newspaper editors or reporters, but to the Executive Branch of the United States.

Had there been consultation between Government and press -- the judicial clash might well have been avoided. The documents which the Times had held for months might have been reviewed to de-classify all but the truly sensitive, and the court case avoided. As you know, some newspapers took this course of action. I believe those latter newspapers were correct. If you read the opinions of the Supreme Court Justices -- even some of those who believe the Government could not impose prior restraint -- I think you may find that a majority believed that to have been the more proper course of action.

Q. Sir: Can you tell us if any damage has been done to the security interests of the United States by publication of those papers -- and precisely what damage?

A. Let me say, first, that if parts of those papers are published -- great damage could be done to the security interests of the United States. Many of the jurists who read those documents -- laymen themselves in matters of national security -- instantly recognized this. Secondly, how do you measure the loss of confidence in the United States by foreign diplomats, friendly and hostile, when they see top secret documents and communiques on the front pages of American papers? How do you measure the loss to the cause of peace -- when future diplomats exercise excessive caution in dealing with the United States. These are intangibles -- and we cannot measure accurately how great the damage that has been done to trust in the United States as a confidential partner in building peace.

As for an assessment as to how much damage was done to the security interests of the United States, I cannot gauge that. But there is an assessment now underway, and it may be sometime before we become aware of the full impact of these releases.

Q. Sir: What is your opinion as to what the papers contained?

A. First, it would be difficult to characterize a study of well over 40 volumes, and 7000 words in a few sentences. I have been briefed on them -- and I understand that what is represented here is a study prepared by an anti-war group, in a single Department of a previous administration. Those who prepared, those who purloined, those who transferred, and those who published the documents -- all of them to my knowledge -- had well-known anti-war biases. So, the American people who retain a healthy skepticism, should administer to these documents and the conclusions that are alleged being drawn a great dose of salt.

Frankly, I think the American people themselves are fully capable of judging whether this was a truly objective historical account or something written to advocate a particular point of view.

Let me say this: If the impression left with the American people is that somehow John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson are responsible for the war in Vietnam -- then that is a grossly false and distorted impression. The primary responsibility for this war of aggression is the aggressor himself -- right there in Hanoi.

Q. Sir: What do you think will be the impact of these papers upon the Democratic Party, upon the reputation of Presidents Johnson and Kennedy and upon the Presidency?

A. Well, you gentlemen are in a better position than I to make such judgements. These are not things that I would want to speculate upon -- except to say my view is that the impact will be not so dramatic as some were saying just a few weeks ago.

Q. Sir: Has there been any progress on de-classification since the publication of those papers?

A. Yes, there has. First, on the Pentagon papers themselves, I asked Secretary Laird to review them expeditiously, and I understand this exercise is well along. Secondly, as of last January I directed a general review of government de-classification procedures -- that review is continuing. When completed, it should measurably increase the amount of government information that is de-classified and made available to the American people. When that happens competent scholars will be better equipped to write the history of this war.

DEFICIT IN TRADE BALANCE

Q. Sir: How seriously do you view the unprecedented deficit in the American trade balance this year; and what is the Administration doing about it. Is there any action anticipated to curb the flow of Japanese imports?

A. The problem of America's trade imbalance is not a problem with any one country; nor will it be resolved by action directed at any one country. Its solution involves economic relations with all our trading partners.

The primary causes of the adverse trade imbalance of the last three months has been the continued inflation in our economy which raises the price of American goods in foreign markets -- and the slowdown in the domestic economy of some of our trading partners, which reduced the demand for American goods. My Council on International Economic Policy is examining this situation and the proper way to handle it. What is not called for, however, is panicky or ill-considered action to restrain imports -- which would only intensify our inflationary problems, and cause retaliation against our exports. Our principal job is to increase our exports, and that is the focus of our study and concern right now.



HUGH SCOTT ON WAR POWERS/FOREIGN AID

- Q. Sir: Minority Leader has favored restricted Presidential War Powers; voted to cut off all foreign aid if Defense refuses to turn over internal planning documents. Is there an Administration split?
- A. Scott has (a) expressed concern that these issues be clarified (b) not endorsed legislation reallocating Constitutional powers as several bills before Congress seek to do.

PRESIDENT'S POSITION

"I am unalterably opposed to any and all legislation that would have the effect of restricting the Constitutional Powers of the President as Commander in Chief Executive in Foreign Policy. The great opportunities which lie before us to negotiate a generation of peace cannot be exploited if the flexibility essential to the conduct of diplomacy is lost to the Executive."

The Congressional Powers of investigation, advice and consent are not adversary to the President's powers as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. They are necessarily complementary provisions providing the framework for each branch to participate creatively in the policy process. The conduct of the balance of powers is a difficult and demanding task. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes "The great ordinances of the Constitution

do not establish and divide fields of black and white."

It is entirely inappropriate to attempt through legislation to fix in detail, and to freeze the allocation of these constitutional powers between the President, the Congress and the Senate.

This is a step which the framers wisely and deliberately decided against. No one can gain from a confrontation between the Executive and the Senate, but the nation would gravely suffer.

Congress as a whole provides invaluable policy guidance, but as recent events make clear, it is the President alone who must provide the initiative and the execution to realize national policy goals. It is the President and no other elected official, let us not forget, who must answer to the electorate for the failure or triumph of American policies abroad.

RN POSITION ON JAVITS BILL

RN opposes present language because

- a) It attempts to narrow Constitutional Power of the President and
- b) It attempts to fix in detail, to freeze, allocation of war power between President and Congress,
a step framers of Constitution, in their wisdom, deliberately decided against.

(Framers of Constitution painted with a broad brush. They intended to leave flexibility in this area. They recognized that the wide variety of situations that could arise, and did no more than announce the general outline of the authority of President and Congress. Passage of time has confirmed the wisdom of this approach. There appears no sufficient reason for breaking with the past, and establishing rigid guidelines at this date.)

JAVITS PROPOSAL Would in effect limit Presidential response to hostile foreign action to thirty days -- without explicit Congressional approval -- and Congress could terminate hostilities before that thirty day period was completed.

Javits bill would not have sanctioned the Cuban missile actions of JFK(since it allows Executive to act only to repulse attack, to protect lives and property, to comply with national commitment approved by Congress) and would have limited recent Laos action to thirty days, unless Congress took positive action.

Constitutional Question Whether Congress really has the power to limit the duration of a Presidential response to attack

to 30 days, or less. As it impinges upon Presidential
authority to repel attacks, it is of dubious constitutionality.

VIETNAM

Q. Sir: When will U.S. combat role in Vietnam end?

- A.
- a) As U.S. forces have declined, number of men in combat has declined; casualties have fallen off dramatically.
 - b) ARVN has taken over burden of combat -- fighting more and more effectively.
 - c) As long as U.S. troops remain, they will take measures necessary to defend themselves.
 - d) Further troop level announcements in November.



NEW ROAD THROUGH DMZ - RN CONCERNED?

On RN instructions, Bruce severely condemned Communists for this activity at last week's meeting in Paris. We are concerned about the development and are following it very carefully.

Q. EMK claims RN prolonging the war so that war's end will come sooner to the election? Any comment?

That statement is not worthy of comment; and it is not worthy of Senator Kennedy.



Q. Which of two criteria -- fair chance for SVN or return of prisoners -- is more important to the United States?

A. Both are crucial.

- 1) We will not accept a peace that does not bring home our men.
- 2) We will not make a peace that mocks the sacrifices of the thousands who have died there.

PETROLEUM EXPLORATION IN VIETNAM

- 1) SVN has opened bids for exploration of large off-shore area which may contain oil.
- 2) U.S. policy same here as anywhere else in the world.
- 3) We are in South Vietnam to fight Communist aggression, not to win oil rights.
- 4) Any suggestion we are protecting some "oil deposits" is so ludicrous and preposterous as not even to merit comment.

JAPAN

How does RN feel about Japan acquiring nuclear weapons?

Japan has signed the NPT -- RN knows of no responsible body of opinion in Japan or in US that advocates possession of nuclear weapons by the Japanese.



Short notice of RN's announcement has caused serious internal political problems for Sato. Does RN believe our relations with Japan damaged?

a) RN hopes not, believes not. For twenty five years Japan and United States have grown closer; interests have grown together; both have common aim of peaceful Pacific; both are partners in that objective b) RN recognizes that lack of prior consultation here caused difficulties, but RN had no choice -- extraordinary circumstances existed; confidentiality essential to mission's success c) In coming days, RN intends to do all in our power to strengthen bonds, and ties of confidence between us

HIROHITO VISIT? RN TO TOKYO?

- a) RN would be honored to receive Emperor.
- b) No firm plans for such a visit
- c) RN looks forward himself to visiting Japan some time in the future.

* GREECE

House Foreign Affairs Committee has voted to cut off military assistance to Greece, because of lack of progress in restoring democracy. RN position?

- a) US assistance is provided Greece to enable her to live up to her NATO commitments in Eastern Mediterranean
- b) Greece plays a crucial role in the alliance, especially since the Soviet build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean
- c) No US purpose is served by jeopardizing relationships with a NATO ally over an issue only Greeks themselves can manage
- d) Government of Greece has stated intention to return to fully representative government as soon as possible. We support that objective. Not for us to determine the pace of that program.

* SOVIET FLEET: Is RN concerned over rising Soviet naval power in Med?

- a) Size and activity of Soviet fleet being watched with care.
- b) In nuclear age, neither superpower should make it a matter of policy to seek unilateral advantage at expense of another. Such efforts only stimulate arms race and could produce dangerous confrontations.
- c) US and allies have basic interests in the Mediterranean and we expect Soviets to recognize those interests.

MIDDLE EAST

* Q. Peace Prospects? Any hope left for Israeli-Arab settlement?

- A. Neither side wants the fighting to break out again -- that is a basis on which to work for peace. There are still wide gaps between the two sides, and the efforts we have made to close those gaps must continue. That is why Mr. Sisco is in the Middle East.

Q. Is the United States trying to squeeze Israel by withholding plane deliveries. Has Sisco made any new commitment?

A. Many times the President has stated his intention to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East, and his belief that a shift in the military balance could increase the chances for war. Having repeated that position, I do not intend to go into details about the specific delivery schedule.

BERLIN

* Q. Four-Power talks on Berlin. RN Appraisal?

A. In recent months, negotiations have intensified. Real progress has been made. These are confidential talks, however; inappropriate for RN to comment. We have clarified the major problems to be resolved. (Four Ambassadors will begin semi-continuous talks on August 10)

ICELAND

RN comment on New Government's intention to seek US Pullout.

- a) RN had warm exchange of telegrams with PM Johannesson
- b) New Leaders, naturally, wish to review all foreign and domestic policies
- c) Important to remember -- US personnel are manning a NATO base, at request of NATO, and that base continues to be of importance to NATO activity in the North Atlantic.

SOUTH AFRICA

Q. Why is US Ambassador hosting segregated receptions?

A. Circumstances in South Africa, or most every other country, are not of our making; and our ambassador there, as our ambassadors in other nations of the world, have to work within the framework established by the nations to which they are accredited. Ambassador Hurd is doing an excellent job. He also has the latitude to operate as he deems most effective as the envoy of the President of United States. He enjoys my full confidence; RN not going to second guess him from Washington, D.C.

(FYI Javits, Kennedy, Diggs have rapped Hurd who held a reception with white opposition and white Government types. Had blacks come, Government officials would not have attended, not clashed with opposing viewpoints)

LOCKHEED

Q. Do Laird/Packard support Administration position on Lockheed?

A. They do.

U THANT'S SUCCESSOR

Q. Who will US support?

A. a) Premature for RN to comment on potential candidates
b) Important post
c) Will work for election of a qualified man

CUBA

Q. In view of China; initiatives, why not "normalize" with Cuba?

- A.
- a) We are prepared to modify our relations with Cuba when they modify their posture toward United States.
 - b) However, no indication of this at present. Cuba is
 - 1) antagonistic to United States
 - 2) internal affairs of hemispheric states
 - 3) militarily tied to the Soviet Union
- Thus, no basis exists for a changed relation

BRAZIL

Q. What is U.S. doing about harassment of U.S. fishing boats by Brazil?

- A.
- a) Brazil claims 200-mile territorial jurisdiction. United States recognizes three for territory, nine more for fishing.
 - b) United States now participating in Geneva preparatory meeting for 1973 Law of the Sea Conference where we hope issue can be resolved.
 - c) Meantime, hope to work with Brazil for a practical solution that will not jeopardize our position on the jurisdiction question.

NATIONALIZATION IN CHILE

- a) U.S. recognizes sovereign right to expropriate
- b) However, fundamental principle of international law requires prompt, adequate, effective compensation
- c) Through several channels, we have made our position known to Chilean government
- d) Expect Chile to meet international obligation in providing compensation.

(Chile's July 16th Constitutional Amendment provides for nationalization of mineral resources -- Negotiation with Anaconda and Kennecott have not yet begun)

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

- Q. Conference Committee has refused to appropriate this year's U.S. contribution to ILO. What is Administration going to do?
- A.
- 1) Some trends in ILO we don't like
 - 2) Work within ILO to change it should be our policy
 - 3) Our contribution to ILO is a valid obligation under international law -- we owe the money; should pay it
 - 4) Congress should appropriate the money in RN's view.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

- Q. RN shifting nukes from Okinawa to Taiwan?
- A. RN's practice is not to discuss location of nuclear deterrent weapons at press conferences.



MANSFIELD AMENDMENT/DRAFT

- Q. What does RN think of Mansfield Compromise? How long can nation go without the draft?
- A.
- a) Language now consistent with basic direction of this Administration
 - b) If finally passed as expression of Congressional will, will have appropriate weight in policy considerations
 - c) Hope Congress will take positive action before Friday's recess

Need for a draft?

- a) Our goal is an all-voluntary force; however
- b) Hasty and premature effort to end reliance on draft would have serious consequences for national security and impeded, not advance, move to an all-volunteer force.

TEXTILES

Q. Where do we stand?

- A. 1) Dave Kennedy negotiating with principal suppliers
2) Not helpful to success of negotiations to comment on detail.

AMCHITKA NUCLEAR TEST



Question:

Are you going to cancel the Nuclear Test on Amchitka Island?

Answer:

These tests are being given careful study and review within the Administration, weighing all aspects of environmental safety and national security. An announcement will be made when this review is completed.