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A revealing report on the
Political background of the
Democratic Candidate!

McGovern

the Candidate

**what do you really
know about him?**

Wallace:

"I think he's a tool of the Communist Party. If he had run on his record, a record not everybody knows, he wouldn't have got one delegate."

—Governor George Wallace

Kennedy:

"George is the most decent man in the Senate. As a matter of fact, he's the only one."

—Robert F. Kennedy

by NATHANIEL WEYL

author of the best seller

"Red Star over Cuba"

WHY WRITE ABOUT MCGOVERN?

McGovern

The Candidate

by

NATHANIEL WEYL

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WHY WRITE ABOUT McGOVERN ?

This book is not a biography. It is not based on inside sources, since the public record is ample and eloquent. It is written, not from admiration, but from dread.

My emphasis is on McGovern's foreign policy, particularly insofar as it relates to Communism, rather than on his domestic policy. There are several reasons for this. Many of the McGovern domestic planks are so far out, so much tinged with Cloud-Cuckoo-Land visionary radicalism, that the Senator has had to tone them down, refurbish them, explain them away and even withdraw them right up to his nomination by the Miami Beach Convention of the Democratic Party.

But there is a more fundamental reason for the limitation. Domestic policies determine progress, but foreign policies determine survival. A nation can survive without progressing, but it cannot progress without surviving.

McGovern's domestic program is probably the most radical set of proposals ever submitted by the Presidential candidate of a major American political party.

The South Dakota politician originally advocated a ferocious 100 per cent inheritance tax on all estates in excess of \$500,000. This would have wiped out the great American fortunes within a generation and thus destroyed a major source of capital investment. One predictable consequence would have been to destroy the value of the securities portfolios of the 24 million Americans who own stock. Under strong pressure from his less extreme advisers, McGovern toned down the plan to provide for an estate tax of "merely" 77 per cent. This would have generated the same sequence of economic disasters, but it would have worked a bit more slowly.

McGovern's most widely discussed plan was to give every American a \$1,000-a-year bonus. It took no mathematician to realize that this would cost the U.S. Treasury \$209 billions annually. The funds were supposedly to be obtained by a \$30 billion cut in American defense expenditure, by the savage estate tax already mentioned, by virtually confiscatory taxes on incomes over \$50,000 and by a vastly increased tax burden on Americans earning \$20,000 a year and over.

Toward the end of the California primary campaign, Stewart Alsop reported, "Max Palevsky, who owes his vast fortunes to mastery of computer technology, put the McGovern figures into the computers and made his discovery. The discovery was that there was a shortfall of a cool \$42 billion between outgo for the welfare program and income

from spending cuts and taxes. Palevsky made all the most favorable assumptions, and fed the figures into his computers front, rear and sideways. The result was always the same -- a \$40 billion-plus shortfall."¹

McGovern hastily retreated from his most extreme and punitive proposals in order to button down the nomination and to prevent fatal schism in the Democratic Party. He scrapped the \$1,000-a-year giveaway plan. He exempted such family-owned businesses as independent newspapers from his confiscatory inheritance tax program for the obvious reason that he didn't want a large and influential section of the American press crusading for his defeat at the polls.

These retreats and evasions were accompanied by usual McGovern litany about his unwillingness to make compromises with his principles and his profound belief in the importance of integrity. He would claim that his conduct was controlled, not by his ambition, but by his conscience. At the same time, he would trim his amnesty program to exempt deserters. His most radical proposals would be modified or scrapped when expedient.

Estimates of the cost of McGovern's vast social programs vary within wide limits since some of them are vague and ill-defined. The Democratic standard bearer promises a "federally funded National Health Care" program, but gives no details as to cost. There is also a McGovern emergency health care plan. Paramedical education at government expense is advocated. A "corps of personnel" is to be created "to serve as communicators between medical centers and the public," whatever that may mean. In his speech accepting the Democratic nomination for the Presidency on July 14th, McGovern pledged "a system of national health insurance so that a worker can afford decent health care for himself and his family."²

"The highest single domestic priority of the next Administration will be to ensure that every American able to work has a job to do," McGovern declaimed in the same speech.

A laudable objective. How was it to be achieved? By "a reinvigorated private economy," McGovern replied.

Now most people with some knowledge of either economics or business know that the private economy is "reinvigorated" by raising profits, which in turn stimulates investment, output and employment. This, however, is not the way things work in the Alice-in-Wonderland economics of the South Dakota rural statesman. In fact, quite the contrary. A

program "to put America back to work demands that work be properly rewarding," McGovern told the drowsy Democratic Convention. "That means the end of a system of economic controls in which labor is depressed, but prices and corporate profits are sky high."

This characterization of the price and wage control program of the Nixon Administration was, of course, neither factual nor honest. It was a demagogic attempt to get votes and money from the trade unions. What is much more appalling is the implication that McGovern believes that one can stimulate private enterprise to expand employment by slashing corporate profits. It can be argued that a Senator who will propose an economic program to the nation which contains a \$42 billion arithmetic error is capable of any absurdity. However, McGovern lived through the Great Depression and his family suffered from its ravages. Even the dullest veterans of that experience learned that when profits fall, unemployment rises.

Perhaps the real explanation is that McGovern's appeal to private enterprise is insincere, a smoke-screen to reassure the gullible as to his moderate stance and to conceal his real purposes from the American people. Thus, in the same acceptance address, he promised: "...whatever employment the private sector does not provide, the Federal Government will either stimulate or provide itself." In calling on private enterprise to employ the idle millions, while proposing pressures on profits that would make this impossible, was McGovern merely pursuing his vendetta against the free enterprise system?

The exact costs of the McGovern proposals are not of basic importance since the content of these programs is shifted in accordance with political expediency. What is important is their direction and purpose. Thus, Newsweek estimated that the \$1,000-dollar-a-year giveaway plan would involve a yearly transfer of \$43 billions from the well-to-do and the middle class to the poor. The grandiose social welfare programs would have the same sort of impact.

A natural question is how can a responsible political leader propose a plan which involves an arithmetical error of 42 billion dollars. How can he advocate measures, the predictable consequence of which would be to wreck the free enterprise economy of the United States, particularly in the key area of investment? The answer may well be that the underlying purpose is to substitute a largely socialist system and that any such transition must involve wrecking established economic institutions. Should McGovern be elected, National Campaign Director Frank Mankiewicz stated, "the government will do all the investing."³

Experienced politicians have urged McGovern again and again to tone down his revolutionary views

and assume a more moderate position on the issues. Of course, McGovern can assume moderate positions. So can a chameleon assume protective coloration.

Yet, in a more fundamental sense, he is incapable of basic change. His record of extreme radicalism, of opposition to American defense and American internal security, of demanding withdrawal in the face of Soviet aggression, of downgrading Free World nations resisting Communist aggression and of devising sophisticated justifications for Soviet foreign policy has been sufficiently consistent over the years to warrant the conclusion that they are a measure of the man.

The foreign policy record which emerges from these pages has been consistently radical, if not revolutionary, over the past quarter of a century. In 1948, McGovern was an enthusiastic supporter of former Vice President Henry Wallace and his Communist-dominated Progressive Party. He wrote ingenious justifications for Stalin's seizure of eastern Europe. He opposed American aid to Greece and Turkey. He opposed the Marshall Plan. These were not merely ideological eccentricities of youth. McGovern today believes that Henry Wallace was "essentially right."

As President Kennedy's Food for Peace Administrator, McGovern tried to give American surplus foods to Castro Cuba and to Communist China. He admired Fidel Castro and the Brazilian Maoist-Communist agitator, Juliao, claiming both had performed a positive service. He thought U.S. policy in Latin America should be to help "overthrow an unjust social order through a peaceful democratic revolution."

As a Senator, McGovern again defended Stalin's subjugation of eastern Europe as a defensive measure to protect the Soviets from "another invasion from the West..."

The key to American security was not "to waste billions of dollars on nonessential military gadgets," but "to improve relations with the Kremlin in every area we can." He thought the United States should never have broken relations with Cuba and that it should now assist the Marxist government of Chile. He didn't believe the United States Government had any obligation to protect American direct investments abroad. America had always intervened in Latin American affairs, McGovern thought, but "on the side of dictators and American corporations."

McGovern favored unconditional American abandonment of Nationalist China and complete withdrawal of U.S. aid to South Vietnam. He openly sympathized with the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, at a time when both were killing American soldiers, because they were "striving for national independence." He called President Thieu of South Vietnam a "tin horn dictator," but hailed Ho Chi Minh, the genocidal Communist leader of North Vietnam as comparable to George Washington.

As a leading layman in the World Council of Churches, McGovern supported "revolutionary action" against countries practicing racial discrimination. In plain English, this meant mobilizing the Christian churches affiliated with the World Council behind a revolutionary program to subvert and overthrow the pro-Western governments of Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa. As chairman of the WCC's London consultation on racism, McGovern endorsed such extremist measures as the "formation of 'underground' churches and Christian cells." Cadres were to be trained to infiltrate the police and armed forces of the White African nations.

This resolution thus aligned the largest Christian church organization on earth behind Soviet-controlled and Chinese-infiltrated Negro terrorist organizations that were spreading havoc and murder of Blacks as well as Whites throughout southern Africa. In effect, it advised Christian member churches to help do the work of the Kremlin in the latter's efforts to subjugate South Africa and turn the richest and industrially most advanced nation of the Southern Hemisphere into a Soviet satellite state.

McGovern supported the demands of Negro extremists that every Black in America be paid "reparations" because his ancestors had been brought over here in slave ships. He sought for justifications for urban race riots, for "night bombings" and "assassinations," in which "blood flowed in the streets." He predicted "racial strife which will tear apart the fabric of our society," led by "infuriated minority leaders and inflamed mobs and sulking killers" unless pro-Negro legislation was enacted.

McGovern justified revolutionary violence in the cities and on campuses on the theory that we have no moral right to disapprove these acts after having "unleashed unspeakable violence and horror on the people of Vietnam." American bombers had killed hundreds of thousands of noncombattant civilians in World War II, but no responsible political leader had ever used that fact to justify murder and urban riot. Charles Manson and his "family" would use Vietnam as a pretended justification for their wanton and gruesome murders of Sharon Tate, her guests and her unborn child. It was perhaps no accident that a representative of the Manson "family" would endorse McGovern's quest for the Presidency.

When responsible law enforcement officers attempted to suppress campus riots, McGovern characterized their action as a "rampage of official violence" and added the bizarre charge that many American leaders "do not believe in the peaceful democratic process..."

University faculty members who helped the Government strengthen national defense or designed better weapons for American fighting forces were attacked by McGovern for "selling their brains and souls to a war machine." McGovern must have been one of the few Americans who did not know that a

man does not sell out when he serves his country!

McGovern went even further. He said that such people were not entitled to "academic freedom" and that "we must end the hypocrisy of their making such a demand." If this meant anything, it was attempted justification for the violent revolutionary minority to disrupt the classes, silence the lectures and perhaps even dynamite the laboratories of professors who had a more exacting conception of patriotism than the South Dakota politician.

Except for his verbal support of Israel, McGovern's foreign policy involves a withdrawal of American armed forces from every country and every frontier in which they confront expanding Communist power. He has advocated removing 170,000 of the 300,000 American troops now in Europe. McGovern has committed himself to eliminate 311 of the 511 planes in our long-range bomber force, halt the construction of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, stop development of the B-1 bomber, and throw out further land and sea installation of MIRVs. This despite the fact that the MIRV is the one area in offensive nuclear weapons in which the United States was left with a massive advantage over the Soviet Union in the Moscow agreement. McGovern is committed to halt development of new weapons programs fundamental to American qualitative parity in the air such as the Navy F-14 and Air Force F-15 fighters.

He proposes to slow down modernization of the Navy, to scrap ten of our sixteen giant carriers, to eliminate all new ship construction except for three new nuclear submarines annually. Perhaps most ominous of all is the McGovern program to cut military research and development expenditures below five billion dollars annually. This would put American new weapons research and development at less than half the current Soviet level. As a result, American military inferiority would soon become decisive and irreversible.

This is a program for surrender of all basic American foreign policy objectives, for American abandonment of her Free World allies, and for American acceptance of Soviet world military hegemony. It is coupled with sophisticated arguments in favor of American retreat from this nation's traditional role as a champion of freedom.

This blueprint for disaster is particularly ominous in the light of President Nixon's new diplomacy for a permanent detente with the Soviet and Chinese world power systems. Through negotiated bilateral arms reduction with the Russians, President Nixon hopes to end the nuclear arms race and banish the shadow of atomic terror that hangs over mankind.

By contrast, McGovern favors unilateral American abandonment of her commitments and allies and unilateral arms reduction on a vast and unprecedented scale. This headlong retreat from responsibility would encourage the Russians to make no concessions whatsoever. World disarmament cannot be

achieved if the Free World is led by a man who is prepared to sacrifice American military strength without demanding any corresponding sacrifice from America's Soviet adversary. If the hope of world disarmament is to be realized, it is essential that the United States bargain from strength. America can only compel Soviet arms reduction if it is clear to the Kremlin that we are prepared to make every possible sacrifice to avoid falling into a position of military inferiority.

McGovern's defeatist policy recommendations have been coupled with inordinate admiration for such Communist leaders as Ho Chi Minh. At the same time, he has been a savage critic of Americans who sought to defend the internal security of this country against Communist subversion. He has called such people "fascist-tinged minds" who indulge in "smear charges" and "witch-hunting."

Shortly before J. Edgar Hoover died, McGovern attacked that great American patriot as "a menace to personal citizens" and "a chief obstacle to proper law enforcement." In the interview which he gave *Life* magazine on July 7, 1972, shortly after Hoover's death, McGovern said that he couldn't join in the eulogies over the FBI Director because to do so would be "hypocritical." He added: "I could feel nothing but relief that he was no longer a public servant. I thought he had become a menace to justice."

When he ran for the Senate unsuccessfully against the late Karl Mundt, McGovern's attitude toward the Senator who had both fathered UNESCO and co-authored the Mundt-Nixon Bill for registration of Communist and other subversive organizations was: "I hated his guts... I hated him so much I lost my sense of balance."

The men McGovern chooses as his closest advisors are of very different stature and character from the late Senator Mundt and FBI Director Hoover. Consider, for example, Frank Fabian Mankiewicz, the National Campaign Director during McGovern's 1972 quest for the Presidency. As Latin American Director of the Peace Corps, Mankiewicz wrote: "...our mission is essentially revolutionary." To build schools for impoverished, illiterate, uneducated Indian children might, he thought, "simply be contributing to the preservation of a system that cannot last and must not last." In other words, don't educate; make revolutions instead.

In implementing his efforts to transform the Peace Corps into an agency to engineer revolutions against the governments of the supposedly friendly Latin American nations which had invited it to their country, Mankiewicz went out of his way to recruit draft dodgers, agitators who were constitutionally unable to do anything constructive, and New Left fanatics.

One of Mankiewicz's first steps in this direction was to urge Tom Hayden, founder of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), to head a Peace

Corps project in Peru. The SDS was a communist-anarchist organization which would be prominent in urban and campus riots. Its leader, Hayden, would confer with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leaders in Czechoslovakia and return to the United States to write that "a conscious guerrilla" can "carry the torch" to "white neighborhoods" and "shoot to kill."

As Hayden later reported the interview, Mankiewicz offered him a free hand in Peru. Mankiewicz and his crony, Wofford, said they were convinced "there won't be a revolution in that part of the world for at least a hundred years," Hayden recalled. "But they say they want me to go ahead and try to make one."

Another man Mankiewicz enthusiastically recruited into the Peace Corps was called Paul Cowan. Cowan's idealistic motive for joining the Corps was: "I had to get out of New York anyway. Old Man Draft had trapped me." His patriotism was revealed by his statement: "I fight myself, my class, and my country every fucking day."

Mankiewicz is not merely someone who supports McGovern. He is the Senator's top political advisor and the key man in his 1972 presidential campaign.

Another staff advisor in that campaign is Robert Legvold, a 32-year-old Tufts political science teacher who displays an heroic poster of Lenin on his office wall.

Among the extremists who have climbed on the McGovern bandwagon are Yippie leaders Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin.

In his books, Rubin has urged children to leave their homes and burn down their schools. He has boasted of mixing "sex, drugs, revolt, and treason together." He calls for a new generation of "obnoxious people" who "burn their draft cards," who hold young people "with marijuana and LSD... people who proudly wave the Vietcong flag."

Why do professional revolutionaries and nihilists like Rubin back McGovern? Why should a man who advocates "treason" want McGovern in the White House? And why hasn't McGovern repudiated the support of people who wish to destroy every aspect of American life worth preserving? These seem to me to be good questions.

Nathaniel Weyl

Delray Beach, Florida

July 1972

(1) Stewart Alsop, "McGovern as Word-Eater," *Newsweek*, June 19, 1972, 104.

(2) Ralph de Toledano, "Campaign Oratory Sounds Costly," *Sun Sentinel*, June 15, 1972.

(3) As reported by syndicated columnist Ralph de Toledano on June 1, 1972.

I

McGOVERN AND THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY: "THE CRACKPOTS ARE HAVING CONNIPTION FITS"

When former Vice President of the United States Henry Agard Wallace broke with the Truman Administration in 1946 and launched his communist-controlled Progressive Party, one of his most ardent followers was a demobilized World War II bomber pilot named George Stanley McGovern.

There are a few interesting enigmas and contradictions about the military service of this pilot.

"When Pearl Harbor came," McGovern reminisced in an interview *Life* magazine published on July 7, 1972, "I volunteered to be a bomber pilot, though I knew I was terrified of the air."

This heroic version is unfortunately in diametric contradiction to what Robert Sam Anson writes in his "authorized biography" of McGovern. According to the Anson version, McGovern not only did not volunteer, he hoped to escape the draft until he could complete college – that is for two and a half years after Pearl Harbor.

However, this was not to be. In February 1943, McGovern received his induction notice and was "crushed."¹ Facing the inevitable fact that, like other young, single men of his generation, he would have to fight for his country, McGovern chose the Air Force.

If Anson is correct, McGovern never enlisted. Nor did he rush forward eagerly to serve his country on Pearl Harbor Day. The Japanese strike against Oahu occurred on December 7, 1941. McGovern avoided the draft until fourteen months later.

Is Anson mistaken? I think not. He wrote his biography at Senator McGovern's request. McGovern "opened himself up to hours of detailed interviews, covering every aspect of his life." He "turned over his files, records, and memoranda, as well as official and personal correspondence – virtually every piece of paper written by him or about him since he entered public life eighteen years ago." A *Time* correspondent, Anson is an experienced journalist. He knows the difference between enlisting and being drafted. He also knows that the Pearl Harbor disaster did not occur in February 1943.

The major discrepancies between these two versions strongly suggest the possibility that McGovern may have embroidered his military record to further his presidential ambitions.

The year before the Wallace venture was launched, young McGovern had returned from the European Theatre of Operations to study history, philosophy and theology in his home town institution of higher education, Dakota Wesleyan, a small, Methodist, liberal arts college with an undistinguished academic reputation. Together with his war bride, McGovern managed to eke out a precarious livelihood on the GI Bill of Rights.

Oratory and debate had traditionally played a big role in South Dakota and McGovern made his first splash in prairie politics with a prize-winning contribution to the state's Peace Oratory Contest. This literary effort, entitled "From Cave to Cave," foreshadowed some of the ideological views that McGovern would expound over the next quarter of a century.

Having learned of an alleged American atrocity in which Chinese villagers were wiped out, McGovern proclaimed that these people had to die "because American values insisted that even in this minor instance American military pride was of more value than the human life of a foreign village." Thus, the youthful orator generalized from one obscure episode to condemn the moral standards of his country. The assertion that America was a ruthless, arrogant, militaristic nation, imbued with disregard for foreign lives, came at a time when the United States was spending hundreds of millions of dollars to feed the victims of the War and to assist in the economic reconstruction of a war-torn world.

McGovern proceeded with an allusion to an American owned steel mill in India that allegedly paid its workers starvation wages and raked in exorbitant profits. The reason for this, McGovern told his listeners, was that "American values insist that maximum financial return is of greater concern than human welfare." This was an extraordinary conclu-

sion. Again, it was an indictment of an entire nation which happened to be McGovern's own, on the basis of one incident which might or might not have been true.

The policy of American corporations abroad was to pay substantially higher wages than their competitors. In fact, much of the resentment of U.S. economic penetration came from native businessmen who could not or would not meet the wage scales offered by American firms and were consequently losing their skilled workers. All this was common knowledge at the time. Those who attacked American industries for paying coolie wages in backward countries were, for the most part, Communists, their dupes, and intellectuals who resented the United States and welcomed any club with which to bludgeon her.

The McGovern attack on American values continued with the more pertinent observation that Americans "place such a high value on our daintily pampered appetites and pleasures that we sometimes lose sight of people dying of starvation the world over."

A man less hostile to some of the dominant institutions and ethical values of his country might have wished to add that no nation in history had ever given more to feed the victims of poverty and famine in foreign countries.

Fortunately, there is a happy ending to this vignette of an impoverished and resentful student who fulminated, like a Hebrew prophet, against the pampered appetites and luxurious tastes of his more fortunate countrymen. Many years later, after his election to the U.S. Senate, McGovern bought a house in Washington for \$110,000. When conservative columnist Kevin Phillips wondered how he could afford it, McGovern flew into a rage. "What the hell kind of a crack is that?" he asked angrily. "Aren't South Dakotans supposed to enjoy nice things like everybody else?"²

The middle-aged and prosperous politician did not look upon himself as "pampered" or compare his own lot to that of the starving millions of Asia. He had evidently come to the conclusion that he was just as entitled to live high on the hog as any other American.

After rounding off his indictment against America with the assertion that she placed a higher value on "military expediency" than on "international cooperation," the young McGovern declared that the U.S. could purge herself of sin by returning to "the applied idealism of Christianity." He added: "As long as men continue to scoff at idealism, at such ideas as international cooperation through the United World Government, and continue to advance the notion of expediency and material gain, just so long will we continue to reap the tragic harvest of so-called practical men."³

This muddled and pretentious pronouncement was probably no better and no worse than the out-

put of dozens of other undergraduates in secondary institutions of higher learning who believed they possessed a recipe for the moral regeneration of the world. If it was different from the others, the most interesting points of difference were the barely suppressed anger of the author at American values and his calm conviction that extremely complex problems would yield to simplified moralistic solutions.

After graduating, McGovern tried the ministry briefly. Despite his tendency to pontificate, it didn't suit him. Taking up graduate work at Northwestern, he lived in squalor on the GI Bill of Rights. His family, by now grown to four, subsisted on a meagre diet and lived in abject poverty.

Although he was the son of a Fundamentalist preacher, McGovern readily absorbed the radical atmosphere of Northwestern. This Illinois university was one of only twenty or so institutions of higher learning in the United States in the late 1940's which boasted a secret Communist Party cell.⁴ Its graduate students in history enthused over the revolutionary strikes that had convulsed American industry in the early decades of the century. McGovern's Ph.D. thesis would be an account of the strikes in the Colorado coal fields in 1913 and 1914 and of the Ludlow massacre, one of the most brutal and unjustifiable instances of the prostitution of law enforcement agencies to serve as agents of rapacious companies. His thesis was naturally highly sympathetic to the strikers and to the men, women and children who fell victims to the massacre.

Winston Churchill's speech in Fulton, Missouri, in which he declared that an iron curtain divided the continent of Europe, profoundly shocked the liberal-to-radical faculty and graduate students at Northwestern.⁵ The Truman policy of giving military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent these free countries from being overrun by Communist armies outraged them. During World War II, they had believed the official propaganda that Russia was a friend, as well as an ally, and that the Stalinist totalitarian system was merely a different type of democracy. Many were unwilling to discard these illusions.

In 1947, over sixty Northwestern faculty members wrote Henry Wallace, urging that he run for President the following year on a third-party ticket. Practically all of McGovern's fellow graduate students in history supported the candidacy of the former Vice President.

The pro-Wallace faculty members and students would cry persecution, perhaps with reason, in the months to come. Yet the pressure seemingly was not all one-sided. Wallace backers among the faculty were so zealous that students hostile to the Progressive Party candidate wore Wallace for President buttons in their classes to avoid being victimized and given poor grades by the leftwingers.

MURKY ORIGINS OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY

Henry Agard Wallace, the leader of the cause to which George McGovern would dedicate himself heart and soul, had served Roosevelt for eight years as Secretary of Agriculture, for another four as Vice President of the United States and briefly as Secretary of Commerce.

He was certainly the most creative, in all probability the most intelligent, and undoubtedly the most exasperating and unreliable Cabinet member whom Harry S. Truman inherited. Wallace's work on hybrid corn would save millions of human beings from starvation. It earned him the respect, amounting almost to veneration, of American agricultural experts.⁶ Anti-social, withdrawn, a mystic, a radical by temperament, the prey of pseudo-religious quacks and politicians who peddled utopian nostrums, immensely practical in what he knew and sometimes childlike in what he did not, Wallace was also a man of exceptional integrity, personal courage, and indomitable will. He enjoyed a great deal of prestige and was the acknowledged leader of the radical and pro-Soviet forces in the Truman Administration.

Although a member of the Cabinet, Wallace went around the country attacking Truman's foreign policy and proclaiming that Russia wanted peace but was afraid of American intentions.⁷

The President finally fired Wallace even though he "hated to do it." In a letter to "Dear Mama and Mary," he wrote:

"So - this morning I called Henry and told him he'd better get out, and he was so nice about it I almost backed out. Well, now he's out, and the crackpots are having conniption fits."⁸

This was the apparent genesis of what many gullible people, George McGovern among them, imagined would become a great third party. Yet, three days before Truman fired him, "the Communists had adopted Mr. Wallace completely for their own..."⁹

The Communist Party's National Board decided to launch the Progressive Party at a 1946 meeting in the New York City apartment of millionaire activist in the Red underground Frederick Vanderbilt Field. The fellow traveller organizations were given their marching orders. They got the new party off the ground and quietly seized control over its personnel, organization, platform and policies.¹⁰

From the outset, Wallace's movement was dominated by Communists. This control soon became a more or less open secret. Most intelligent Americans saw the Progressive Party as a Trojan Horse of international Communism. Former FDR Cabinet members Ickes and Morgenthau shunned Wallace's adventure. Perennial Socialist Party candidate for the Presidency Norman Thomas called Wallace "heir to the policy of appeasement disastrously fol-

lowed by Chamberlain... and by Roosevelt and Truman at Cairo, Teheran and Yalta."¹¹

Time called Wallace an "Iowa horticulturalist" who "emerged last week as the centerpiece of U.S. Communism's most authentic-looking facade."¹²

Newsweek was even more caustic:

"The Communist Party boasted that it had decided that Wallace would run for the Presidency even before Wallace did, and that Sen. Glen Taylor, the self-styled 'Singing Cowboy' from Idaho, would be his running mate."

President Truman thought the new party had "a sinister aspect" in that "it provided a front for the Communists to infiltrate the political life of the nation and spread confusion."¹³

George McGovern was not one of those who loitered on the fringes of this dubious movement. He plunged heart and soul into the cause. According to his official biographer, he worked long hours at such humble tasks as turning the crank of a hand mimeograph machine, which spewed out leaflets extolling the Progressive Party. He also churned out screeds, urging that such measures as the Mundt-Nixon Bill be defeated. This provided for the registration of Communist and fellow traveller organizations, an obviously fascistic plan in the minds of most Progressive Party stalwarts.

DEFENDING STALIN'S FOREIGN POLICIES

On April 14, 1948, the Daily Republic, newspaper of McGovern's home town of Mitchell, South Dakota, published a long letter from its native son which is such an extraordinary mixture of denigration of the United States, defense of Stalinist Russian policies and misinterpretation of history that it is worth quoting almost in full. At the time McGovern wrote this remarkable letter, Stalin's police state had an estimated 12 to 17 million of its subjects in slave labor camps and had executed, murdered, starved or worked to death an additional 12 million or so.¹⁴

By 1948, the Soviet Government had long since abandoned its pretense of friendship for the Western democracies. In violation of its wartime agreements, it had imposed Communist dictatorships on Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia, imprisoning, deporting or liquidating those who stood in its way or were of suspect class origin. It had launched a ferocious civil war against the Greek people and threatened the national independence of Turkey.

These facts were widely publicized and matters of common knowledge among educated men and women. As a graduate student of history and government from Northwestern, in a first-class university, George McGovern could not have been classified among the ignorant. Nor does his youth entirely explain either the letter about to be quoted or some of his other writings and activities during this period. He was not a boy, but a man. He was 25 years old. At his age

Newton had discovered the differential and integral calculus, William Pitt was Prime Minister of England, and Napoleon was about to conquer Italy.

"Throughout my years as a student at Mitchell High School and Dakota Wesleyan," McGovern wrote, "I appreciated the frank, liberal view of the Daily Republic. I still subscribe to the paper as an antidote to the poison being pumped into the Chicago area by the Chicago Tribune and other papers of its kind. It is thus with considerable surprise that I have noted the tendency of my home town newspaper to climb on the anti-Russian, smear Wallace bandwagon. It seems to me that the mass movement to discredit Russia and the Wallace campaign is predicated upon at least three illusions...

"Millions of intelligent Americans who have made no effort to understand Communist Russia are now clamoring for dollars, battleships and bombs as a means of 'containing communism.' Have we forgotten that the best way to challenge a dynamic idea is to meet it with a better idea -- one that we believe in enough to apply in all areas of life? American democracy, if it is really practiced at home and abroad, need have no fear in the ideological struggle with communism.

"In spite of this truth, we are pumping billions of political dollars into Europe. It is unfortunate that ERP is based primarily upon fear rather than sincere humanitarianism. U.S. military aid is flowing to Greece in an effort to prop up a decadent reactionary monarchy -- a futile policy which we inherited from the British at a time when they had already realized its stupidity."

ERP was the European Recovery Program, more popularly known as the Marshall Plan. Devised by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and carried out under the leadership of General of the Armies George C. Marshall, it was designed to use American dollars and goods to bring war-devastated Europe from the shambles of war to prosperity based on cooperative effort. It is generally acknowledged that the Marshall Plan was the most outstandingly successful foreign aid program undertaken by the United States in the Truman era.

Yet McGovern condemned it. To be sure, isolationists opposed the Marshall Plan because it involved spending billions of dollars abroad, but McGovern was emphatically no isolationist. Virtually the only other powerful and influential group which fought the Marshall Plan was the Communist Party and its controlled organizations and individuals. The reason for Red opposition was clear and simple. The Marshall Plan was designed to bring war-torn Western Europe back on its feet and make it strong enough so the Soviet Union could not conquer the area through internal subversion coupled with pressure or invasion from the Red Army.

McGovern has always characterized himself as an idealist. His followers have echoed that tribute. Hence it is odd that he should have come out against

the one program of practical idealism in America's postwar economic policies that was a universally acknowledged success. Back in those days, some of McGovern's critics asked whether his idealism ended where the national interest of Soviet Russia began.

By contrast with McGovern's opposition to those policies which were detrimental to Soviet aggressive expansion, Congressman John F. Kennedy, though a severe critic of many of Truman's policies, enthusiastically endorsed the Marshall Plan and vigorously backed American aid to Greece and Turkey.

Most of McGovern's other assertions were false or misleading. While the Communists of that period habitually characterized the Greek monarchy as "decadent" and "reactionary," it was neither. Greece was a democracy. Its rulers were an enlightened couple, dedicated to the prosperity and freedom of their people.

When McGovern urged that the United States "challenge" the "dynamic idea" of communism with "a better idea," it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he must have known better. The armed forces of communism were not conducting a debate in Greece. Having been generously supplied with Soviet arms by their three northern communist neighbor-states, they had "gained control of large areas, and carried off thousands of families (including children) behind the 'iron curtain,'" as the Encyclopedia Britannica put it.¹⁵ Most of these thousands of children would be indoctrinated in Bulgaria, Rumania and the Soviet Union to serve as the nucleus of a future Greek Communist movement. This barbarous practice of kidnapping young children apparently did not stir McGovern to righteous indignation.

McGovern was pleading for an American abandonment of Greece even though this meant the inevitable overrunning of that valiant nation by Communist forces. The two Communist attempts to take over the country would cause the slaughter of a quarter of a million Greek men, women and children, according to international correspondent and columnist Henry J. Taylor who was an eyewitness to the struggle. Taylor wrote in his syndicated column on June 14, 1972, that more Greeks had been killed in the struggle with Communist insurgents than had perished during four years of Nazi occupation. When I was in Greece, friends detailed tortures and atrocities perpetrated on women by the Communists which are too revolting to repeat. There was something almost obscene about an American intellectual using his powers of persuasion to help bring about the subjugation, with attendant genocide on a vast scale, of a country which was the cradle of Western Civilization.

Fortunately, nobody of any importance listened to McGovern in those days. Supplied with modern American arms and military leadership, the Greek people repelled the Red insurgents. The Commun-

ists liquidated their Greek adventure when Marshall Tito broke with Stalin and closed the Yugoslav border to the Greek Communist forces.

DEFENDING FREEDOM WITH BUTTER

Over the decades that would follow publication of this revealing letter, McGovern would elaborate one ingenious reason after another for American inaction when free and independent nations were threatened with conquest or extinction by forces armed by Soviet or Chinese Communism. As in his 1948 letter to the Daily Republic, he would discover that the leaders of these jeopardized countries were corrupt, decadent, reactionary, "tinhorn dictators" or men not freely chosen by their people. He would shower their governments with withering criticism and relentlessly expose their real or imaginary shortcomings, often forgetting in the process the infinitely worse fate that would befall their people if American aid were withdrawn and they were subjugated. McGovern would urge that we have faith in the power of the democratic philosophy, as if supplying arms to free peoples who need them for self-defense were undemocratic. He would urge that it would be nobler for America to supply food which sustains life than guns which destroy it, forgetting that one cannot defend freedom against aggression with vitamins and butter. The litany would vary, but the message would remain fundamentally the same: In the name of democracy, the United States should abandon the military support of small, independent nations when their existence is jeopardized by Soviet or Chinese Communism.

The most important exception to these generalizations is McGovern's apparent support of American military aid to Israel against aggression by her Soviet-armed neighbors. The practical value of this support is somewhat dubious, however, in view of the fact that McGovern's defense program would involve unilateral American arms reduction on such a catastrophic scale as to make the Soviet Union the undisputed master of the Mediterranean.

To continue with the letter:

"American B-29's and cruisers are in Italy. We have followed the fatal policy of filling our government posts with men who are most at home on the battlefield or plotting the battle movements of other men. We should expect them to call for the draft and talk continuously about the 'inevitable war' with Russia.

"Under the blinding light of the current Red Scare, we are going all-out for nationalism, militarism, suspicion, and power politics. Do we realize that we only show our loss of faith in the American dream when we foolishly hope to stop communism with dollars and bombs?..."

It is interesting that a professional historian, as McGovern was, should have characterized the Tru-

man era as one of all-out "nationalism, militarism, suspicion and power politics." Yet this was the Administration which launched the Marshall Plan and thus engineered the economic recovery of Western Europe. It inaugurated enormous programs for the rehabilitation of victor and defeated nations alike, for economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, for the unification of Europe, for a worldwide war against hunger and for international cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

"TREACHEROUS" WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

"A second popular illusion which has at least colored the Daily Republic," McGovern continued, "is that Russia is all wrong and the U.S. is virtually blameless. Russia has been pictured in the popular mind as a vile, imperialistic gangster. Uncle Sam, on the other hand, like mother's little boy, can do no wrong."

"Perhaps it is time to remind ourselves that it was Russia alone who saw the terrible danger of the Axis aggressors, and who pled for collective action to stop them as early as 1933. It was the virtuous Western Allies who treacherously sought to maneuver the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis into an all-out war against Russia."

Was it Russia alone which saw the danger of Nazism? Of course not. That the West conspired with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan to get them to invade the U.S.S.R. had been reiterated by Soviet propagandists, but reiteration did not make it true.

It is strange that McGovern called this alleged Franco-British conspiracy against Russia "treacherous." Would it really have been "treacherous" for Western leaders to have preferred to have the fury of the Nazi war machine averted from their own people and turned against a third power? This characterization came naturally to Communists because of their implicit assumption that the national interests of the Soviet Union were paramount and those of all other countries could be swept aside. But it was incongruous from McGovern.

When he moralized about Western treachery, McGovern conveniently forgot about Stalin's 1939 pact with Hitler. He failed to mention that the Nazi-Soviet Pact made World War II inevitable, that it led to the dismemberment of Poland by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, caused the extinction of Polish independence and was responsible for the genocide of millions of Poles. As he must have recalled, as a result of this pact, the American Communist Party engineered strikes against plants making arms for Britain and France. This increased both the Nazi chances for victory in Europe and the ultimate human cost of the conflict. It is strange that an historian should have had such a blind spot. It is equally

"WITCH-HUNTING" BY "FASCIST-TINGED MINDS"

In another letter to the Daily Republic, McGovern scolded:

"Some people, calling themselves Americans, may resort to egg-throwing, smear charges, witch-hunting, or intimidation of their employees on political grounds. But these Fascist-tinged minds are still a minority. Anyone capable of recognizing the devil must surely view such individuals as the real threat to the United States."¹⁸

This litany of abuse, with its distortions of fact, seemed to foreshadow the McGovern style of later years toward anti-Communists such as Senator Karl Mundt and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. If the charges that the Progressive Party was Red-controlled were "smears," then Time, Newsweek, Norman Thomas and President Truman were all in a conspiracy to deceive the American people. The analogy with "witch-hunting" was inaccurate because witches don't exist, whereas Communists unfortunately do. When McGovern called those who exposed the Progressive Party "Fascist-tinged," he was following the standard procedure of Communist agitation and propaganda. Anyone who exposed Communist activities was automatically branded as a fascist. Perhaps because of his fire-and-brimstone home background, McGovern added the original thought that these security-minded folk were also Devils!

In suggesting that McGovern resorted to communist debating ploys of an intellectually dishonest sort, no implication is intended that he was a Communist then or subsequently. The composition of the Red cell on the Northwestern campus is not a matter of record. Whether McGovern was involved with this group or not is unknown and is perhaps not of fundamental importance.

Two features of these early McGovern political polemics are significant.

The first is his virulent attack on people who questioned Henry Wallace's working alliance with the Communists. McGovern didn't merely suggest that these people were wrong. He called them witch-hunters and fascist-minded. Later, he would add the abusive term McCarthyite. This invective against anyone and everyone who was concerned about Communist infiltration in American politics was fairly common among certain types of intellectuals and, if McGovern enjoyed any distinction in this respect, it was that of using these devices relentlessly and consistently. The ultimate effect was to discredit everyone who asked questions about the loyalty of American government officials, politicians and candidates for political office. This would make it possible for people with long records of Communist connections and subversive activities to infiltrate the Government and win elections with lit-

tle fear of exposure.

The second, and to my mind even more significant, point is that McGovern did not merely agree with the Soviet and Communist position on a few points. Any American might legitimately have done that. The McGovern letters quoted, however, consistently avoided criticism of the Soviet Union or expression of disagreement with its expansionist policies. This myopia concerning Soviet failings did not occur during the comparatively enlightened era of Khrushchev and Breshnev, but during one of the worst periods of Stalinism. The regime for which McGovern was inventing excuses was an iron dictatorship which suppressed even the most elementary human freedoms and which operated slave-labor camps that swallowed up millions of innocent people.

TROJAN HORSE DISCOVERED

Meanwhile the Progressive Party staggered toward disaster. George McGovern went to the Philadelphia National Convention as a member of the South Dakota delegation. There, on July 23rd, Henry Wallace dodged a demand by James Loeb, Jr., National Secretary of Americans for Democratic Action, that he condemn "all police states," including the Russian one.¹⁹

The following day Henry Agard Wallace accepted the Progressive Party nomination for President before a packed audience.

"In a search for peace" with the Soviet Union, Wallace demanded that the United States unilaterally evacuate Berlin!

The demand that the former capital of Germany be surrendered gratis to Stalin came as a shock to those delegates who were not already committed heart and soul to the Soviet Union. The New York Times noted "restiveness" among delegates over "domination of the Party and its platform by Communists and 'fellow travellers.'"²⁰

The Progressive Party platform was a recipe for total surrender to Stalinist Russia.

America should end all military aid to "reactionary governments" in Greece, Turkey, China, the Middle East and Latin America. Read "anti-Communist" in place of "reactionary" and the meaning of this proposal becomes abundantly clear.

The Marshall Plan should be abolished. Instead an aid plan should be substituted over which the Russians "would have veto rights." In other words, the United States was to spend billions of dollars of taxpayers' money and the Soviet Union was to have a veto over where it was to go!

A peace treaty should be signed only with a united Germany. In this new Germany, Russia should share control over the Ruhr! Thus, the most important heavy industrial base in Europe was to be turned over to Stalin.

The platform also contained planks for repeal of the draft, repudiation of the Truman Doctrine

which provided American aid to free nations threatened by Communist aggression, and socialization of banks, railroads, merchant marine, public utilities and all industries mainly dependent upon government orders.

Official biographer Anson writes, on the basis of numerous interviews with McGovern, that his subject was "disappointed" at the "fanaticism" of some of Wallace's supporters and that he returned to Northwestern with a more "sheepish" attitude toward the great crusade. When election day rolled around, McGovern allegedly cast no ballot.²¹ One gathers from the text that McGovern was not prepared to concede that these people were Communists despite the overwhelming evidence of the platform, CP-control of the convention, and the verdict of such experienced political leaders as President Truman.

For many years, McGovern remained silent about his fervent support of Henry Wallace and the Progressive Party. An earlier official biography and a long autobiographical sketch he prepared in 1959 for a woman's magazine contain no reference to the episode.

If McGovern buried his love affair with the Progressives under the rug as long as possible, there is little reason to assume that he was being candid when he stated that he left the Philadelphia Convention disillusioned and never voted for Wallace. It is difficult to see what there was in the platform which the Communists ramrodded through the Progressive Convention that was in conflict with the views George McGovern expressed in his letter to the Daily Republic.

On the other hand, even as a young man, McGovern combined a highly developed political sense with strong ambition for power. The open and flagrant way in which the Communists imposed their will on the Progressive Party National Convention may well have convinced him that continued association with the new movement could spell political suicide.

The fact that a man was wrong in the past does not necessarily disqualify him for the Presidency. But if a man learns nothing from his mistakes, it would seem evident that he is unfit for that awesome office and the fearful decisions it requires.

Many years after the Progressive Party fiasco, Henry Agard Wallace publicly admitted that he had been duped by the Communists, that they had manipulated him, and that the Progressive Party program would have been disastrous for the United States.

In recent years, George S. McGovern also reviewed this episode.

"I liked what Wallace had to say about foreign policy," he remarked. "I still think he was essentially right."²²

In his Life magazine interview, McGovern went even further. He said that he had supported Henry

Wallace in 1948 "because he foresaw the revolutionary movements around the world, and felt as I did -- that our foreign policy was becoming too militarized, too 'get tough' and we were being identified with an order that was passing."

The implication here seems clear enough. McGovern backed Wallace because he considered Communism the wave of the future and because he agreed with Wallace's policy of appeasing the Soviet Union and surrendering to its demands.

(1) Robert Sam Anson McGovern, a Biography (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). I have relied heavily on this work. While highly favorable to its subject, Anson has followed Oliver Cromwell's advice to his portrait painter and left in the wars. The reason to cite Anson on matters unfavorable to McGovern is that this "authorized biography" cannot be accused of bias.

(2) When I was in Surinam in 1948, a Vice President of Alcoa, which had an enormous bauxite operation there, explained that the company was detested by local Dutch and Surinam capitalists because it paid high wages and provided its workers with the best medical care in the country. Local businessmen accused Alcoa of deliberately stirring up labor unrest with its high wage policy, which they branded as "American imperialism".

(3) Anson, McGovern 53-54.

(4) Testifying before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on September 8, 1952, Bella V. Dodd, who had been a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party of the United States from 1944 to 1948 and in charge of its work among teachers, named the four New York City colleges, Columbia, Long Island University, New York University, Vassar, Wellesley, Smith, Harvard, MIT, Michigan, Chicago, Howard, the University of Minnesota, the University of California and Northwestern as the only ones which, to her personal knowledge, had Red cells. v. Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Subversive Influence in the Educational Process. Part I, p. 17..

(5) The phrase "iron curtain" was originated, not by Winston Churchill, but by Hitler's Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Joseph Paul Goebbels. "If the German people surrender," he wrote during the last weeks of the Third Reich, "the Soviets will occupy...the whole east and southeast of Europe in addition to the larger part of Germany. In front of this enormous territory, including the Soviet Union, an iron curtain will go down...The rest of Europe will fall in political chaos which will be but a period of preparation for the coming of Bolshevism..." John Toland, The Last 100 Days (New York: Random House, 1965), 181 fn.

(6) When my wife asked some of the top agricultural statisticians in the United States how they could support an impractical visionary like Wallace for President, one of them replied: "If Henry told us to plant corn upside down, we would do it."

(7) Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Volume One, Year of Decisions (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), 558.

(8) Ibid, 560.

(9) Karl M. Schmidt, Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusader (Syracuse: University Press, 1960), 23.

(10) Ibid, 261.

(11) Ibid, 24.

(12) Ibid, 260.

(13) Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, 185.

(14) Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (New York, Macmillan, 1968), 525-535.

(15) 1961 edition. Article on "Greece: Modern History" by Christopher Montague Woodhouse, Director, Royal Institute of International Affairs, and author of The Greek War of Independence.

(16) Stefan T. Possony, A Century of Conflict (Chicago: Regnery, 1953), 294.

(17) As Harry Truman put the matter (Memoirs, Vol. I, 241)

"In early 1948 still another series of events jarred the free world. In Czechoslovakia, which had so long been the stronghold of democracy in central Europe, a ruthless Communist leadership, backed by the Russian Army at its border, demanded the full powers of government. President Eduard Benes, the able successor to the great Masaryk, held out for four days before yielding to the pressure. On February 25, 1948, however, democratic Czechoslovakia, for the second time in less than nine years, fell under the heel of totalitarianism. Two weeks later, Jan Masaryk, son of the founder of the Czechoslovak republic and a close friend and associate of many statesmen in the countries of western Europe, died in Prague under mysterious circumstances that suggested foul play. His death was a dramatic symbol of the tragic end of freedom in his nation."

(18) Anson, McGovern, 60.

(19) New York Times, July 24, 1948, 1:2.

(20) New York Times, July 25, 1948, 1:6.

(21) Anson, McGovern, pp. 60-61.

(22) Time, May 8, 1972, 17.

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SOUTH DAKOTA POLITICS AND MIDEASTERN CRISIS

In 1951, George McGovern landed a teaching job at his old alma mater, Dakota Wesleyan University, an institution that could scarcely be described as the Cambridge of the Corn Belt. Even its use of the term university was more of an aspiration than a fact, since its 1950 enrollment totalled only 281 students. Nor was McGovern lured to this prestigeless place by greed. His salary as a member of the faculty was less than \$4,500 a year. That left him with a formidable problem of supporting himself, his wife and their three small children.

Reminiscing about his career twenty years later, McGovern talked about this teaching job as if it had been an unusual distinction and the opening door to a brilliant future.

"Also I knew my whole career had been one cause after another that everybody said was hopeless," he told Life interviewer Richard Meryman, "- and mostly I had come out all right. In 1953 I had the security of a full professorship at Dakota Wesleyan University in Mitchell. I was 30 years old, had my Ph.D., and was head of the history and government department."¹

Dakota Wesleyan gave McGovern a political base in his native state and the young professor stuck it

out there for one year; then tried for a teaching position in the History Department of the University of Iowa, but failed to make the grade.

He continued to write political letters to the Mitchell Daily Republic, in which he advocated such measures as a cease-fire in Korea, negotiation of an Asian peace, and American recognition of the People's Republic of China. McGovern's popular course on current history gave him ample opportunity to air and discuss his political opinions and philosophy.

The American Legion post became alarmed over what it considered were dangerous radical and pro-communist tendencies in the college. Veterans were sent in to audit the classes and take notes on what the more suspect professors said. Evidently, there was enough basis for the Legion's concern for the FBI to enter the picture and interrogate faculty members.

Dakota Wesleyan's Board of Trustees fired the president of the college, Samuel Hilburn, a supposed radical. Ironically, the FBI probed McGovern's brother-in-law and fellow teacher, Robert Pennington, despite the fact that Pennington had had sharp disagreements with the Henry Wallace crowd and had backed Truman in the 1948 presidential election.

Although George McGovern's radical opinions and ingenious justifications for Soviet foreign policy were abundantly on the record, he escaped this ordeal unscathed. This curious circumstance may be due to the fact that he was the son of a highly respected Methodist minister in Mitchell, (the seat of Dakota Wesleyan) and a war veteran who could boast the Distinguished Flying Cross.

In 1952, McGovern decided not to look for a teaching job in some university other than Iowa, but to accept instead the task of building up the Democratic Party organization in the state of South Dakota. The party was moribund and in a state of acute disintegration. To make matters worse, McGovern had to raise his own salary of \$6,500. With his usual indomitable energy and personal ambition, he spent long hours crisscrossing the state, visiting every registered Democratic voter, building up a card index that would eventually become the foundation of the most powerful political machine in South Dakota, and creating an organization that would both challenge Republican domination and send McGovern to Washington.

THE FORGING OF A REBEL

The man who had chosen Democratic Party politics as his lifelong career had been shaped by the special environment of a preacher's son in a prairie town. His father was a Fundamentalist and a so-called "building minister." He would build a Methodist church, working as a carpenter

"get restless after a while, and in five, six years he'd move on and erect another church in some town." The McGovern's were poor. Joseph McGovern ruled his family with a strict hand and made few concessions to human needs. Drinking, smoking, dancing, movies and card playing were absolutely taboo.

"Being a minister's son," McGovern told Life, "I remember feeling more closely watched than the other kids, and that any kind of breach would be regarded as more serious - - - that I wasn't free to do the things that other kids got away with. My father every morning would gather the family around and he'd read a chapter out of the Bible and then say a prayer. I remember at an early age being embarrassed by that, especially when other kids would look at us through the windows.

Visiting evangelists would stop over at the McGovern house and scare the children with stories of unrepentant sinners burning in hell and begging vainly for water. "I used to be terrified as a small child at some of those hellfire sermons," McGovern recollected.

In later years, he would depict his childhood as almost idyllic. There are strong reasons to doubt the truth of this picture. Joseph McGovern had a quick temper and, when it flared up against his wife, George would privately side with his mother.

He was "painfully shy as a boy." In the first grade, he "was too embarrassed to say anything in class" and never read aloud during the entire year. "So I used to sit there and look at those dummies stumbling over the words, and could hardly bear the thought of their stupidity because I could read the whole book while they were doing the first page."

It is easy to visualize this shy, withdrawn child, taking no part in classroom work, but secretly gloating over his superiority. This is the stuff of which the sicker type of revolutionary is often compounded. The fact that McGovern would recall this episode and present it to millions of Life readers at a time when he was seeking the Presidency is intriguing. It never seems to have occurred to him that average people might identify with the pupils he had despised and resented.

McGovern's younger brother, Larry, reacted to parental tyranny with open revolt and hell-raising. He stole tires from his father and sold them. At sixteen, he got a girl pregnant, left school to marry her, and later divorced. He had problems with alcohol and was in and out of veterans' hospitals.

George McGovern reacted by withdrawing into a private world exemplified by secret trips to movie theatres. He had few friends and he was shy. His gym teacher publicly called him a physical coward. His memories of his childhood emphasize his fears and contain repeated reassurances that it was a happy period.

The sort of adult formed by this childhood is brilliantly revealed in the Life article, an engrossing self-portrait which is unintentionally devastating to its author. McGovern emerges from these pages as a man, saturated with hate, obsessed with his own importance and ability, without any feelings of sympathy or kindness toward ordinary people. The self-portrait is that of a man who is unable to cope with rejection. A single example will suffice.

"If there is one thing I cannot tolerate, it's rudeness," McGovern told his Life interviewer. Then he told an anecdote. During the 1972 primary fights, he held up a commercial flight for ten minutes. Boarding the plane, he apologized individually to the passengers. However, one "old biddie" called him "a terrible person" and refused to shake hands.

"I leaned over," McGovern recalled, "and said very quietly, 'Well, you're the biggest horse's ass I've met in the campaign.' I had a great feeling of elation. It was such a good, clean shot."

His triumph over this elderly woman was evidently one of the episodes in his life that McGovern relished. He thought it should be recorded for posterity. It may never have occurred to him that his conduct was reminiscent of rebellious schoolboys who write four-letter words on walls. McGovern must have given the interview to convince millions of Americans that he had the stature required in a President. What he achieved was to portray himself as an arrogant snob, a bad loser, and a man who brags about his culture, but uses obscene language to insult old ladies. It is amazing that a man should have been able to go as far in national politics as McGovern has with so little understanding of the thoughts and feelings of other people.

McGovern's childhood and youth, judging by this interview, were dominated by fear much more than in the case of more normal young people. He was extremely sensitive about charges of cowardice. His anxiety to prove that he is tough and manly was illustrated in another paragraph.

"The people who don't think I'm tough enough to be President don't know me," he explained, "- - don't understand that you can be tough and quiet and restrained at the same time. My toughness comes from my sense of justice. The guys who are supposed to be the toughest of all - the Pentagon brass - they're going to find out I'm tough if I get to be President. I think that is going to be the chief test of the next President - whether he can stand up to the military - and I don't mean the Russians or the Chinese - I mean our own."

This attitude of braggadocio was more likely to repel intelligent people than reassure them. The fact that McGovern regarded the military chiefs of his country as enemies is symptomatic of his revolutionary ideology and alienation from American institutions. It also reflects rage against those who wield authority. In wading through McGovern's defiant and boastful speeches, one sometimes gets the impression that this is the sort of man who would be a rebel against any society. His great popularity among large sections of the youth is partly due to the fact that he has not outgrown adolescent rebellious-

ness. A man who expresses his distaste for "rudeness" by calling an elderly woman a "horse's ass" might be more at home on a psychiatrist's couch than in the White House.

GHOSTS OF A PINKISH PAST

In 1956, after four years' work, McGovern was ready to run for Congress. His opponent, Harold Lovre, a four-term incumbent, paid little attention to his brash and comparatively unknown opponent until late in the campaign when polls showed that McGovern had closed the distance between them and that the contest was a toss-up.

A South Dakota Volunteer Bipartisan Committee Opposed to the Admission of Red China to the United Nations was organized. It began to buy full-page ads in South Dakota newspapers which blasted McGovern for his record on China, his ardent support of Henry Wallace and his Progressives, and his alleged advocacy of a foreign policy of "sell-out."

A former student at Dakota Wesleyan named Lionel Stacey released an open letter which accused McGovern of using his classes to propagandize for Communism. "Why did you make Communist propaganda compulsory reading?" Stacey asked. "Why did you criticize and condemn our government for removing Alger Hiss and all other Communists from the government payroll?" Stacey added the extravagant charge that "a man who will betray his trust in the classroom just might betray his country."²

The reference to Alger Hiss was interesting, even though not strictly accurate. Hiss had not been removed from the government payroll. It was only after he had resigned from the State Department that the evidence concerning his past criminal conduct became so overwhelming that he was indicted for perjury concerning his wartime activities as a Soviet spy. Convicted at his second trial, Hiss served time in a penitentiary.

Time has blurred the details of this enthralling and momentous espionage case and fully half of the American people are too young to remember it. The man who relentlessly brought the facts of Hiss's disloyal conduct to light was then - Congressman Richard M. Nixon. In this task, he was ably seconded by South Dakota Congressman, and later Senator, Karl Mundt.

Nixon's private verdict on Hiss was that he should have been boiled in oil. While publicly asserting, because of its adverse affect on his Democratic Party, that the Hiss case was "a red herring," President Harry S. Truman had a very different private opinion on the matter. "Why the son of a bitch -- he betrayed his country," Truman exploded to New York Herald-Tribune Washington Bureau Chief Bert Andrews.³

People too young to remember the case some-

times assume that Alger Hiss and his supporters were victimized. The contrary was the case. Those who testified against Hiss or supported his accuser, former Soviet spymaster Whittaker Chambers were targets of abuse, villification and slander of an unprecedented sort. For having exposed Hiss's treasonable conduct, Nixon recalls that, for the next twelve years, he was "subjected to an utterly unprincipled and vicious smear campaign. Bigamy, forgery, drunkenness, insanity, thievery, anti-Semitism, perjury, the whole gamut of misconduct in public office, ranging from unethical to downright criminal activities -- all these were among the charges that were hurled against me, some publicly and others through whispering campaigns which were even more difficult to counteract."⁴

According to Stacey, McGovern used his classroom to urge support of Alger Hiss. More than twenty years later, Hiss would surface to support McGovern's bid for the Presidency.

In his 1956 campaign for Congress, McGovern was fated to suffer an even more damaging blow than the Stacey charges. In high school and for years thereafter, he had admired and sought the advice of his former history teacher, Bob Pearson.

Based presumably on interviews with McGovern, Anson characterizes Pearson as "one of those rare men who are as charismatic as they are gifted."⁵ A teacher of broad and deep intelligence, a man of wit and grace, Pearson was moved by large ideas and had the ability to transmit his enthusiasm for those ideas to his students. In addition to all this, Pearson was a liberal in the great tradition of Jeffersonian democracy.

During the campaign, Pearson publicized an open letter to "Dear George" in which he stated that McGovern "frightened" him. The letter, which appeared in every newspaper in the state, recalled McGovern's soft attitude toward Communism, his backing of Henry Agard Wallace and his communist-controlled Progressive Party, his opposition to the draft and his advocacy of unilateral American nuclear arms reduction. "The fear haunts me," Pearson wrote, "that the same 'liberals' who fell for the Communist strategy in 1948 and 1951 are playing into the hands of these conspirators again."⁶

As Anson tells the story, Pearson wrote this devastating attack on his admirer and friend because he wanted a postmastership somewhere in the Bad Lands which McGovern's Republican enemies were able to get for him. The shortest answer to that theory is that if Pearson were the sort of man who would slander a friend to get a picayune government job, he couldn't have had those exceptional virtues of intelligence and character which Anson imputes to him.

McGovern replied to these charges by claiming that he had "always despised communism and every other ruthless tyranny over the mind." He accused

his opponent Lovre, of "a desperation type of smear campaigning" (sic!). McGovern also wrapped himself in the flag. He said that Lovre "also knows that I was quick to volunteer my services as a combat soldier in World War II while he was free to advance his fortunes at home."

This sheds light on McGovern's vaunted honesty and high ethical standards in politics. When Pearl Harbor struck, Harold Lovre was 37 years old, married and the father of young children. Military service was not expected of men of his age and family responsibilities. The imputation that Lovre lacked courage or patriotism was below the belt.

McGovern's assertion that he was "quick to volunteer" for combat in World War II was, as I have already pointed out, almost certainly false.

Despite the charges of appeasement of Communism, McGovern won the election. The secrets of his success included a magnificent precinct organization which he built up over the years, in the course of which he had become personally known to thousands of South Dakota voters. He conducted much of his campaign against Eisenhower's farm policies, which were thoroughly unpopular in the state. Last and probably not least, it was evident to voters that McGovern was more able, better equipped mentally and better trained in political science and history than the great majority of candidates for Congress.

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

Representative McGovern made his first speech, one for which he was allowed five minutes, on January 31, 1957, in opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine. This address shed significant light on his future conduct in Congress and served to lay bare basic inconsistency, or contradiction, in his attitude toward foreign policy.

The Eisenhower Doctrine authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the United States and to extend economic aid to protect the existence of Middle Eastern countries provided they were threatened by the forces of international Communism. As Commander in Chief, the President already had these powers under the Constitution. He requested that they be ratified by a joint session of both Houses of Congress to make it abundantly clear to the Middle Eastern nations that there was a national consensus behind an active and affirmative American policy in that area. By going to Congress and getting an overwhelming vote of approval, the President believed that he would destroy any illusions the Arab states under Communist influence might harbor that he would be unable to intervene in an emergency because of domestic opposition.

McGovern began his speech with a typical disclaimer.

"Certainly, no Member of the Congress would de-

liberately wish to hamper the Administration in its efforts to check the spread of Communist tyranny in the Middle East or in any other quarter of the globe," he announced. "Likewise, thoughtful Americans are deeply concerned with the explosive crisis that exists in the Middle East."

McGovern alleged that he was voting against the Administration's request for authority because it "represents a dangerous illusion of policy where there is no policy" and because it was "shadow" rather than "substance." Thus far, only rhetorical window-dressing.

He then made the point that the President didn't need the Doctrine because it added nothing to the powers he already possessed. This, of course, ignored the fundamental point that what Eisenhower was requesting, and what McGovern was attempting to deny him, was an expression of national unity from the Congress.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, McGovern continued, "seeks no real answers to the fundamental political problems that threaten the peace and stability of the Middle East. It provides no intelligent, practical plan to use American aid dollars to eradicate the swamplands of poverty and disease that open the way for Communist inroads in the Middle East."⁸

McGovern's basic assumption here, one that he would expound with undiminished fervor through the volumes of the Congressional Record for the next fifteen years, was that the cause of Communism is poverty and that the cure for Communism is to shower foreign countries with billions of American dollars.

The strange thing is that McGovern never seems to have examined this fundamental premise objectively. Did revolutions flourish in the soil of poverty? The evidence on this point was contradictory, but on the whole negative. Thus, the first Communist conquest of power in Latin America would be in Cuba, which boasted the highest per capita income and the most advanced labor legislation of any Latin republic. Moreover, on the eve of Fidel Castro's victory, Cuba was enjoying boom conditions.⁹ In Haiti, by contrast, the most impoverished and hungerblighted of the Latin republics, Communism has never been a serious force.

Professor Crane Brinton of Harvard made a study of the sociology of revolutions about a decade ago and came to the conclusion that they were more likely to erupt in times of economic growth than those of stagnation or decline. Insecurity and want tend to make people too timid to risk what they have. Hunger, particularly if it is chronic, tends to be the midwife of apathy, rather than that of upheaval.

When one turns from the general question of the causes of revolution to the specific one of the sort of environment which is favorable to Communist revolution, the error in McGovern's analysis becomes more apparent. When he urges the lavishing of bill-

ions of dollars on backward and impoverished foreign countries as an antidote to Communism, McGovern proceeds on the tacit assumption that Communist revolutions are expressions of the discontent of the poorest strata of the population.

This, however, simply is not the case. What is required for a successful revolution, according to that profound theorist and strategist of the armed insurrection, V.I. Lenin, is a general crisis, affecting the rulers as well as the ruled, one which is as much psychological and spiritual as it is physical and material. Lenin's analysis is worth quoting extensively to show the ways in which McGovern confused the basic issue through oversimplification.

"The fundamental law of revolution," Lenin wrote in 1920, "confirmed by all revolutions and particularly by all three Russian revolutions in the twentieth century, is as follows: it is not sufficient for revolution that the exploited and oppressed masses understand the impossibility of living in the old way and demand changes; for revolution it is necessary that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. Only when the 'lower classes' do not want the old and when the 'upper classes' cannot continue in the old way, then only can the revolution be victorious. This truth may be expressed in other words: revolution is impossible without a national crisis affecting both the exploited and the exploiters."¹⁰

Lenin's profound insight into the anatomy of revolutions would be confirmed by history in the decades following his death. The Chinese Communist triumph in 1949 proceeded from the havoc created by a catastrophic war, accompanied by a hyperinflation, in which a large part of the propertied classes was expropriated. Under these conditions of chaos, insecurity, drift and general corruption, all classes searched for a way out, for a new faith.

The rise of Communist influence in Western Europe and the United States during the past twenty years has been associated with rapid economic advance and growing prosperity. What has been most conspicuous is a loss of faith and direction among those classes which have traditionally constituted the Establishment. In the United States particularly, the strongest support for Communism has come, not from economically depressed or undernourished groups, but from the university students, the professionals, the discontented youth of upper-middle-class origin.

No American political leader should be more keenly aware of this than George McGovern, since no other national political figure has ever enjoyed such strong and enthusiastic support from precisely this quarter.

This does not mean that McGovern's point about the relationship between hunger and revolution is entirely mistaken.¹¹ One can visualize situations in which rampant population growth, causing fam-

ine and seemingly insoluble urban crises such as those afflicting Calcutta and Bombay, might create an attitude of hopelessness among all classes that would bring about the general psychological crisis that Lenin describes, the conviction by both the rulers and the ruled that a fundamental change is urgent and imperative. But this is very different from the view that malnutrition causes Communism and that, therefore, Communism can be prevented by providing abundant food. In fact, this latter view is reminiscent of the crude materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach, one of Karl Marx's contemporaries whom Marx regarded with profound intellectual contempt. Feuerbach's discovery was that: "Mann ist was er isst!" (Man is what he eats!)

Having made his ritualistic point about the "swamplands of poverty" that caused Mideastern Communism, McGovern cast a moralistic eye on the rulers of that region. He objected to possible American aid to nations threatened by Communism in the Mideast because some of those dollars might support "the wild extravagance and vice that characterizes the life of ruling monarchs in the Middle East." McGovern specifically objected to the fact that Saudi Arabian ruler Ibn Saud "lavishes \$54 million a year on his own personal household while his people live on a yearly per capita income of \$42." He disapproved of the "vast array of air-conditioned Cadillacs, luxurious palaces, slaves, concubines, and revelry beyond imagination" which he believed fed Ibn Saud's sybaritic tastes. While the "vast array of palaces" was an exaggeration, Congressman McGovern was on solid ground when he disapproved of Ibn Saud's governmental methods and social policies.

What he evidently failed to grasp was the elementary point that the United States was not supporting Ibn Saud because it approved of the African slave trade or believed in a system of justice which relied primarily on mutilation as punishment. What was involved was the protection of the Middle East against Communist takeover. The regime of Ibn Saud could be reformed by external pressure. In a comparatively brief number of years, it would be changed substantially to the benefit of its subjects. Should the United States refuse to lend economic and military aid to Arab nations when threatened by Communist aggression, however, there was a prospect that the entire area would be assimilated into the Soviet Power in one way or another. This would not only mean the complete encirclement and therefore probable extinction of Israel, it would also mean that the major source of oil for Western Europe would fall under Soviet control, thus giving the Russians additional leverage with which to dominate the Continent.

The morality of Ibn Saud, was, thus, a completely secondary, if not tertiary, consideration. Perhaps

the most appropriate remark ever made on this sort of situation was an alleged comment by President Woodrow Wilson at a Cabinet meeting. A speaker criticized a Central American Chief of State. "Don't call that man a son of a bitch," Wilson reputedly interrupted. "He's our son of a bitch."

After his somewhat facile generalizations about the relationship between Communism and poverty and his moralizing over Ibn Saud, McGovern gave the Congress the benefit of his wisdom about the real sources of conflict in the Middle East.

There was the Arab refugee problem, he pointed out. There was also "the unsettled question of the Suez Canal. Very true. But if these were the sources of 'the incendiary political problem' how were they going to be solved by plunging billions of American dollars into eradication of 'the swamplands of poverty and disease?'"

Without answering this question, Congressman McGovern proceeded to make a prediction:

"From all indications, it is more likely that one of these trouble spots might erupt in a shooting war between one or more of the Arab States and the State of Israel than that the Russians will be so stupid as to launch a military attack in the Middle East."¹²

This is what is known as flogging a dead horse. Nobody expected a Russian invasion. The realistic fear was that the Soviets would take over a few Arab states by internal subversion or bribery, then arm them up to the hilt until they were capable of dominating their neighbors militarily or else serving as spearheads of an aggressive alliance against Israel.

McGovern proceeded with an interesting appraisal of the role of Israel in relationship to the Eisenhower Doctrine:

"As a nation that has played a key role in the creation of the State of Israel, the only real democracy in the Middle East, America may be ill-advised in strengthening the hand of those Arab chieftains who insist that they will not rest until Israel is destroyed. It would hardly be a victory for democracy if democracy's showcase in the Middle East were destroyed by feudal despots with the help of American arms and material.

"No one but the Communist or the Fascist could rejoice over that prospect."

This analysis may have seemed to some realistic at the time. However, it was based on a fundamental illusion which clouded all McGovern's thinking on foreign policy and Communism and which would continue to cloud it for the indefinite future. Reasoning from the simplified sequence that hunger and poverty cause the discontent of the masses, which in turn causes Communism, he claimed that the real danger to Middle Eastern stability and to Israel came from such backward sinks of rural and Bedouin misery as Saudi Arabia.

This was a misunderstanding of the situation. Communism would advance among much more mod-

ern and much more fanatically nationalist states, such as Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Feudal Saudi Arabia would not be seriously threatened by Communism and it would serve as a more or less unreliable buttress of the status quo in the Middle East for decades to come. The assumption that the threat to Israel's existence came from "feudal despots" such as Ibn Saud was a bad misreading of the political situation.

The speech ended with a typical McGovern idea. America should curtail arms aid to the Arab states until they worked out, "with the cooperation of the proper United Nations agencies, a series of constructive, well-defined projects that will build for true strength against Communist subversion, by a full scale attack on those ancient evils - poverty, ignorance and disease."

Fortunately for the United States, McGovern's speech was not taken seriously in the Congress or elsewhere. Only 61 Representatives and Senators voted against the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Approval of the Doctrine on March 7th made it clear to the world that the United States was prepared to try to check the expansion of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. It was ready to take counter action against Russian shipment of modern arms to Nasser Egypt to abet Nasser imperialism. The Doctrine also gave advance Congressional approval to swift Executive action in case Israel's existence was jeopardized by pro-Soviet Arab neighbors.

In July 1958, Eisenhower implemented the Doctrine by landing Marines in Lebanon to preserve that country from seizure by pro-Nasser forces.

The crisis was negotiated; the balance of power in the Middle East was restored; Lebanon returned to her traditional quasi-neutral status. With these objectives achieved, American forces were withdrawn.

McGovern's 1957 vote against the Eisenhower Doctrine and his earlier speech on the Middle Eastern situation suggested that his support of Israel might be more verbal than effective. What Israel most needed from the United States at the time was a clear signal that this nation would move massively and swiftly, if necessary, to protect her independence. A rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine by the Congress might have been interpreted throughout the Arab world as an indication that Israel could be attacked and dismembered without fear of American action.

Israel also needed division within the Arab world. American arms support to such Arab states as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Morocco helped create a viable balance of power in the region. If McGovern's view had prevailed and the United States had denied the entire Arab world arms until the latter agreed to grandiose United Nations projects for social reform, these countries would inevitably have turned to the Soviet Union for their military requirements. To the extent that this occurred, the entire Arab world might have fallen under Soviet

influence and the external restraints against the military destruction of Israel by her neighbors would have been seriously impaired.

On January 28, 1958, McGovern again rose on the floor of the House to give his views on the Middle East and to reveal that he was an historian who learned little or nothing from history:

"Mr. Speaker the widespread poverty of the Moslem world is well known. Why then do we perpetuate the futile effort to pile up military arms on a foundation of economic misery? Will such an approach effectively counter the accelerated economic offers of the Soviet Union? Will such a lopsided arms program go to the heart of the real problems that afflict the people of the Middle East? Is the image of fortress American the image we want to hold up to nations who are hungry for the spirit of Jefferson and Lincoln."¹³

Were the Egyptians who screamed for a war of annihilation against Israel "hungry for the spirit of Jefferson and Lincoln?" Was the Soviet Union concentrating its energies on programs of economic uplift in the Middle East? Was she too disinterested in power politics to equip Egypt and Syria with modern weapons? How naive could Congressman McGovern get?

The view on Middle Eastern politics of their South Dakota colleague must have seemed bizarre to more sophisticated members of the House. The grammar of power politics was clear to responsible State Department and Pentagon Officials. Why was it obscure to a man whose mind had been trained in history and political science, the disciplines which supposedly shed most light on international affairs?

FIGHTING ANTI-COMMUNISTS

Another interesting McGovern vote was in opposition to the Jencks Bill, which denied accused persons the right to examine the evidence against them in government files. The bill was designed to prevent accused subversives from successfully demanding that FBI data be publicly revealed. What was at stake was the compulsory exposure of the identity of undercover agents working inside American Communist organizations. A majority in Congress believed that blowing the identity of these agents would shatter the internal security system of this country. Safeguards against Communist infiltration in Government and against Communist espionage activities in defense plants would be destroyed. Congress passed the measure. Predictably, McGovern opposed it. Again fortunately for the United States, McGovern was in a minority.

In 1958, McGovern ran for re-election, this time against an authentic war hero and Medal of Honor recipient, Joe Foss. Foss was maladroit, afflicted with an elephantine mind, slow at repartee, and lacking the debating training which had stood his

opponent in such good stead. The charges that McGovern had Communist sympathies and fellow traveller affiliations again surfaced.

Nevertheless, McGovern won re-election and returned to Washington. Here he continued his advocacy of measures detrimental to the power and security of the United States. This was not enough to destroy his political base in South Dakota because on the really important issues voters considered him a sound man. He never, or hardly ever, missed a chance to plug for measures that would help boost the price of, or increase the world market for, South Dakota's wheat and other products. He ran a glad-hand office, following the rule that every letter from a South Dakota voter was to be answered within 24 hours, congratulating citizens of that great state for every achievement in their momentous careers, from marriage and reproduction to breeding outstanding bulls and high-milk-yield cows. Nobody from South Dakota was ever turned away. Their dedicated, folksy Congressman was never too busy to listen to their complaints and aid them in getting what they wanted from the great manna-dispensing machine known as the Government of the United States.

Nor was McGovern bashful in the pursuit of either publicity or his political ambitions. He was never too busy to see reporters and give them a glowing account of his career. In fact, he sometimes made the mistake of disturbing their sleep with telephone calls. Not all of the press corps appreciated his zeal. Not all of them were imbued with McGovern's passionate interest in his own plans and accomplishments.

* * *

In 1960, McGovern risked his seat in the House to try for the Senate. The decisive factor in that decision may have been that his opponent would be the Republican incumbent, Karl Earl Mundt, a man who "represented the worst kind of holdover from the McCarthy days" in McGovern's opinion.¹⁴ This was not merely an election campaign; it was "an ideological crusade," a battle "between good and evil." For years, McGovern had collected every scrap of evidence he could lay his hands on concerning Senator Mundt; he had clipped the newspapers religiously and filed everything that the Senator had said or done. All this was in preparation for the day when he would be able to strive with all his might for Mundt's utter political destruction.

When McGovern had abandoned his small teaching job to reorganize the Democratic Party, Mundt had expressed his admiration and generously welcomed him into the South Dakota political arena. Humorless and heavy-handed, McGovern replied ungraciously with a diatribe, accusing the Senator of "sensationalism instead of statesmanship" and "at-

tacks upon the loyalty of his Democratic opponents."¹⁵

He made no pretense of impartiality toward Karl Mundt. "I hated his guts," he recalled. "...I hated him so much I lost my sense of balance."¹⁶

Why was this normally calculating, politically adroit rural politician consumed with such hatred? What was there about Karl Mundt that made McGovern lose his cool? Was the senior United States Senator from South Dakota morally corrupt or lacking in principles or integrity?

Far from it. Karl Earl Mundt had been born in 1900 and was thus 22 years older than McGovern, a fact which might have made a different sort of opponent treat him with the respect that is normally accorded distinguished men of an older generation. The careers of McGovern and Mundt were not dissimilar. Like McGovern, Mundt had been an outstanding debater. Like McGovern, he had been a teacher. His educational career, however, had lasted, not for only a year, but for more than a decade and had been considerably more successful than that of his younger opponent. Elected to the Senate in 1948 largely because of his distinguished work in unravelling the tangled skein of the Hiss espionage case, Mundt had served there for twelve years and would continue to grace the Senate with his presence until his death. He was the author of the Voice of America Act and claimed, in his Who's Who in America biographical entry, responsibility for the establishment of UNESCO, the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, a body of which McGovern heartily approved.

Given this distinguished and honorable record, why did Senator Mundt seem to McGovern a diabolical force in American politics?

Senator Mundt's sole and besetting political sin had been to recognize the danger of allowing Communists to infiltrate the Federal Government and to use democratic institutions to destroy American democracy. His major offense was co-authorship of the Mundt-Nixon Anti-Communist Bill, a measure that his Democratic opponent considered evil and odious.

McGovern attacked Mundt as a recrudescence of "McCarthyism." If McCarthyism meant the exposure of Communists in Government and the prosecution of Soviet espionage agents, the charge was well-founded. If it meant the harassment of the innocent, it was not.

It was a matter of record that Senator Mundt, together with such other Senators as Henry Jackson of Washington and Stuart Symington of Missouri had been on the committee which Senator McCarthy had chaired.¹⁷ McGovern was, of course, thoroughly cognizant of the fact that the censure of Senator McCarthy by a majority of the Senate did not apply to any of his colleagues, neither to Mundt nor Jackson nor to Symington. But this did not prevent him from slinging mud.

One of the worst strikes against Mundt was that, when a Congressman, he had conducted a relentless, but fair, interrogation of Alger Hiss and Whitaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. This had led in part to Hiss's indictment. It will be recalled that one of McGovern's students had accused his former teacher of using his classes to defend the convicted Soviet spy.

The Mundt-Nixon Bill, which so aroused McGovern's indignation, provided for the compulsory registration of Communist organizations. In checking through my files, I see that what I wrote about this measure some twenty years ago still seems valid: "The underlying theory was that the public had a right to know if propaganda was coming from a tainted source. The aim was to compel Communist organizations to identify themselves in all printed matter and radio programs. By analogy, the investor has the right to know the facts behind a corporate prospectus and the consumer is entitled to know what harmful ingredients go into the groceries he buys."¹⁸ The Mundt-Nixon Bill was so far from being an extremist measure that even Senator William Fulbright voted in its favor!

Despite the fact that McGovern had made a study of his adversary in detail and over a number of years, he publicly accused Mundt of unethical conduct in connection with a business deal. The Sioux Falls Argus-Leader, a Republican paper, charged McGovern with conducting the "filthiest campaign" in the history of the state. Editorially, it demanded that he apologize, adding that the charge was "a dirty smear, one of the worst in South Dakota history -- an unconscionable attempt to blemish the record of a man who did only what any other citizen could have done and what many others did do."

Karl Mundt was too much of a gentleman to roll in the gutter with his opponent. He merely expressed sorrow and regret at his adversary's conduct. Even though most South Dakotans probably disapproved of the gut tactics and disregard for truth of their ambitious Congressman, McGovern stood a good chance of winning for the same reasons that he had won previous elections. The basic ingredient of victory was ward-heeler politics, getting to the registered Democrats in every precinct, seeing to it that they voted right, ringing doorbells, buttonholing the apathetic, and bamboozling the dubious. He had taken care of the pocketbook interests of his people. He had a folksy, disarming quality that made charges of radicalism, however well-documented, seem out of character. He knew how to lard his speeches with quotations from the Bible. By talking about his conscience, he conveyed the impression of integrity.

With the election in doubt and the Republican Party in South Dakota in deep trouble, Karl Mundt got a testimonial from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover that he hoped would turn the tide. Speaking of Mundt and three other Senators, Hoover said:

"In my humble opinion, these fearless men, knowing of the scorn and abuse that would be heaped on them by the Communists, pseudo-liberals, and others of like ilk, have consistently risen above personal considerations to strike out whenever possible against the treacherous enemy. The Communists, both here and abroad, have long felt the heel of Senator Karl Mundt."¹⁹

McGovern lost by 15,000 votes, his first political defeat. The disaster was partly due to his open support of Democratic presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy, who was unpopular in South Dakota because of his Catholic faith and for other reasons. The intervention of Hoover, whom most South Dakotans revered, even though their Democratic Congressman privately had little use for him, was another cause of defeat.

Moreover, McGovern had attacked Karl Mundt with self-defeating violence. He may have felt righteous anger at the man who sought to hamstring the activities of the Communists, people who had been McGovern's co-workers in the Progressive Party adventure. McGovern had allowed his political emotions to run over his judgment. The penalty had been defeat.

Unlike other South Dakotan aspirants for high public office, McGovern had laid his career on the line by open backing of, and identification with, John F. Kennedy. The President-elect had been favorably impressed by McGovern. He believed he had caused the latter's defeat at the polls. To make amends, he phoned McGovern and indicated that he should hold himself in readiness to take up a position with the new Administration in Washington.

For McGovern, victory had sprung from the seeds of defeat. From now on, the center of the scene would be Washington; the political stakes would be, not South Dakota, but the nation.

(1) George McGovern, "I Have Earned the Nomination," Life, July 7, 1972, 31-41.

(2) Anson, McGovern, 82.

(3) Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), 64.

(4) Ibid, 70.

(5) Ibid, 28-29.

(6) Ibid, 82.

(7) Ibid, 34-35.

(8) Congressional Record, 1368

(9) For economic conditions in Cuba on the eve of the Castro victory, see Nathaniel Weyl, Red Star Over Cuba (New York: Hillman books, 1961), 196-200.

(10) V.I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder v. A Handbook of Marxism (New York: International Publishers, 1935), 876. Emphasis in the original.

(11) Nor am I for a moment suggesting that the United States should not continue to use her surplus agricultural resources to alleviate malnutrition, hunger and famine in the rest of the world. The point is merely that providing food under these conditions will not generally be an effective way of curbing or containing Communism.

(12) All quotations from Congressional Record, January 31, 1957, p. 1368. Emphasis supplied.

(13) Congressional Record - House, 12-4. Emphasis supplied.

(14) Anson, McGovern, 92.

(15) Ibid, 92.

(16) Ibid, 92-93.

(17) It was also a matter of record that McGovern's friend, Robert F. Kennedy, had worked for Joe McCarthy.

(18) Quoted in Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random House, 1952), 689.

(19) Nathaniel Weyl, The Battle Against Disloyalty (New York: Crowell 1951), 328.

(20) Sioux City Argus-Leader, October 4, 1960.

3

FOOD FOR PEACE

Through the grapevine, McGovern learned that he was being considered for a really top job in the new Administration. Considering the matter carefully, he decided that he would like to be Secretary of Agriculture, a position of power and responsibility for which he was admirably qualified in terms of knowledge and background. Agriculture had always been a political storm center and it was characteristic of McGovern that he should not be afraid of grasping the nettle.¹ Whatever one may think of his political ideology, no objective observer would ever accuse McGovern of seeking soft sinecures and safe havens.

McGovern telephoned the President and asked for the Cabinet post, receiving an evasive answer. He next approached presidential adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., whom he didn't know, but who was favorably disposed toward him as one of the more radical backers of the new Administration. McGovern also approached his powerful friend in court, Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General designate and the President's closest adviser.

Both men supported McGovern for the post and Kennedy would have liked to appoint him. However, as a Chief Executive with an almost totally urban background who was bored to death with farm problems, Kennedy needed a man in Agriculture who had political power in the Farm Belt and who had earned a seat in the Cabinet by past services to the Democratic Party. The result was that Agriculture went to Orville Freeman, the Governor of Minn-

esota who had gone down to electoral defeat that fall.

Schlesinger points out in his valuable memoirs of the Kennedy Administration that "the liberals" were unhappy because only one of their "particular favorites" had made the Cabinet. The chosen one was Arthur J. Goldberg, who was Secretary of Labor designate. It is interesting that, even as early as 1960, George McGovern would be considered one of these five paladins of "liberalism," the others being Adlai E. Stevenson, Chester Bowles and G. Mennen ("Soapy") Williams. All would get subcabinet posts.²

McGovern was named Director of a new agency to be part of the Executive Office of the President and hence directly responsible to the latter. The agency would be called Food for Peace. Its function was to administer Public Law 480, a piece of legislation dating from the Eisenhower era, which authorized the United States to make surplus foods and other agricultural products available to needy foreign countries under conditions of payment which imposed no foreign exchange drains on their central banks and treasuries.

The Kennedy people claimed, perhaps with some justice, that the stress of the Eisenhower Administration had been on disposal of unwanted surplus crops and fibers, which would otherwise have had to be stored domestically at government expense. Under the New Frontier, there would be a transformation of "what is now a surplus disposal act into a food-for-peace act designed to use American agricultural capacity to the fullest practicable extent to meet human needs the world over and to promote world economic development."³

This meant that, instead of sending whatever was in surplus abroad, the United States should transform its agriculture and land-use pattern so as to produce whatever crops were needed to provide foreign populations with their nutritional needs, the incentive foods necessary to induce their unemployed to work on public projects, and the foods and fibers which would offset inflationary pressures that might result from shifting their labor from agriculture to public projects.⁴ What was involved, in short, was a profound revolution, not only in agriculture, but in the nature of the American economic system and in the concept of national sovereignty. Agricultural objectives were to be prescribed by government, not merely on the basis of projected domestic market demand or need, but also in terms of the nutritional requirements of the underdeveloped world.

McGovern's powers under the old Eisenhower law were immense. The basic mode of operation was to sell food to foreign countries, receiving payment (if they were short of gold or dollars, which was almost invariably the case) in local currency. The American government would then loan back 80 per cent of

these local-currency proceeds to the recipient government, which would spend the cash on such beneficial projects as health, education, defense or internal security protection against Communist aggression. The remainder of the local-currency would pay in part for the construction and upkeep of American diplomatic missions, for Fulbright scholarships, and for other cultural and scientific projects. The second approach, that of Title II, enabled the United States to grant food outright in case of famine or other emergencies and to pay foreign workers on internal development projects in their countries with food. In the case of backward countries, which pursued unsound fiscal policies causing rampant inflation, payment of workers with food could be about the only possible way of persuading them to stay on the job. Whether the projects thus financed by American agricultural surpluses were beneficial or the contrary depended, of course, on the honesty, intelligence, and administrative capacity of the foreign governmental agencies concerned. Title III of the Act provided for food distribution through private charitable institutions, such as CARE.

McGOVERN'S FOOD FOR PEACE PHILOSOPHY

McGovern's philosophy of using American agriculture resources as a major instrument for the ending of famine and for the nutritional rehabilitation of the underdeveloped world was revolutionary in its implications, although it was advocated with reassuring reference to generally accepted ethical norms and with the implication that the Communist advance in hunger-plagued areas could be halted by filling empty bellies.

McGovern wrote in a 1967 article which expounds his food-for-peace philosophy more clearly than his official reports during the Kennedy Administration:

"'A hungry people,' Seneca said, 'listens not to reason, nor cares for justice.' There can be no peace or safety on a planet ravaged by famine. Nikita Khrushchev told Red China that if there was nuclear war, the survivors would envy the dead.⁵ So it is with starvation."⁶

McGovern continued with the observation that the Malthusian law has not been refuted by the achievements of modern technology. All that has happened is that its dire effects have been postponed. Malthus had posited that human populations multiply at a geometric rate, whereas food supplies increase merely at an arithmetic rate. Consequently, human numbers must be kept down, either by such national and man-made calamities as famine, pestilence, war and genocide, or by such human activities as celibacy, postponement of marriage or

"vice." By "vice" Malthus meant contraception and abortion. He was a minister of the Church of England and he published his Essay on the Principle of Population in 1798.

"Food production is increasing at a rate of one percent annually," McGovern wrote, "while population is growing at a rate of two percent."

"This is the Malthusian equation in stark relief. Its meaning is clear: We are now losing the race between available food and the growing number of stomachs."⁷

McGovern pointed out that "population is growing fastest in areas where food production lags most" and that "food output is hardest to increase in areas where population pressure is most intense." He added that "the ever-present companions of malnutrition — lethargy, disease and early death — generate a vicious circle of listless, ineffective humans, powerless to break out of their misery."⁸

While the food crisis was perhaps painted in excessively dramatic terms, there is little in McGovern's factual analysis with which experts would wish to quarrel.

He proceeded to point out that American application of science and modern technology to superb land resources had created unprecedented agricultural productivity. The comparison of American farming efficiency with that of the Soviet Union was devastating, that between American and British productivity impressive.

He recommended as an urgent need which brooked no delay, a "short-term effort" and a "second and more permanent front." The emergency operation was to revolutionize American agricultural production to meet the objective of supplying the most fundamental nutritional deficiencies of the rest of the world. This was based on the twin assumptions that the recipient countries could not introduce birth control measures fast enough to bring their population growth down to zero in less than ten to fifteen years and that "for the foreseeable future they cannot increase (food) production fast enough to meet their needs..."

The longer-range program, which McGovern hoped would supersede the emergency plan in ten to fifteen years, provided for American assistance to the underdeveloped world in family planning and in modern agricultural techniques.

He added that "the peasant communities, comprising four fifths of the world's people, are the primary targets of international communism.... We thought that communism would come as the logical next step after the advanced stages of capitalism. Instead, it came to the primitive peasant societies of China and Russia."⁹

The McGovern program suffered from several defects.

He assumed that Asian, African and Latin American peasants would not be able to increase food production enough to eliminate starvation during

"the foreseeable future." Yet the great recent advances in the battle against hunger have come not from grandiose governmental projects, but in a very different fashion. High-yield, resistant rice and corn strains were developed in Rockefeller-financed laboratories and pilot farms in Mexico and the Philippines. Once the sensational yield increases that these new strains could furnish were demonstrated, they were accepted with amazing alacrity by supposedly backward and tradition-bound peasants in such countries as Turkey and Pakistan. The profit motive brought about massive agricultural change where governmental schemes, involving multimillion dollar expenditures often achieved nothing.

Second, McGovern did not propose that viable birth control education and family limitation policies be a precondition of American aid. Unless this were insisted upon, American food aid could become, not a boon, but the harbinger of disaster. The problem did not arise in the course of relief of temporary famine conditions, whether caused by natural calamities or by inhuman governmental policies, as in the case of Biafra. It arose where surplus food was shipped, without strings attached, to countries which were hungry because they were overpopulated and which were doing nothing to bring population growth under control.

Unconditional American food aid under these conditions could fuel the fires of population explosion, involving ever increasing demands on American ocean transportation, fertilizers, land resources, etc. A time would come when the United States would have to choose between cutting down food exports and thus condemning millions to starvation or continuing to feed ever-increasing surplus populations at an intolerable cost. As Thomas Jefferson once wrote in a very different context, "we have the wolf by the ears, and can neither hold him, nor safely let him go..."¹⁰

One of McGovern's first acts as Administrator of Food for Peace was to occupy offices in the White House on the sound theory that, in the confusion of a shift from one Administration to another, possession would be nine points of the law. During the year that followed, McGovern inaugurated major child-feeding programs in the poverty-stricken regions of Brazil and Peru, helped avert famine in Egypt and India, and made a round-the-world inspection trip of his agency's operations. Under McGovern, there was a significant increase in the scope of the Agency's operations from the 60 million people in 80 countries who were fed under Public Law 480 during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration.¹¹ Food for Peace entered the fibers field and provided enough cotton to give every man, woman and child in India seven yards of cloth.¹²

FOOD AS A WEAPON FOR SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Congressman McGovern had been installed as Food for Peace Director about a week when he proposed to the President that his Agency make American food available to Communist China. There was famine in Mao's domain. However, millions of Americans, who remembered Chinese intervention in the Korean War, hated the Communist regime and adamantly opposed any U.S. program that would assist it out of its difficulties. At the time, Mao was denouncing the United States as the chief enemy of the peace of the world, the arch-imperialist exploiter, and the main obstacle to human progress toward Communism. Moreover, when a private American agency had broached the possibility of making food available to China, the Peking dictatorship had rebuffed the offer.

President Kennedy rejected McGovern's proposal, not on grounds of principle, but because he doubted the Chinese would be amenable and because he considered it a disastrous move politically.

The President decided to send McGovern to Latin America on the first foreign mission of the new Administration. Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., would go along representing the White House and lending the mission stature.

In many ways, Schlesinger was not the best choice for this assignment since he shared many of McGovern's limitations. The Harvard historian had a sketchy background on Latin American affairs; his knowledge of the area was limited; his facts were often wrong; he tended to see the issues in terms of an oversimplified social democratic ideology,¹³ and his policy recommendations would prove unfortunate. While he was opposed to Communist penetration of the area, he was somewhat inept at distinguishing between Communists and their opponents. Thus, in 1950, Schlesinger had been one of the moving spirits in the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom, a somewhat confused organization which sought to further democratic socialism south of the Rio Grande. The Latin American luminaries of this "anti-communist" society included Salvador Allende, who would later head the Marxist government of Chile, and Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic, who would in time reveal his true colors as an inveterate enemy of the United States and a disciple of Soviet Communism.¹⁴

McGovern and Schlesinger visited the drought-stricken, impoverished Brazilian Northeast, a region of centuries-old misery and despair.¹⁵ This was a bleak land of poor soil, deficient rainfall, hideous shacks, and stunted people, plagued by chronic hunger and malnutrition.

Schlesinger was enthusiastic over the plans of the

leftist Brazilian Government of Janio Quadros to rehabilitate this stricken region. He was particularly impressed by Celso Furtado, a Cambridge-educated economist who had been placed in charge of this plan. American Embassy reports from Brazil in the 1950's had rated Furtado as a Marxist, but Schlesinger believed that Furtado "saw the problem of the Northeast as a personal race between himself and the agitator, Francisco Juliao, who was organizing the peasants in Ligas Camponeses and urging them to seize the land."¹⁶

McGovern seems to have been impressed, not so much by the radical intellectual, Furtado, as by the Communist insurrectionary leader of the peasantry, Francisco Juliao.

Two years later as a freshman, Senator McGovern would deliver a remarkable speech on the floor of the Senate, which he entitled "Our Castro Fixation versus the Alliance for Progress." This was an extraordinary address for at least two reasons. It suggested that the Communist organizer, Juliao, was an agent of Providence. It also seemed to imply that the difference between the Communist program and that of the Alliance for Progress was merely one of means, not one of ends, that each sought in its own way to end oppression and raise living standards. McGovern said:

"Two years ago, at the request of the President, I led a food-for-peace mission to Latin America which took us to northeast Brazil. In this benighted section of the largest and most populous nation of Latin America, our mission came face to face with the real challenge to the hemisphere. There we saw the wretched life of Brazil's 27 million peasants, who are trying to survive in the feudal, drought-stricken sections of the northeast. There we saw the miserable mud huts, the total absence of sanitation facilities, the villages devoid of doctors, teachers, and adequate water and food.

"We saw, too, Fidel Castro's counterpart and alter-ego, Francisco Juliao, the flaming peasant leader, urging his wretched followers to seize the land and destroy the suppressors. (sic!)

"It may very well be that in the long view of history, the Castros and Juliaos, for all their mischief and violence, will have indirectly performed some service in that they have forced us to give closer attention to our neighbors to the south. Likewise, they have confronted the ruling classes of Latin America with a stern choice between making long overdue reforms or seeing themselves swept aside in a series of violent Castro-type revolutions. There can be no mistaking the fact that much of Castro's appeal to the oppressed rests on the knowledge that his presence has forced every government in the hemisphere to take a new and more searching look at the crying needs of the great masses of human beings.

"The real issue, it seems to me, turns upon the question of whether or not the people can overthrow an unjust social order through a peaceful democratic revolution, or whether they will do it by a violent, Communist-led upheaval."

"The Alliance for Progress is a mutual effort to raise standards of living through the painstaking, often frustrating, method of democratic reform and constructive economic development.

"The Communists call for a quick upheaval that promises a new day through Marxist shortcuts Castro-style."¹⁷

The most shocking thing about this speech was McGovern's bland statement that the objective of the Alliance for Progress was to "overthrow" the Latin American "social order." The question, to his mind, was the secondary one of whether this revolution was to be achieved "through a peaceful democratic revolution," engineered no doubt by the United States Government, or a "violent, Communist-led upheaval." The implication was clear that there are no fundamental differences of purpose between Communists and "peaceful revolutionaries" of the McGovern stamp. If we can assume that Senator McGovern's views have not changed radically on this fundamental issue, then there is good reason to fear that, if elected President, he will use the vast powers of that office for the peaceful transformation of the United States into a Socialist state.

To return now to the Brazilian story:

Juliao's plan was to arm the peasants and expropriate the middle and larger farms by force as Lenin and his Bolshevik Party did in Russia in 1917. The predictable results would have been a flight of capital from the Northeast on an enormous scale, consequently increased rural misery and hunger. Historically, peasant civil wars, or jacqueries, have been the most bloody and ruinous of all social conflicts. If the revolutionary rural politician who so impressed McGovern had had any real concern for the welfare of the peasantry, he would have chosen a different course.

Juliao was not merely a Communist, he was a revolutionary extremist whose heroes were Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro and "Che" Guevara. The Chinese leaders courted him and invited him to visit their country. "Furthermore, they highlighted the visit of his wife and two daughters in April 1962. Indicative of the high priority accorded to the Brazilian 'peasant' leader and his family was the fact that they were received by Ch'en Yi and by Mao himself... Given the remoteness and inaccessibility of the area (in which Juliao operated), one can well imagine that the Chinese Communists were extremely excited about the prospects of winning a foothold in this the largest and most strategic of the republics in Latin America."¹⁸ Juliao was

impressed by the Maoist approach to social revolution, but he was "equally attracted by the Cuban model."¹⁹

The fact that McGovern was dazzled by this formentor of chaos and revolution indicated how little he had changed fundamentally since the old days of the Progressive Party.

The sequel to the Brazilian story was ironic. The Northeast was slowly lifted out of its centuries-long misery, not because the revolutionary politicians McGovern admired were appeased, but because they were crushed. That great nation of 92 million inhabitants (one of every two South Americans is a Brazilian!) staggered toward chaos. Communist takeover with the connivance of an irresponsible left-wing government seemed in the cards.

The military intervened at the crucial moment. After an almost bloodless coup d'etat, the Communists were arrested, driven underground, or forced into exile.

A decade of unprecedented Brazilian prosperity under rightwing military dictatorship followed and, in the 1970's, Brazil could boast one of the fastest rates of economic growth in the world. Large resources were plowed into the tragic Northeast. The rising economy drew labor from the drought areas to the thriving cities. More was achieved to improve the lot of the Northeast than in any prior period of Brazilian history.

The McGovern approach had combined an almost inexplicable admiration for Juliao, the prophet of chaos and insurrection, with the standard socialistic appeal that the United States must foment "peaceful" revolutions in order to stave off more violent Communist ones. Here all that need be said is that the radical advocates of Kennedy's Alliance for Progress had alarmed the Latin American middle class with their talk of necessary social revolution and generated an immense flight of capital to safe havens abroad. Thus, the radical and revolutionary policies backed by such Kennedy men as McGovern, Schlesinger and Goodwin were not the alternatives to Communist revolution; they were its trail blazers. The answer to the Communist threat was not more socialistic measures; it was free enterprise in the economic sphere and order and individual freedom in the political sphere.

Having failed to persuade the President to let his agency give food to Communist China, McGovern's next move was to announce that his Food for Peace operation would make American surplus agricultural produce available to Cuba. Few steps could have been more unpopular. American hostility to the Castro dictatorship was running high. The blood of the paredons, against which some of the best brains of Cuba had been spattered by Castro firing squads, was fresh in the memory of the American people. The crimes and outrages committed by the bearded Cuban dictator, had affronted the moral sense

of the nation.

National pride, moreover, had been injured by the Bay of Pigs fiasco. While the Soviet Union had not yet begun to install offensive IRBMs on Cuban launching pads, pointed at American cities, it was on the verge of doing so and there was an uneasy awareness that the Communist regime in Cuba was an imminent threat to national security.

Nor did Americans understand why their Food for Peace Agency should be used to strengthen the nation's enemies. If there was a food crisis in Cuba, the fundamental reason was the destructive policies of its Communist regime: the expropriation of efficient, modern agricultural enterprise (which, incidentally, had been primarily Cuban-owned and not American-owned), the harrying into exile of the most able, hard working and productive elements in the Cuban population, and the shackling of agriculture under totalitarian controls. Moreover, Castro breathed hatred of the United States with every five-hour harangue and did not hesitate to proclaim that "Yankee imperialism" must be destroyed.

There can scarcely be any doubt that, had they been informed or consulted, the American people would have rejected by a decisive majority this McGovern plan to use taxpayers' money to assist Castro's dictatorship, an open and avowed enemy of the United States.

Before the issue could come to a head, McGovern found the ground slipping away from under his feet. As early as May 18, 1961, the New York Times reported that a power struggle was going on to determine who should control Food for Peace. Henry R. Labouisse, an experienced and able diplomat, urged that the McGovern agency should come under the direction of his International Cooperation Administration (ICA). McGovern fought for complete independence from the State Department. He wanted to remain responsible to the President only.

The official McGovern version of this story makes it, not a bureaucratic power struggle of the run-of-the-mill sort, but a battle between the forces of light and darkness, of idealism and grubby expediency. When the State Department finally had its way in the dispute, a victory which took place several years after McGovern had left the Agency, the South Dakota politician described that event as a blow struck against internationalism.

"Instead of strengthening the hand of the Food for Peace director," he wrote, "the administration took him out of the White House in 1965 and put him in a closet at the State Department. Thus, when the 1966 act was passed, the administrative turmoil accelerated until Richard Reuter, my capable successor, resigned in dismay to avoid being pulled apart in a bureaucratic tug of war."²⁰

Only the naive will mistake this self-serving statement for an objective account. One of the issues involved was that of naked power. Like all successful politicians, McGovern was not bashful about

fighting to hold on to the power he had and struggling for more. Being responsible directly to the President gave him more prestige and authority than being subordinate to the Department of State. Nor was the State Department blind to the bureaucratic advantages of devouring the Food for Peace agency.

The larger issue, however, was whether the U.S. should distribute food surpluses abroad in accordance with its foreign policy or in accordance with George McGovern's prejudices and preferences. The State Department was constitutionally entrusted with the conduct of American foreign policy. It must have seemed intolerable to experienced and dedicated State Department Officials to have McGovern offer food to nations, such as Castro Cuba and Maoist China, which proclaimed their hatred of the United States and their desire to destroy its free institutions.

McGovern became embroiled in additional conflicts, with the Department of Agriculture and with the maritime unions. The White House began to give him the cold treatment. At the birth of the new agency, President Kennedy had directed his staff to give McGovern "all the help we can." As Anson tells the story, one of the first indications of the approaching bureaucratic ice age was that, when McGovern staff people picked up the phone and announced, "This is the White House calling," the reaction at the other end of the line would be, "Who at the White House?" This process of disintegration began half a year after McGovern had accepted control of the new agency. By early 1962, memoranda from Food for Peace would remain unanswered; it would even sometimes be impossible for McGovern men to get through to members of the White House staff.²¹

Probably, the main reason McGovern fell out of favor was that he was too radical for the Kennedy Administration. Shrewd, canny and calculating, he nevertheless refused to compromise, for reasons best known to himself, on the basic issue of appeasement of Communist forces. A man whom President Kennedy had considered potentially one of the four key people in the New Frontier let himself be frozen out of the Administration.

(1) "Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety." King Henry IV, Part I, Act iii, Scene 2.

(2) Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 143-44.

(3) George S. McGovern, War Against Want (New York: Random House, 1964), xi-xii.

(4) As interpreted by Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 169-170;

(5) I am unable to find this quotation from Khrushchev. What he said in his memoirs (Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970) was very different: "I have always been against war, but at the same time I've always realized full well that the fear of nuclear war in a country's leader can paralyze that country's defense...We must not lower our guard. Under no circumstances should we let our nuclear missile force fall below the necessary level. There are other weapons, too which are necessary to have in any eventuality, namely chemical and bacter-

iological weapons." (p. 518). To the extent that he was portraying Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders as men who were sensitive to the peril of nuclear war and aghast at its consequences, McGovern was being less than realistic.

(6) This is better rhetoric than logic. The survivors of a nuclear holocaust might envy the dead because they would not escape radiation sickness and genetic damage. The well fed, however, do not sicken because others starve.

(7) This and the previous quotation are from George McGovern, "We Are Losing the Race against Hunger," Look, March 7, 1967, pp. 86-92.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Ibid. Emphasis supplied. The italicized sentence summarizes the Marxist view of why the victory of Communism is inevitable. When McGovern begins this statement with the words "we thought" the implication seems to be that he is a former Marxist.

(10) Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, Monticello, April 22, 1820.

(11) Congressional Record, April 6, 1960, p. 7482.

(12) Anson, McGovern, II:10-III.

(13) Thus, Schlesinger was the principal author of the Kennedy Administration's White Paper on Cuba, although "President Kennedy devoted many hours to the pamphlet, personally going over it with Mr Schlesinger." (New York Times, April 4, 1961.) This publication was characterized by Spruille Braden, former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba and Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, as "one of the most indefensible documents I have ever seen issued by a presumably responsible foreign office" and reflecting "the socialistic prejudices of its drafters." (Address to the Cuban Chamber of Commerce in the United States, May 17, 1961.)

(14) Schlesinger, Thousand Days 172.

(15) Thus, the plight of the Northeast forms the setting of Brazil's most famous literary work, Euclides da Cunha's Os Sertoes (1902), translated by Samuel Putnam as Rebellion in the Backlands (Chicago: Phoenix, 1944.)

(16) Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 176.

(17) Congressional Record, March 15, 1963, 4345. Emphasis supplied.

(18) Cecil Johnson, Communist China and Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 198-199.

(19) Ibid., 292.

(20) McGovern, Look article, 90.

(21) Anson, McGovern, 155.

time friendly and cooperative relationships with movements which were nominally anti-war, but were actually Communist-dominated and dedicated to the defeat of the United States, not only in Vietnam, but throughout the world. The record of these affiliations is complex and involves a good deal of background information. In the interests of brevity, only a few instances of Senator McGovern's assistance to these subversive-influenced or Communist-controlled "anti-war" movements will be recorded in these pages.

In September 1967, McGovern wrote an open letter to an organization called Veterans for Peace in Vietnam, which read:

"Dear Friends:

"Veterans have a special interest in working toward world peace, including a resolution of the conflict in Vietnam.

"I wish you well in your efforts to bring about an honorable and early end to the war.

Sincerely,

George McGovern"¹

The tactical objective of Veterans for Peace in Vietnam, according to its leader and prime mover, LeRoy Wolins, was "a massive confrontation with the warmakers, each group and individual on their own level of militancy..." (In other words, as much violence as any member or subgroup cared to indulge in.) It was dedicated to "dramatic confrontation with the symbol of U.S. militarism." That symbol was the Pentagon.

Formation of the Veterans for Peace in Viet Nam had been announced shortly before in The National Guardian, a New York City pro-communist weekly. Its leader, LeRoy Wolins had previously been secretary of the Chicago chapter of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, an organization listed as subversive by the Justice Department. In 1960, he had taken the Fifth Amendment when asked by the House Committee on Un-American Activities whether he was a member of the Communist Party and whether he had received money from a Soviet official. After a trip to Russia in 1962, Wolins returned to the United States. He was queried about violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act as an importer of communist literature and again refused to answer on grounds of self-incrimination.²

This background information was, of course, readily available to Senator McGovern. Most high officials of the U.S. Government avoid giving their blessing to unknown organizations without at least cursory investigation. A phone call from McGovern's staff to the Department of Justice would have elicited the information that the so-called peace organization was suspect and had unsavory connec-

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McGOVERN AND THE RED ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

Senator McGovern's opposition to the war in Vietnam created a situation which resulted in his establishing and maintaining over the course of

tions with the Communist Party. Observers differ as to Senator McGovern's intellectual capacity, but there is agreement that he is not a stupid man. Hence, it would seem reasonable to conclude that he endorsed the Veterans for Peace in Vietnam with his eyes open.

Several years before this, specifically in November 1963, a struggling little leftwing magazine printed in Passaic, N.J., called The Minority of One, devoted eighteen columns to reproducing in full Senator McGovern's speech to the Senate, urging drastic unilateral cuts in the military budget of the United States.³ This was an unusual action because the paper was suffering from financial anemia and because the McGovern address was printed in the Congressional Record and available free of charge from the Senator's office.

The Minority of One, edited by M.S. Arnoni, was characterized as "a pro-Soviet magazine"⁴ and as "a vitriolic left-wing monthly."⁵ Editor Arnoni had espoused such patriotic causes as recruiting U. S. volunteers to go to Vietnam to fight against American troops. He sold records of the Anthem of the National Liberation Front, pledging that all proceeds would be sent to the Viet Cong.⁶ "China no less than the Soviet Union or any other nation must not be thrown to the Pentagonist wolves," he urged ungrammatically. He advised then Premier Khrushchev to "put the Pentagon on notice that thus far and no further may they go in harassing China."⁷ The Minority of One was sponsored by such old-time fellow travellers as Reverend Stephen Fritchman and retired Brigadier General Hugh B. Hester. Its financial agents included identified Communists Frances E. Tandy of Oakland and Harvey O'Connor of the Emergency Civil Liberties Union.⁸

Why did this revolutionary publication, one which was perennially short of funds and which would expire in 1969, consider that the propagation of Senator McGovern's views on national defense warranted re-publication of a speech that took up more than five pages of closely printed text? Presumably, because Editor Arnoni considered that McGovern's plea for unilateral American disarmament served the national interests of his Russian and Chinese friends.

Concerned lest a few phrases in McGovern's long speech, which seemed to suggest that American democracy was superior to Soviet totalitarianism, might offend his Communist readers, Arnoni hastened to assure them that these were noises which politicians have to make. He introduced the McGovern article with these words:

"In spite of a few compulsory cliches about freedom and tyranny, the voice of sanity has rarely sounded so clearly in the Senate as when Sen. George McGovern presented, on August 2, 1963, his analysis of the military budget as a detriment to national security."⁹

THE CHICAGO CONVENTION RIOTS

When the Democratic National Convention met in Chicago in 1968 to choose a Presidential candidate, it was confronted by some 15,000 demonstrators who blocked streets, clashed with police, and sought to dominate proceedings with mob power.

The police overreacted because of lack of experience in handling revolutionary demonstrations. Instead of confining the disturbances to a limited area and then selectively arresting the ringleaders, they remained passive until matters got out of hand and then struck out mindlessly, hitting reporters and photographers as well as activists. Yet the pro-Communist Guardian correspondent concluded that "Chicago was not a bloodbath" and added that "at the height of the rock-throwing and cherry bomb-tossing, it was safer to be a protester than a cop!"¹⁰

The purposes were nominally anti-war and peaceful, but actually pro-Vietcong and revolutionary. The organizers and leaders were the youth cadres of the Trotskyists, orthodox Communists and Anarcho-Communists of the amorphous New Left, such men as David Dellinger, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin. "Chicago," commented the Berkeley Barb "was a revolutionary wetdream come true."

McGovern witnessed some of the clashes between police and demonstrators. He completely lost his sense of balance and perspective.

"Do you see what those sons of bitches are doing to those kids down there?" he repeated. "Those bastards."

Theodore White, the distinguished analyst of presidential campaigns, urged McGovern not to obey his impulse to go down into the street with the rioters.

"There are ten people who are causing all the trouble," White said. "They're all Communists from New York."¹¹

McGovern was dissuaded from joining the demonstrators. Instead, he told the press next morning that he had eyewitnessed "a naked example of what I would call police brutality" against people who assembled "to peacefully protest policies over which they have no voice."

Eric Hoffer, ex-longshoreman, member of the Kerner Commission and author of The True Believer, saw matters in a more realistic light. "Like Hitler," he said, "they (the rioters) said they were going to take everything apart and Daley took them at their word..." AFL-CIO President George Meany also backed Mayor Daley and received a tumultu-

ous ovation when he referred to the "dirty-necked, dirty-mouthed demonstrators in Chicago" in a speech to a labor convention.¹² Among other forms of peaceful protest, the anti-war element had planned to pour enough LSD into Chicago drinking water to drug the entire city. Ignorance of chemistry and their general technical incompetence prevented this plan from becoming operational.¹³

McGovern's emotional outburst of hatred and profanity against the Chicago police was not a political move. He was running for re-election to the Senate that year and he must have known that his defense of the Chicago rioters would jeopardize his chances. Yet he called the police "bastards" and reinforced that statement with a formal charge of "brutality." These actions came from the heart. They were a measure of his overwhelming sympathy for the revolutionary element.

At the Convention, Connecticut Congressman Don Irwin yielded to Senator Abraham Ribicoff to enable the latter to nominate McGovern for the Presidency. When Ribicoff used the occasion to compare Mayor Daley's police with Heinrich Himmler's Gestapo, Irwin turned on him, called him a "creep," and added "I hope they mace you."¹⁴

Even though McGovern's political base in South Dakota had been badly shaken by his intemperate defense of the revolutionary element, he was not willing to let the matter rest and preserve silence until the storms of protest blew away.

He approached Mayor Daley with unctuous talk about letting "raw wounds" heal. If Daley would drop charges against the accused Chicago rioters and seditionists, he would be striking a blow for "charity and humanism." Daley replied that these people had come to Chicago to destroy President Johnson and added: "In knowingly violating the law, they must take the consequences." McGovern's star seemed to be declining. Governor Lester Maddox of Georgia called him the leader of the "socialist" wing of the Democratic Party. Other Senators with Presidential aspirations kept him at arm's length.¹⁵

NEW MOBE

Experienced Washington politicians and publicists were amazed when Senator McGovern agreed to march with and address the mass movement against the war in Vietnam in the fall of 1969 directed by the so-called New MOBE. This organization, led by the incendiary David Dellinger, had already been publicly branded by Mayor Richard Daley as the chief instigator of the Chicago riots. It was common knowledge that New MOBE was manipulated by Communists, Trotskyists and others dedicated to Viet Cong victory, that some of its principal leaders were irrevocably opposed to free American institutions and committed to a dictatorship of the proletariat in Soviet, Cuban or Chinese form. With one trivial exception, Mc-

Govern was the only United States Senator who agreed to march with these people.

Since the background history of New MOBE is complex with labyrinthine interconnections, no single and direct characterization of its origins and objectives is possible.

In 1969, Communists of all shades and complexions, Anarchist revolutionaries, fellow travellers and leftwing pacifist groups agreed on a mass march on Washington that would compel the Nixon Administration to end American participation in the Indo-Chinese war on terms laid down by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong enemy. According to the American Security Council, an organization of enormous prestige and authority,¹⁶ this plan was hatched at a conference called by radical leaders in Cleveland on July 4th and 5th. The 900 or so delegates who assembled represented such well-known leftwing organizations as the Communist Party, the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs, the National Lawyers Guild, the Socialist Workers Party, the Young Socialist Alliance, the Women's Strike for Peace, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and the McGovern-endorsed Veterans for Peace in Vietnam.

Planning was in the hands of a small steering committee "composed mostly of Communists and radical pacifists with Communist leanings."¹⁷ The key people included Arnold Johnson, public relations director of the Communist Party; Irving Sarnoff, who had been a big wheel in the southern California CPUSA organization; Dorothy Hayes of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, identified as a Communist Party member in sworn testimony; Sidney Lens (alias Sidney Okun), Revolutionary Workers League, and Fred Halstead, 1968 Presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers Party. The new coalition was called New MOBE. New MOBE's Co-Chairman, David Dellinger, had said in May 1963: "I am a Communist, but I am not the Soviet-type Communist."¹⁸

Splits developed between the Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers Party, who wanted revolutionary action, and the Communist-Party-led majority, which favored the sort of comparatively peaceful mass action which would not drive away "respectables" of the McGovern type who had a public position to maintain or who had to run for re-election. When David Dellinger rose at one of the meetings to announce that, speaking on behalf of Jerry Rubin, Abbie Hoffman, and other of his co-defendants at the Chicago conspiracy trial then in progress, he recommended storming the Justice Department building, Sidney Lens branded the plan as adventurous and a shouting match between the two developed.¹⁹

Leaders of the terrorist Weatherman faction of SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) took part in planning sessions. Mark Rudd, leader of the Columbia campus riots and currently wanted on a Federal indictment, allegedly played a prominent role.

The new MOBE decided to appoint its own Marshals to control violence within the ranks of the demonstrators. In some instances, these Marshals were given instructions to prevent the authorities from making arrests.

New MOBE organizers were instructed to concentrate on recruiting middle-class elements so the revolutionary nature of the demonstration would not become too obvious. On October 14, a month before the planned action in Washington, D.C., New MOBE received a telegram from North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Dong, which read in part:

"STRUGGLE OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES AGAINST U.S. AGGRESSION WILL END IN TOTAL VICTORY. I WISH YOUR 'FALL OFFENSIVE' A BRILLIANT SUCCESS." ²⁰

The leadership decided to keep the text of this telegram and the favorable answer it dispatched to Hanoi a secret so the New MOBE would not be branded as giving "aid and comfort" to the enemies of the United States and as treasonable.

New MOBE had decided initially to endorse the Chicago demonstrations planned by the Weathermen against the Vietnam War and against the conspiracy trials of Dellinger, Rubin, Hoffman and the other accused leaders of riots at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. At the last moment, New MOBE withdrew its support, fearing that the forthcoming events in Chicago would tarnish its carefully cultivated and phoney image as a gathering of liberal, idealistic, pacifist young people.

It was a wise decision. When the helmeted, armed and well-drilled Weathermen went into action, they announced: "We're going to tear up pig city... we're going to tear the motherfuckers up. We're going to make Communism around the world and destroy imperialism and we're starting in Chicago, the biggest pig city." ²¹

This was hardly the image that people like Senator McGovern cared to project.

Yale Chaplain William Sloane Coffin advised McGovern to march with the New MOBE masses and address the crowd at the foot of the Washington monument. Along with radical baby doctor Benjamin Spock, Coffin had been indicted for conspiring to counsel draft evasion. Convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, the Reverend Coffin had escaped punishment because the U.S. Appeals Court reversed his conviction on grounds of judicial error.

Members of McGovern's staff were aghast when he told them what he had decided to do. The biographies of some of the revolutionary leaders of the demonstration were well known and McGovern's active participation seemed an act of political suicide.

That day, the 14th, McGovern read into the Congressional Record some rather unctuous remarks which he entitled "Peace Demonstrations," which were designed to explain and justify his

conduct.

He informed the Senators that "tens of thousands of people from all parts of the country, young and old alike, are in Washington for the purpose of expressing their concern and their views with reference to our policy in Vietnam and with reference to other issues that are of concern to them..."

"Mr. President, I wish to say how pleased I am that the first news reports on the activities of last night and again today indicate that these Americans who are visiting here in the Capital are conducting themselves as I fully expected they would, in a climate of dignity, good taste and genuine conviction. These people come in an atmosphere of peace. They come here for the purpose of expressing their opposition to violence, not to perpetuate it." (sic!) ²⁴

McGovern's speech quoted some self-serving expressions of pacific intent by leaders and activists in the forthcoming demonstration. He quoted David Hawk, one of the leaders of the operation to the effect that it represented "a youth culture, a culture that believes in love, peace, joy, not war, death and destruction."

On the night of the 14th, tightly organized action groups of participants rampaged up Connecticut and New Hampshire Avenues, smashing store windows and wrecking parked cars ("behaving, as I fully expected they would, in a climate of dignity, good taste, and genuine conviction.") It appeared that the demonstrators had planned an attack on the South Vietnam Embassy, or failing that, an assault on the South Korean Embassy, which they characterized as equally "imperialist." ("These people come in an atmosphere of peace.")

These violent actions had been planned earlier that day at a preliminary meeting attended by such peaceful, democratic youth leaders as John Hoffman and Lew Cole from Mad Dog, Vincent Tsao and Sheila O'Connor from the New York Crazies, John Seeley of Veterans for Peace in Vietnam (the organization that McGovern had endorsed) and Key Martin, national chairman of Youth Against War and Fascism. Tactical planning involved such operations as scouting the area for construction sites with abundant bricks and rubble.

By 7 P.M. on November 14th, the night before the big demonstration, everything was ready. "Helmets were produced, water canteens filled, several dozen gas masks strapped and tested out. A number of short sticks and short solid plastic clubs, handy for window breaking, were tucked into jackets." ²⁵

Chanting "John Brown, be like him; dare to struggle; dare to win," the Weathermen contingent swarmed into the streets. Soon there were about 3,000 people in the Dupont Circle area. The militants, mostly Weathermen and Crazies, prowled through the fashionable Washington shopping area in groups of three to fifty, smashing plate glass store windows and vandalizing cars. ("These people...come here for the purpose of expressing their opposition to violence, not to perpetuate it.")

The police reacted with arrests of only 26 per-

sons. This encouraged the leaders to plan more violence. Late that night, Jerry Rubin, wearing a wig under his Indian headdress, joined the radical planning group. A decision was taken to attack and, if possible storm the Department of Justice building as a protest against the Chicago conspiracy trial, in which prominent leaders of the New MOBE operation, were defendants. To preserve the fiction that New MOBE was a peaceful expression of democratic protest, the Marshals were to rip off their New MOBE armbands and substitute headbands reading "Conspiracy," before joining in the attack.²⁶

On the morning of the 15th, just before McGovern met reporters to announce that he would march with New MOBE and address the demonstrators, one of the more moderate leaders of the operation rushed into his office to urge him not to do so. This man had been at some of the meetings that night at which violent action was planned. He warned the Senator that these people were dangerous revolutionaries and that they planned violent action. For McGovern to march with them would be politically ruinous.

McGovern replied that his informant was unnecessarily alarmed and that he would stick with his decision. The only other United States Senator who marched with the New MOBE rabble was Charles E. Goodell of New York. Goodell was so far to the left that Vice President Agnew would attack him publicly as a man who had nothing in common with Republican Party principles and was disloyal to the Administration. Repudiated by the Nixon Administration, Goodell would be soundly defeated by Conservative Party candidate James L. Buckley when he ran for re-election in 1971.

McGovern made an unusually mild speech which was received with apathy by an enormous crowd. At 2 P.M., right on schedule, the radicals removed huge papier-mache effigies of President Nixon and Attorney General Mitchell and moved on the Department of Justice. Rocks were thrown, windows in the building were smashed, and trash cans were set on fire.

"Smoke bombs were thrown by the (revolutionary) storm troopers at the police, and groups of Weathermen wearing helmets and gas masks, raced in teams 25 strong around the area, gathering like-minded militants for renewed attacks. When these assaults failed, they dashed off into the surrounding streets for another orgy of diversionary window-breaking and car-smashing."²⁷

Wave after wave of assault failed to give the militants entry into the Justice building. The culminating act of the rioters was to rip down the American flag outside the building and, before cheering crowds of subversive youth, to rip it to pieces. The rabble then ran the Viet Cong flag up the flagpole.²⁸

New MOBE leaders David Dellinger, Abbie Hoffman and Rennie Davis had promised on November 10th that the march and mass meeting would be peaceful. After the violence, the leadership disclaimed any responsibility for it. Nevertheless, David Dellinger, national co-chairman of New MOBE,

had told the crowd to go to the Department of Justice building and reporters for Combat stated they saw four members of the National Committee, whom they named, taking part in the action.²⁹

McGovern's support of, and active participation in, the New MOBE operation brought down a storm of criticism on his head, particularly from South Dakota voters who constituted his only solid political base. He proceeded to extricate himself with another carefully prepared essay, this one entitled "Folly of Undisciplined Radicalism," which he read into the Congressional Record on September 1, 1970.

He referred to the "recent bombing of the Math Center of the University of Wisconsin," which had cost the life of a young researcher, and to other "violent acts" as the "folly of undisciplined radicalism." His objection to "the bombers and other irresponsible advocates of violence" was both that they "threaten all that is decent in our society" and that "the tactics of violence only ensure a self-defeating counter-reaction that leads, not to peace and justice, but to conflict and repression."

A few paragraphs later came this revealing thought:

"What I personally resent most about some American radicals is their willingness to jeopardize the chances of constructive change by flaunting their own foolish and destructive tactics. They have invited the so-called hard-hat reaction to the peace effort by such antics as displaying Vietcong flags, disrupting courtrooms, shouting obscenities, and other obnoxious patterns of conduct. Instead of building a broader base on the nearly universal hunger of man for peace, they seem determined to isolate the peace movement from any kind of effective relationship with other human beings."³⁰

These observations were directed at a movement concerning which it is difficult to believe that Senator McGovern harbored illusions. The careers of the leaders of New MOBE were a matter of public record and in many instances were notorious. Many were not only not pacifists, they were not even opposed to the Vietnam War. Rather they wanted to use the occasion of the Vietnam struggle to bring about the defeat of the armed forces of the United States. They were not liberals, but Communists and Anarchists. They were not defenders of the Bill of Rights, but its would-be gravediggers.

Thus, insofar as Senator McGovern's advice referred to principles, it was, as he may have realized, a waste of breath and an exercise in futility. He was not talking to people who shared "the nearly universal hunger of man for peace," but to people who wanted to see the armed triumph of the enemies of their country.

Insofar as the advice referred to strategy and tactics, that is to political means, however, it was excellent counsel. In the 1972 presidential campaign, Senator McGovern would use his enormous political and propaganda skills to urge the leaders of the revolutionary youth movement who supported his candidacy to hide their true objectives and to assume a veneer of sweet reason and respectability.

What was perhaps most interesting about the Mc-

Govern critique of "undisciplined radicalism" was the absence of any feeling of outrage. He was angry about a bombing which snuffed out the life of a laboratory researcher in a great university, but his anger seemed to concentrate, less on the moral enormity of the act, than on the fact that it was "undisciplined" and that it showed loss of contact with reality.

To counteract the damage done to his political strength by association with revolutionary extremists, McGovern went to the unusual lengths of denouncing some of these people by name and for specific offenses.

He attacked Tom Hayden for "glorifying the recent kidnapping of a California judge, which led to his death and that of three other people. Hayden endorses the very barbarism that he professes to despise."

Comment: This was a reference to the murder of a California judge with weapons supplied the criminals by Angela Davis. Right after a jury had finally acquitted Miss Davis on all counts, McGovern told a Negro audience: "This is a happy day which I can understand. This is another demonstration that we can be pleased about."³¹

McGovern added: "In claiming that Panther leader Huey Newton was released from prison because of the guerrilla kidnappers of Uruguay and Brazil, Hayden has gone beyond the limits of either reason or decency."

Comment: Entirely true. But this was the same Hayden to whom Frank Mankiewicz offered a responsible position in the Peace Corps as part of the Mankiewicz program of stacking that organization with "revolutionaries." How did it happen that McGovern had promoted Mankiewicz, the patron of New Left infiltration into the Peace Corps, to be his national campaign director?

"The Jerry Rubins and the Abbie Hoffmans have done all right for themselves doing their own thing," McGovern continued. "They have made themselves into nationally known personalities complete with lucrative fees. But they have discredited in the public mind legitimate efforts for peace and justice."

"I repudiate the tactics of the Jerry Rubins and the Abbie Hoffmans. And I repudiate the foolish words of Tom Hayden, spoken in praise of the California court tragedy and the Latin American kidnappers."

Comment: McGovern repudiated the tactics of Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman; he did not repudiate their subversive and revolutionary purposes. The disagreement was a matter of method, not a matter of objective. This may explain the fact that to date Senator McGovern has conspicuously failed to repudiate the support of Rubin and Hoffman in his presidential campaign.

(1) Both the McGovern letter and the Wolins article are quoted from Veterans Stars and Stripes for Peace, September 1967. This issue is described as Vol. 1, No. 1, indicating that the news sheet was a fly-by-night organ of the anti-war committee, put together to promote the forthcoming demonstrations.

(2) Chicago Tribune, March 23, 1966.

(3) "National Security & the Military Budget," delivered to the Senate by McGovern on August 2, 1967.

(4) Tocsin, December 11, 1963.

(5) Combat, February 1, 1969.

(6) Combat.

(7) Tocsin.

(8) Ibid.

(9) The Minority of One, November 1963, 11.

(10) National Review Bulletin, October 1, 1968, B154.

(11) Anson, McGovern, 209.

(12) National Review Bulletin, September 17, 1968, B147.

(13) According to Combat, September 1, 1968, 2.

(14) National Review Bulletin, September 17, 1968, B147.

(15) Anson, McGovern, 250.

(16) The American Security Council has such eminent Americans on its National Strategy Committee as Nobel scientist Dr. Willard F. Libby, General Bernard A. Schriever, General Nathan F. Twining, former California Senator William F. Knowland, Vice Admiral R. E. Libby, former Ambassador Clare Booth Luce, General Thomas S. Power, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Dr. Edward Teller, the physicist who developed the hydrogen bomb, Rear Admiral Chester Ward, and General Albert C. Wedemeyer.

(17) American Security Council, Washington Report, "Mobilization for Surrender," WR 69-37, October 21, 1969.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Bob Phillips and Arthur Berg, "New Mobe's November Action," Combat, November 15, 1969. Phillips and Berg are the pseudonyms of undercover participant-observers in the New MOBE operation.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Washington Report.

(23) National Review Bulletin, November 11, 1969, 2.

(24) Congressional Record, November 31, 1969, 34281. A good guess is that Senator McGovern confused perpetuate with perpetrate.

(25) Combat, December 1, 1969. Another insider report on New MOBE operations.

(26) Ibid.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Congressional Record, 30639.

(31) National Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 24, June 23, 1972, 670.

5

MODERN CHRISTIANITY AND AFRICAN TERRORISM

During the late 1960's, Senator McGovern was not merely a recognized leader of the radical forces in Congress. He was also a power in the World Council of Churches, and, in this role, was

able to contribute toward mobilization of the main body of Protestant Christianity in favor of revolutionary action against nations which practiced racial discrimination. What this meant in terms of the realities of the world political situation was that the Christian denominations were to be committed to conditional support of terrorist and guerrilla movements, for the most part financed by Communist nations, trained in Soviet or Soviet-satellite partisan warfare institutions, and armed and led by agents of either Soviet or Chinese Communism. The purpose of these movements, operating under the religiously appealing cover of bringing an end to racial discrimination and oppression, was to subvert and overthrow the pro-Western governments of Rhodesia and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, supplanting them by ostensibly multi-racial regimes which would in actuality be Communist in character. These three nations constitute, geographically and strategically, the protective shields which guard the land approaches to the Republic of South Africa, incomparably the richest, most heavily industrialized and most militarily powerful state on the African Continent and, for that matter, in the Southern Hemisphere. The subversion of this Western bastion, which dominates both the eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean and a major sea route to Asia, was obviously a central goal of Soviet global strategy.¹

In stating that McGovern used his position as a leader of the World Council of Churches to direct the Protestant Christian world community into these militant, revolutionary and ideologically murky channels, I neither state nor imply that he did so with the intention of furthering the political designs of the Soviet Union.

On February 3, 1969, the Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches announced that it had "named Sen. George McGovern, a Methodist layman, chairman of a consultation on race to be held May 19-23 in London." The meeting was designed to initiate "a crash program" for the "eradication of racism." It had been called in response to a mandate from the Council's Fourth Assembly in Sweden the previous year, in which Senator McGovern had participated, "to revise the stance of the World Council on racism of all types, but principally white racism, in the light of crises in the U.S., Africa and elsewhere."

After stating that the situation was "very explosive in many places," the Council observed that the London meeting would be not merely hortatory, but would create such action instrumentalities as a consultant service, investigation of "potential crisis areas," special action projects, and a secretariat to work for "the elimination of racism." According to the press release, "oppressed peoples realize that 'unless they share fully in all of the instruments of power, they will be unable to free themselves from the effects of racial exploitation.'"

The statement concluded with the significant observation that the London meeting would be

attended by "militant black power advocates, social scientists, trade unionists, student leaders and exiles from southern Africa..."²

On the third day of the consultation, McGovern addressed the gathering on the general theme that time was running out for the privileged white nations.

"We had better come to grips with the problem or else the church will become an irrelevant institution," he declared. "The black man is obviously reaching the end of his endurance."³

If this prediction was designed to encourage the Negro representatives present to demonstrate their lack of "endurance" by making extreme, revolutionary demands, it was effective.

The Reverend Channing Phillips, who, like McGovern, had been a candidate for President at the Chicago Democratic Convention of 1968, urged that Christianity reject "the false base of pietism" and accept "violence." The Black preacher from Washington, D.C. denounced "the capitalistic system" for its "horribly efficient technology." The private enterprise economy revealed its "insanity" in the considered opinion of this man of God, because it operated on the principle that "conquering space" was more important than "conquering racism." Not unexpectedly, the Reverend Phillips came out for Black reparations. The White population of the United States should pay every Negro man, woman and child as atonement for having brought their ancestors over here as chattel slaves!

Among the other illustrious speakers at this McGovern-directed conclave was Eddie Brown, brother of "Rap" Brown, the "Burn, Baby, Burn" man who had recommended that his followers "stop looting and start shooting" and who would later be winged by New York police while engaged in a holdup. This particular Brown was as patriotic as his more notorious brother. "Black Power is a rejection of America," he told his Christian audience. "Every Black is reluctant to admit that he is American."⁴

If it achieved nothing else, the consultation of the World Council over which Senator McGovern presided gave hare-brained religious politicians and hate-America spellbinders of the Eddie Brown sort an international platform from which to vent their resentment and their irrational demands. Agitators and revolutionaries were snatched from obscurity, endowed with unearned prestige, and provided with world press coverage for their attacks on the United States.

The record does not reveal whether the representatives of "modern Christianity" who assembled at London were chosen by Senator McGovern or by others. They included some rather incongruous specimens. Oliver Tambo, one of the more able Negro leaders of the underground South African Communist Party, attended. Wanted for sabotage and terrorism in his own country, Tambo moved between London and Zanzibar, probably on courier assignments. Zanzibar had been taken over by Maoist and Castro Communist elements several years before in a bloody uprising in which virtu-

ally the entire Arab population was murdered. It served in 1969 as a staging area for guerrillas and for covert arms shipments to Black African terrorist forces.

While it was doubtful whether Oliver Tambo could be characterized as a Christian in any sense of the word, the same could not be said about another delegate, the Reverend Michael Scott. What I wrote about Dr. Scott two years ago still seems valid:

"The nexus between the 'liberal' clergymen (in South Africa) and the Communist Party varied from sympathetic aid to outright membership. An interesting case was that of the Reverend Michael Scott, an Anglican priest who was to be prominent for a quarter of a century in every protest movement against South African oppression of Natives, real or imagined, and who was to be characterized in Eric A. Walker's history as a 'saintly Anglican clergyman.'"⁵ Definitions of sanctity will no doubt vary widely, but it is generally considered incompatible with use of a priestly office as camouflage for clandestine, illegal activities in support of an atheist movement. Yet Dr. Scott revealed in his autobiography, A Time to Speak, that he had operated for years as an international courier for underground Communist Parties and as a Communist paymaster for illegal Red apparatuses and their agents. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 so shocked Dr. Scott that he briefly enlisted in the Royal Air Force. Discharged from it, Scott turned up in South Africa in 1940 where he immediately 'made contact with some of the South African Communists'⁶ despite the fact that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was still operative and the South African Communist Party was doing its utmost to sabotage the war effort of the Western democracies."⁷

Some of the delegates were more orthodox representatives of organized Christianity, but these people had a bad time of it. Dr. Michael Ramsey, the Archbishop of Canterbury, told the consultation that "there was no room for discrimination in the house of God." The ineffable Channing Phillips characterized this thought as "the same old platitudinous drivel."⁸ A lady from Egypt was supposed to lead evening prayers, "but the majority rather rudely paid no attention to the announcement of such worship and the meeting dissolved."⁹

The Black militants and advocates of revolutionary violence were allowed to push their way to the forefront. Thus, Nathan Hare, an American Negro agitator and a self-designated spokesman for his race, was given the microphone to read his "Declaration of Independence" and to present "monetary demands on the World Council." This hirsute and foul-mouthed speaker regaled the audience with a "doleful history of oppression, slavery and massacre of blacks, browns, and yellows at the hands of nominal Christians" which was "so distorted and so viciously biased that its effect on a sane mind and sensitive conscience was thus reduced in impact, "as the observer for the Christian

Century tactfully expressed it. To be candid, the declaration was unworthy of the seriousness of the encounter and the demands expressed. These demands for 60 million pounds sterling were, the spokesman said, to be met by 11:00 o'clock the next morning by compliance in the form of a legal document which would commit the World Council to such payment. Again, since many of the participants had already expressed agreement with the principle of reparations for past and present racial injustices, it seemed tragic that such outrageously ludicrous instructions should be handed to this highly responsible body. Furthermore, the identity of the group was never accurately determined; the spokesman gave the press his appropriate pseudonym, Mr. Black - a name which the journalists dutifully reported in their stories."¹⁰

Responsible Christian leaders, such as Dr. Visser 't Hooft, were "disgusted with the white Americans for allowing the blacks to go completely unchallenged," the Christian Century duly noted. Leaflets were circulated, suggesting that there would be violence the next morning if the Black demands for reparations were not met. The delegates assembled in a nervous mood. Flanked by three young Whites, Mr. Black arrived. The consultation leaders read a response, stating that the meeting was moving toward decisions on whether it should support the demand for reparations and the endorsement of violent, revolutionary upheaval. However, it had no authority to commit its member church bodies to payment of specific reparations.

Having heard this, Mr. Black read a statement denouncing Christians in general. He then said that he had a plane to catch and disappeared. It had by now become evident that the mysterious reparations man represented the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the "Rap" Brown organization that had played such a prominent role in recent American urban riots.

Pacifism was unpopular, but the demand for reparations was in style. Time noted that the consultation "supported the proposal that churches compensate those who had been 'exploited' by the capitalistic system. The Christian churches, the delegates reported, had 'not only tolerated but also profited from' the system."¹¹

If Senator McGovern took a position of any sort against this repudiation of the free enterprise system and acceptance of the principle of reparations for past racial "injustice," the reporters present failed to record it.

Other Christian bodies had shown more principle, more gumption and more guts. They had faced up to extortionist demands. Thus earlier that year, the Black radical leader James Forman had broken up Sunday service at Riverside Church in New York City with the demand for \$500 million in reparations. Forman said this amounted to "\$15 per nigger." Since there were 20 million Negroes in the United States, it seemed evident that Forman had never mastered elementary multi-

plication.

The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York rejected this demand as did the General Board of the Disciples of Christ. Even Jewish organizations turned it down. Presiding Bishop John E. Hines of the Episcopal Church characterized Forman's manifesto as "calculatedly revolutionary, Marxist inflammatory, anti-Semitic and anti-Christian."¹²

By contrast, the McGovern-chaired conclave took a weak-kneed and conciliatory attitude toward the extortionate demands of "Mr. Black" and his SNCC followers. In comparison with Bishop Hines, it was spineless and appeasement-motivated.

McGovern would consistently support most of the demands of Negro and other racist pressure organizations. In 1972, he declared: "As President, I will make the unequivocal commitment that the Black Caucus calls for." While this did not involve racial reparations, the demands, made public on March 25, 1972, included a guaranteed minimum income for each family of four of \$6,500, a billion-dollar-publicly-financed bank for "minority businesses," a vast increase in Black U. S. attorneys, marshals, Justice Department officials, etc., together with a variety of other racially-oriented give-away programs beneficial primarily to the Negro minority.

The almost hysterical extent to which the London consultation pandered to Negro sensibilities was illustrated by two small incidents. When the Reverend Michael Scott, the one who had been a Communist courier while a priest, mildly noted that African Negroes had made contributions to music and the dance, this remark was greeted with general disapproval, since it seemed to "damn with faint praise," and perhaps to ignore other, and much greater, contributions. The other incident was that two White ministers, Presbyterian Roger Harless and Catholic James Groppi, a priest who had been prominent in riots, "passionately appealed to white Christians to learn to think and act black to the utmost of their ability. They affirmed, for example, the popular idea of Jesus as the Black Messiah. In fact, said some, Jesus was actually black."¹³

Apparently, this was intended, not as a joke, but as a serious statement of historical fact. To more conventional Christians, the London consultation over which Senator McGovern presided seemed either a madhouse or perhaps something akin to the devil worship which prevailed in the Middle Ages.

SUBVERTING SOUTH AFRICA

At the end of the week-long consultation, Chairman McGovern read a series of resolutions which were designed to commit the Christian world community to the support of the revolutionary overthrow of governments practicing racial discrimina-

tion; to the use, if necessary, of underground methods of subversion, and to the payment of "reparations," presumably to all descendants of Negro slaves throughout the entire world.

"The Consultation's document," the official press release read, "also proposed that the WCC and its member Churches support and encourage reparations for exploited peoples and countries and to use every means available to influence governments to apply sanctions to produce justice."

It demanded that the World Council "serve as a coordinating center for the implementation of multiple strategies in the struggle against racism in the Union of South Africa."¹⁴

The final statement of the consultation contained the masochistic assertion that the London discussion had "clearly revealed that the Church and the world are filled with insidious and blatant institutional racism..."

The consultation committed itself to the use of underground revolutionary strategy and tactics against the so-called racist states. This did not, of course, refer to Black racism, to the expropriation and expulsion of Indians and other Asians from some of the newer Negro dictatorships of East Africa. It referred exclusively to the White-dominated nations of southern Africa, that were allied to the West, that enjoyed such free institutions as representative government, due process of law and an independent judiciary, and that were part of the Western Civilization area.

"It must be recognized that in certain situations and lands," the consultation resolved, "the needed transfer of power and change of structures may necessitate formation of 'underground' churches and Christian cells and the training of those who can enter and influence political parties and even the police, army and other agencies often used in the interest of tyranny and exploitation."

"The WCC should not, in our opinion, ignore these possibilities nor the duty of its members to support in certain circumstances revolutionary action of this kind and those engaged therein."¹⁵

This was one of the most subversive documents ever to emanate from a supposedly Christian Church gathering. It recommended that the World Council inform its members that it was their "duty" to support revolutionary action against legitimate governments. It urged that the Christian Churches, not only serve as aids and agents in this insurrectionary activity, but use conspiratorial methods, reminiscent of Communist tactics, in so doing.

They were to form " 'underground' churches and Christian cells." This was not an analogy with the persecuted Christian Church of pagan Rome, for the target areas of this "underground" operation were Catholic Angola and Mozambique and Prot-

estant Rhodesia and South Africa. On the contrary, this "Christian underground" would be working with anti-Christian terrorist bands, trained, financed and led by Soviet and Chinese atheist commanders, in an effort to destroy Christian societies in Africa south of the Zambesi. The churches were not to go underground because they were persecuted. They were to go underground so they could better infiltrate and destroy Christian societies!

Christians were also to train agents to infiltrate the police, army and other security agencies of the pro-Western governments in Africa which the Black Power militants, the atheist representatives of international Communism and the confused social Christians of the London consultation so detested. It was significant that these institutions of law and order should be described, in standard Marxist-Leninist terms, as agencies of "tyranny and exploitation."

Senator McGovern endorsed these extremist resolutions which, had they been applied, would have transformed the Christian churches into revolutionary allies of Moscow and Peking in the destruction of the outposts of civilization in Africa.

When asked whether he believed that these proposals were in accordance with the teachings of Jesus and the New Testament, McGovern replied: "I have no doubt that some revolutions are to correct injustice, and I would have no problem supporting them."

He added: "I am not a pacifist. I participated in World War II as a combat pilot and I endorse the concept as stated in the recommendations."¹⁶

This endorsement of military action was an unusual departure for the South Dakota Senator. When he had defended Henry Wallace and his Communists in his letter to the Daily Republic twenty-one years before, McGovern had written that he "would like to believe with Wallace that we won't have to kill those fiery Russians..." Many years later, he would lose few opportunities to talk about the terrible human cost of war in Vietnam, expatiating on the smashed genitals and maimed limbs of the American combat wounded, talking about the millions of civilians uprooted and made homeless, and characterizing American military support of the South Vietnamese Government as "a criminal, immoral, senseless, undeclared constitutional catastrophe."¹⁷ His recipe was to let the Communists take over the country if they could. If inaugurated President, he would announce "that we were simply leaving on such and such a date -- lock, stock, and barrel."¹⁸

Senator McGovern's sensitivity to the human havoc of war seemed to be most acute in those situations in which the United States was resisting Communist expansion. In these crises, his recipe was simply to bug out.

If his concern were genuinely humanitarian or Christian, McGovern might have hesitated before endorsing support of terrorist activities against Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia and South Africa, not to mention the unleashing of revolution and race war in these prosperous, peaceful and orderly lands.

The Communist-led African terrorists, whom McGovern's fellow "Christians" of the London consultation stripe so wholeheartedly endorsed, habitually committed atrocities that no American in Vietnam has ever been accused of.

Thus, in the invasion of Angola in 1961, under the leadership of UPA leader and Communist agent Holden Roberto, tribesmen were recruited into militant ranks "by the traditional Communist tactic of sending leaders into African villages, killing and mutilating a number of men pour encourager les autres, and threatening the remainder of the men with like treatment if they did not join the terrorist advance. Wholesale use had been made of the influence of witch doctors, fetishism, and residuary cannibalism."¹⁹

In the attack on M'bridge plantation in Angola on March 15th, one that is by no means unique, "A witness...heard the prolonged cries of agony of those being quartered because the terrorists, their victims still alive, plucked their eyes out, cut off their heads, tore pieces of flesh from their bodies, disembowelling them and committed other bestial acts. Some Whites, Mulattoes and Negroes were skinned alive..."²⁰

Nor is this grisly method of waging guerrilla war peculiar to the Communist-led terrorists in Portuguese Africa. Here is an excerpt from an authoritative account of the disciplinary methods used against Negro deserters from the Zambia camps, which were preparing partisan raids into Rhodesia in 1968:

"The methods used include short drops at hangings, so the manacled prisoner (usually minus the mercy of a blindfold or hood) slowly strangles in a dance of death; firing squads that require three or four coups de grace to dispatch the prisoner while he shrieks for mercy; and scientific beatings to daze the bound prisoner just long enough for a gasoline fire to burn deep into his flesh before he recovers to scream in pain until he dies. There are other, even more vicious, methods and techniques, but these are enough to give the picture."⁽²¹⁾

The overthrow of the government of the Republic of South Africa by infiltration, subversion, revolution or guerrilla warfare and invasion, would probably be one of the most bloody operations in the history of Africa. The White inhabitants, whose presence in South Africa dates from the landing in Cape Town of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 and thus precedes the arrival of Bantu-speaking Negroes in that area, have told American observers, myself among them, that they would fight to the last man

and pursue an all-out scorched earth policy rather than surrender their country to tribal Negroes manipulated by Communists. Nor can it be assumed for a moment that the Black majority would welcome the invaders. In Rhodesia, the lack of success of the Communist terrorists is largely due to the fact that the tribal authorities turn them over to the British South African Police, when they don't beat them to death first. This police organization is composed of White officers and entirely Black troops.

As for South Africa, it is sometimes depicted as a concentration camp for Negroes or, as that inveterate foe of Apartheid, Dr. Gwendolen M. Carter, put it, "a symbol of oppression to the peoples of color throughout the world." (22) Obviously, South Africa excites the envy and greed of uprooted Negro intellectuals. It is a standing reproach to the rulers of Asian and African slum republics who see South Africa's prosperity and order as testimony to their own incompetence to provide honest and efficient government. It is detested by drifting, restless White intellectuals who sometimes use the pretense of Christian faith to provide moral justification for their destructive and nihilistic activities.

"One of the most obvious characteristics of concentration camps," I wrote two years ago, "is that they confine their victims and prevent their escape. By this criterion, the Soviet Union might fairly be described as a concentration camp since its laws still punish attempted escape from its borders with death. The Republic of South Africa, by contrast, not only does not hinder its Bantu citizens from emigrating, but welcomes their partial exodus as removing an economic burden..."

"Lenin, in one of his many moments of hard realism, observed that people 'vote with their feet.' The influx of over a million foreign Africans into the countries under White domination and the continued presence there of tens of thousands of illegal immigrants from the Black states are more revelatory of African realities than the academic propaganda of Professor Carter and other professional opponents of Apartheid.

"The primary reason for the population flow is that life offers more hope for the Negro masses in the White-ruled areas. Johannesburg is called Goldi by the Bantu for the same reason that European immigrants to the United States half a century ago referred to their destination as 'the golden land'." ²³

In short, Senator McGovern revealed at the 1969 London consultation of the World Council of Churches that he was prepared to assist African revolutionary opponents of the White States. This meant aid to terrorists in unleashing a savage and sanguinary civil war on the only islands of civilization in the African Continent. The fact that these un-Christian measures were recommended in

the name of Christianity does not alter their substance. Nor should anyone be misled by the oratory about "eradication of racism." There was possibly as much "racism" in some of the Black states of Africa as in the White ones. What was palpably and obviously involved was the transformation of organized Christianity into a revolutionary political organization, using underground techniques of subversion reminiscent of Communist operating procedures. Subversion of armies and police forces was equated, under certain conditions, with Christian duty. Capitalism was deemed a source of injustice; institutions of law and order were called agencies of "tyranny."

Senator McGovern's professed horror of war apparently did not extend to forcing revolution and invasion on peaceful countries which had no territorial designs on their neighbors. In fact, he endorsed the proposals of the WCC consultation with the proud assertion that he had been a combat officer in World War II and was no pacifist.

When one considers Senator McGovern's record on foreign policy, the general rule is to express detestation of war and favor American inaction or withdrawal where the antagonists are agents of international Communism. His stands on the Bay of Pigs, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the American landing in the Dominican Republic, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the continued presence of large American forces in Europe are cases in point. In the African case, however, his attitude was diametrically opposite. Here the target of the projected subversive and revolutionary strategy was the White-ruled nations which constitute the main bulwark against Soviet penetration of the Continent and Soviet domination of the eastern shores of the Indian Ocean.

(1) These matters are treated in some detail in my book, Traitor's End: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Movement in Southern Africa (New Rochelle: Arlington House, (1970), 39-55, 230-255.

(2) Religious News Service, "Sen. McGovern Will Head WCC Consultation on Race," press release dated February 3, 1969.

(3) New York Times, "Action by Churches on Racism Is Called Urgent by McGovern" by Gloria Emerson, London, May 21, 1969.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Eric A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa (London: Longmans, 3rd edition, 1964), 7. This is the standard scholarly history of the area.

(6) Michael Scott, A Time to Speak (London: Faber & Faber, 1958); Harold Soref and Ian Greig, The Puppeteers (London: Tandem, 1965), 103.

(7) Weyl, Traitor's End, 108.

(8) Time, "Violence Justified," June 6, 1969, 88.

(9) Christian Century, "Preparation for Separation and Reparation: The Churches; Response to Racism?" June 25, 1969, 863.

(10) Ibid., 863.

(11) Time, June 6, 1969.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Christian Century, June 25, 1969, 864.

(14) Senator McGovern's radical followers apparently didn't even know that the Union of South Africa had ceased to exist in 1961. In that year, Pretoria severed its links with the British Commonwealth and proclaimed itself the Republic of South Africa.

(15) All quotations from Religious News Service, "WCC Asked to Back 'Resistance,' Revolution as 'Last Resort' in Drive Against Racism," press release, May 26, 1969. Emphasis supplied.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Playboy, "Playboy Interview: George McGovern," August 1971, 62.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Hugh Kay, "A Catholic View," in British Institute of Race Relations, Angola: Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), Quoted in Bernardo Teixeira, The Fabric of Terror (New York: Devin-Adair, 1965), 169.

(20) Report to the United Nations of Portuguese Ambassador Vasco Garin, based on the eyewitness report of Manuel Lourenco Neves Alves, who survived this massacre.

(21) Daniel T. Brigham, Blueprint for Conflict (New York: American-African Affairs Association, 1969), 21. Quoted in Weyl, Traitor's End, 235. Colonel Brigham, who headed the European Service of the New York Times during World War II and was military and foreign affairs editor of the New York Journal American during 1950-1966, made a six-weeks' intensive survey of the partisan warfare area, comprising Mozambique, Malawi, Rhodesia, Botswana and South West Africa in September-October 1968. His report is based on 18 hours of taped interviews, including interrogation of 181 captured terrorists. He added that a frequent witness to these killings, although captured months after they had occurred, vomited in the interrogation room when he was questioned about them.

(22) Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality (New York: Praeger, 1962, 2nd Printing), II.

(23) Weyl, Traitor's End, 44.

6

GAY LIBERATION, CAMPUS RIOTS AND TROTSKYITES

Most Americans are only dimly aware of the fact that there are several Communist parties in the United States and that they have their burning strategic and doctrinal differences. One of these movements is the Socialist Workers Party. Despite its name, it has nothing in common with either European socialdemocracy or the native American socialist tradition exemplified by Eugene Victor Debs and Norman Thomas.

The Socialist Workers Party is Trotskyite-Communist. As such, it is more militant, uncompromising and revolutionary than the more stodgy Soviet-oriented official Communist Party of the United States. The SWP emphasizes infiltrating the armed forces and direct revolutionary action. Shortly before he assassinated President Kennedy, Lee Harvey

Oswald had himself photographed proudly displaying his scope rifle and a copy of the official organ of the SWP, The Militant.

In 1972, the Socialist Workers Party issued an extraordinary pamphlet entitled Everything You Always Wanted to Know about George McGovern. Its 20-year-old author, Laura Miller, had been a volunteer for Senator Eugene McCarthy back in 1968, but had seen the light and become a revolutionary Communist.

As a general rule, revolutionary political organizations like the Socialist Workers Party do not bother to explain to their members why they should refrain from supporting a Democratic candidate for the Presidency. The reasons would be self-evident and the temptations minimal. After all, the Democratic Party has stood traditionally for the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, for due process of law, for free elections, for freedom of speech and of the press, for the rights of private property, representative government and other basic ingredients of the American system. The Socialist Workers Party, by contrast, is opposed to every principle on which American civilization is based. It favors armed uprising, permanent revolution throughout the world, the expropriation of the means of production, the suppression of civil and political rights for all non-Communists, the dictatorship of the proletariat. It would seem superfluous to urge a Trotskyist-Communist not to vote for a Democratic candidate. Yet in the case of George McGovern, the Socialist Workers Party considered this exhortation essential. From its tenor and context, it seems clear that the McGovern pamphlet is written, not primarily to provide Socialist Workers Party agitators with ammunition for political debate, but to convince the faithful that McGovern is not really their man.

Laura Miller's expose of McGovern is revealing and worth serious study because it seeks to marshal all the reasons why revolutionaries and Communists cannot conscientiously support the South Dakota politician.

CONCERNING HOMOSEXUALS

"McGovern has not yet made a definite public statement on the issue of homosexual rights," Laura Miller emphasizes. "His campaign office in New York explains that McGovern 'privately supports' gay liberation, but that to publicly endorse such a 'delicate issue' would hurt McGovern's chances of getting the nomination. McGovern is asking gay people to vote for him merely on the basis of a private promise." During all his years in Congress, the pamphlet adds, McGovern has "never introduced gay rights legislation into the Congress or Senate." Moreover, he refused "to put his force" behind current New York City legislation in favor of homosexuals.

There are several interesting aspects to this para-

graph. First, there is the clear implication that McGovern's campaign headquarters is giving Trotskyite-Communist representatives inside information about his secret position on such delicate matters as pro-homosexual legislation, which McGovern is concealing from the American public as a whole. This suggests a strangely intimate relationship. Second, just how far does McGovern's alleged private support of gay liberation demands go? Does it include approval of the "kiss-ins" promised by the Gay Activists Alliance for the 1972 Democratic National Convention in Miami Beach? Does Senator McGovern agree with the organized homosexual pressure groups that there should be no censorship of movies and plays depicting homosexual copulation?

Leon Trotsky, the patron saint of the Socialist Workers Party, would probably turn somersaults in his grave if he knew of this aspect of his party's program. Like most Bolsheviks, Trotsky was rather puritanical about sex and exclusively heterosexual.

BLACK LIBERATION

It is rather hard to depict George McGovern as an enemy of special privileges for Negroes, but Laura Miller does her best. She begins by quoting some of the things which McGovern has said on the subject and which Trotskyites regard as unacceptable.

"Now I know that in this era of racism, separatism, hate and despair, talk of non-violent social change sounds old-fashioned," Senator McGovern told the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at Atlanta on August 12, 1970. "I know that you must sometimes despair as you confront the seemingly insurmountable obstacles ahead. But my final word to you, SCLC, is simply this: Don't be discouraged, stay on the case."

What disturbs Laura Miller about this statement is that McGovern does not come out for "the right of the Black people to control their own communities" nor does he tell them that the only solution to their problems is proletarian insurrection.

What will disturb loyal Americans about the statement is that it is a thinly disguised appeal to racial pressure organizations to stir up more race strife. As usual, the McGovern statement downgrades the United States. The Senator does not tell his Black audience that the American Negro is better off today than the average citizen of Western Europe. He does not mention the fact that no nation has ever dedicated as much human effort and capital outlay to the social, economic and political upgrading of an ethnic minority as the United States has to the Negro in the twenty years just past. He does not mention the fact that the Black man in America enjoys more privi-

leges based on his race than any other element in the United States population.

The revolutionary pamphlet quotes with equal displeasure one of McGovern's more incendiary speeches in the Senate. The occasion was his advocacy of the Civil Rights Act on June 4, 1964. Senator McGovern's approach to this legislative problem was to threaten dire consequences, including blood running in the streets, unless the measure was passed. Should it fail, the Negroes would riot. There would be bombings, assassination and arson. Moderate Black leaders would be swept aside by wild-eyed, nihilistic extremists.

This particular form of blackmail is a favorite ploy of both revolutionaries and racketeers. Unless their unreasonable demands are met, they will be unable to control the more violent elements, they allege, and these elements will demand much more. If the threat is taken seriously, the result is successive acts of appeasement to the forces of violence and disorder. One consequence of this sort of irresponsible appeal is that it teaches that revolutionary violence by those demanding special privileges is justified if those privileges are denied. When political leaders of national stature use this approach, they not only bolster the case for direct action and mob violence, they fan violence with their oratory.

What McGovern had to say concerning the Civil Rights Act was this:

"I think it is quite possible that, if the Senate were to reject this long-awaited charter of rights, the people of the United States will be plunged into racial strife that will tear apart the fabric of our society. We would then see infuriated minority leaders and inflamed mobs and sulking killers on an unprecedented scale."

"The Negro moderates who have counseled patience and legal redress would be swept aside by the radicals who preach hate and violence. We would then see the Bible of Martin Luther King and the long-suffering patience of Roy Wilkins replaced by the dangerous direct action of Malcolm X and his kind. Race riots, night bombings, assassinations would rage until blood flowed in the streets . . ."

"If I were living in the South or in a great northern city with a sizeable Negro population, I would be on my knees praying for the safety of my family if the Senate spurned the reasonable, patient Negro and white leadership that most earnestly supports this bill."

This incendiary speech seems merely to predict mob violence if this particular legislation should fail of passage. The line between prediction and advocacy, however, is on occasion a thin and tenuous one. Psychologists would find McGovern's choice of language interesting and perhaps revealing. His lurid descriptions of impending violence against members of the White race seem to contain a hidden element of gloating pleasure. There is no condemnation

violence, no suggestion whatsoever that, in a free society, minority mobs are not entitled to resort to "race riots, night bombings, assassinations" until "blood flowed in the streets" simply because a legislative measure which they favor fails of passage. If there is no implicit justification and approval of violent mob action under these circumstances, the latter is seen as a reasonable Negro reaction to a negative decision on the part of the Congress.

The effect of such a speech on simple and unsophisticated people is to inculcate the belief that American Senators consider that they are entitled to bomb, burn and kill unless their pet measures are approved. To this extent, McGovern was guilty of fomenting mob violence and lawless action. He did so without incurring any of the risks which that sort of agitation normally brings with it.

The Socialist Workers Party objected to this particular McGovern address for a characteristically sectarian reason. The pamphlet points out that the reason McGovern gives for passage of this bill is, not primarily the alleged justice of its provisions, but fear of the consequences of inaction. Since McGovern voices disapproval of mobs rampaging through American cities with torch, gun and bomb, the SWP argues, he cannot be a true revolutionary!

The SWP also attacked Senator McGovern for having introduced one of his many grandiose and costly legislative proposals. This one was entitled the Policemen's Bill of Rights. It would entitle police to federally subsidized higher education. Ambitious policemen would naturally study such subjects, cognate to their profession, as criminology, anthropology, sociology, political science and psychology. These are precisely the areas of maximum radicalization of American university faculties. The effect of the McGovern proposal would be to inculcate police departments with permissive attitudes toward crime, thus softening up law enforcement.

However, to the jaundiced and doctrinaire eye of the young author of the SWP pamphlet, McGovern's proposal was evil and reactionary. The Socialist Workers Party does not want better educated Police, but "Black control of the police and all other institutions in the Black community."¹

URBAN AND CAMPUS RIOTS

"In the early stages of urban ghetto rioting," McGovern wrote in *Playboy*, "it was thought by some that such disorders, despite their ugliness and destruction, would awaken America to the needs of the cities."² The Senator then observed that the most tangible reaction to the bloodshed had been Pentagon contingency planning to handle as many as 25 urban riots simultaneously. He concluded that the riots had been counterproductive. The implication was that they might have been justified if they had

succeeded in terrifying legislatures into shelling out more billions of dollars in largesse to the decaying cities.

McGovern proceeded to a more positive justification of revolutionary violence in the cities and elsewhere:

"What are we to say about the importance of restraint and the peaceful resolution of differences when we have unleashed unspeakable violence and horror on the people of Vietnam?"

A careless reader might infer from this immensely revealing sentence that Vietnam was the first war in which the United States had participated which involved the slaughter of civilians on a vast scale. It was not. The incendiary bombing attacks which incinerated tens of thousands of German refugees in Dresden and the equally atrocious firebombing of Japanese cities in World War II were events with which Senator McGovern was perfectly familiar. In fact, as a B-24 commander, he may have personally participated in some of these acts of genocide against civilian populations.

McGovern also knew that while American air power in World War II was deployed with ruthless disregard of civilian life, restrictions were imposed on bombing targets in Vietnam to prevent the recurrence of those earlier atrocities.

Moreover, no responsible person in World War II argued that, because he considered the atom bombing of Hiroshima immoral, comparable massacres of civilians at home should be excused. This was the argument advanced by Charles Manson and his morally perverse "family" for their sadistic butcheries in the Sharon Tate murder. Nihilists and amoral psychopaths frequently offer the existence of warfare as a moral pretext for their own atrocious crimes. Perhaps it is not accidental that the Manson "family," according to press reports, has offered candidate McGovern its support in his quest for the Presidency.

McGovern continued with the thought that "we condemn campus disorder, but what of the authorities who have retaliated in fear and violence?" After an account of some recent campus riots which bore only a remote relationship to the truth, the South Dakota politician concluded: "The rampage of official violence demonstrates that many of our leaders do not believe in the peaceful democratic process; rather they see the resolution of disputes turning on who has the most troops and guns and is most ready to use them."³

Like his revolutionary friends and supporters, McGovern equated the criminals who start riots with the police who maintain law and order. The theory that a willingness to use force to keep the peace and uphold the law signifies disbelief "in the democratic process" reaches new heights of absurdity.

Urban violence, McGovern assured his readers, "is a result of the unspeakable conditions there." If this were true, violence would be greatest in the poorest cities and would be most prevalent during times of

economic slump. It would be the poorest elements of the Black population which formed the militant riot cadres. None of these generalizations stands up under examination. The riot curve has risen with prosperity. Racial strife in the cities has been associated with massive expenditures to improve Negro living conditions, jobs and educational opportunities. Riots have tended to be more frequent, bloody and destructive in the permissive North than in the comparatively disciplined South. The typical rioter was not "a hoodlum, habitual criminal or riffraff" or "a member of an uneducated underclass" or "lacking broad social and political concerns." Rather, he was a teenager or young adult, who was "better educated" than the average for his community, "proud of his race, extremely hostile to both whites and middle-class Negroes and, though informed about politics, highly distrustful of the political system and of political leaders."⁴

In short, the weight of evidence suggested that riots were not caused by poverty and neglect. It seemed more probable that they were the work of politically and racially conscious militants, who were alienated from their society. People with these latent tendencies would be moved toward violence and rioting by incendiary appeals such as those Senator McGovern habitually indulged in.

If the riots were not caused by unspeakable conditions, it seemed reasonable to conclude that they would not be cured by billion-dollar uplift programs for the slums. If largesse of this sort was the habitual response of society to looting, burning and killing, then indulging in the latter would appear an easy way to get something for nothing from the government.

Revolutionary and Communist propaganda reiterated on every possible occasion that riots were the result of urban misery. Senator McGovern took up the refrain. But repetition of a lie does not make it true.

Since he claimed that he knew the cause of urban riots, McGovern was able to confidently dismiss the Nixon Administration's efforts to restore law and order as futile and frivolous:

"The President and his lieutenants also seem intent upon gathering about the Republican Party all those Americans who are plagued with fear about disorder. In this effort, the President and especially Attorney General Mitchell are doing nothing to quell the legitimate fears of the country about violence. Rather, lacking serious dedication to law and order as a natural consequence of justice, the President is offering tough rhetoric and a few more policemen as solutions to a complex problem."

At least two unsound ideas can be extracted from this muddled and intellectually chaotic paragraph. One is the thought that society cannot or should not have order unless it also has "justice." Now people will disagree about whether specific measures are just or unjust, but there is practically no disagreement over the fact that law and order

are preferable to anarchy. The other unsound thought is that the problems of violence and crime cannot be tackled by providing more and better police. Rather government should strike at the causes of these evils. Actually, society must both strike at the causes of crime and restrain the criminal. Nobody in his right mind would say that we should disband our fire departments and spend their budgets exclusively on eradicating the causes of fires.

On campus disorders, McGovern as usual sought to justify the rioters. Instead of seeing this element as a lawless revolutionary minority, which must be suppressed, he pretended that they were driven to arson and murder by imperfections in our higher educational institutions.

"Certainly, we must end the hypocrisy of a community of scholars demanding academic freedom selling its brains and soul to a war machine."

What an unusual way to characterize a scientist who works to improve America's defenses and to provide American fighting forces with better weapons. Such a man apparently is selling out and is therefore unworthy of academic freedom. To whom is he selling out? One assumes that McGovern realizes that a man does not sell out when he serves his country. The implications of this thought in terms of McGovern's own loyalty and allegiance are rather sinister. The assertion that such a man does not deserve "academic freedom" means, if it means anything, that McGovern condones the silencing of professors who support the American war effort by mobs of revolutionary students. The more one explores Senator McGovern's ideas, the more apparent does it become that his professed dedication to democracy and other values of a free society must be evaluated with a good deal of skepticism.

"There is little prospect of peace on our campuses," McGovern continued "until there are substantial reforms in our national institutions, until the colleges and universities themselves provide vitally relevant experiences for our young people, until our national goals and priorities are restructured."

What McGovern is saying here is that students are entitled to create turmoil on the campuses until certain sweeping changes are instituted. The appeal is to the permissive generation of Spock babies who have reached at least physiological maturity. The authorities, like overpermissive parents, are supposed to prove that they care by satisfying even the more irrational demands of their charges. The spoiled child mentality seems at the root of much of current American revolutionary action. Certainly, McGovern is the most articulate spokesman of this particular attitude. The fact that the American revolutionary movement is strongest among the most pampered and spoiled classes in society reinforces this suggestion.

The cry for "relevant studies" is one of the

catchwords of the New Left. Some leading science teachers in America are concerned that this demand will lead to the debasement of educational standards. Relevance means disregarding pure science in favor of immediate practical problems. In the social sciences, it sometimes means abolishing disciplined and systematic study in favor of surrendering classrooms to radicals and turning seminars into crack-barrel forums for half-baked revolutionary propaganda.

The United States offers more people more higher educational opportunity than any other country has at any time in history. Under these conditions, it seems incredible that a supposedly responsible American political leader should teach the doctrine that revolutionary students are entitled to disrupt classes, close campuses and proclaim strikes unless educational methods and policies are changed to suit their ideological prejudices.

McGovern, however, goes even further. He predicts that, as long as "national goals" are not "restructured," the student militants will use violence to close down the universities.

As prediction, this is about on a par with McGovern's other insights into the future. On the contrary, the trend seems to be for the student majority in stricken colleges and universities to resent the disruptive tactics of the revolutionary minority. There is increasing student opposition to strikes and sit-ins because they interfere with education. The riots, arsons, bombings and murders that disgraced American campuses in recent years are increasingly viewed as intolerable.

The view that students will riot unless American national goals are changed to meet their desires forgets that these goals are established by the majority. If the students want to change them, the way to do so is by persuasion, not violence. To the extent that Senator McGovern's comments about continuing campus violence are exhortation, rather than prediction, they suggest that his thinking on fundamental issues may be revolutionary and incompatible with the goals and values of a free society.

(1) Miller, *Everything*, unpaginated.

(2) George McGovern, "Reconciling the Generations," *Playboy*, January 1970, 132.

(3) *Ibid*, 132.

(4) Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, (New York: Bantam, 1968), 111.

7

APOLOGIST FOR CASTRO CUBA

McGovern's maiden speech to the Senate, delivered on March 15, 1963, was an emotional plea that the United States should not take any military action to harass or overthrow the Castro dictatorship

in Cuba. The South Dakota Senator evidently thought enough of this oratorical effort to reproduce it five years later in his book.¹

The address was entitled "Our Castro Fixation versus the Alliance for Progress." Its central theme was that America should not be overly concerned about the establishment of Communist states in the Western Hemisphere, but should dedicate her efforts to overcoming poverty, hunger and what he called social injustice. McGovern not unexpectedly repeated his dogmatic conviction that Communism was merely a reflection of social evils, the implication being, of course, that the way to eradicate it was to plow billions of American dollars into Latin American social welfare programs and to intervene to change Latin American society in a revolutionary direction.

"I am constrained to speak out against what seems to me to be a dangerous fixation on Castro that is not worthy of this great Nation," McGovern asserted. "I submit that we have become so involved in charges and countercharges about our Cuban policy that we have come close to losing sight of the real interests of the Nation in the hemisphere. We have ignored the biblical warnings against straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.

"I have often wondered why the wily Khrushchev would invest so heavily in both capital and personnel in the kind of risky enterprise which Fidel Castro is frantically trying to establish in Cuba. If his purpose was to enhance the influence of Castro and Castroism in the hemisphere, he must be bitterly disappointed with the results, for the Castro-Khrushchev embrace has had the opposite effect...

"But if Mr. Khrushchev's purpose was to create in Castro a gadfly designed to divert the attention of the United States from the real dangers and challenges of Latin America, then he must indeed feel that his investment has paid off handsomely."²

Before reprinting this extraordinary speech five years later, Senator McGovern might have asked himself why "the wily Khrushchev's" successors had continued with his apparent folly and were plowing at least a million dollars a day into the tottering Cuban economy. Was the purpose that of torpedoing President Kennedy's grandiose Alliance for Progress program? Hardly, since that program had been scrapped long before.

The Soviet Communists were not supporting Castro Cuba as "a gadfly" to divert U.S. attention from the inspiring vistas of the Alliance for Progress. Politically, they were interested in planting a Soviet state in the Western Hemisphere and maintaining it in being as an example and inspiration to other Latin Republics. Senator McGovern's characteristically inaccurate predictions to the contrary, this would pay off in time in the establishment of a left wing regime in Peru and a Marxist government in Chile.

Anybody who has ever taken the trouble to read

Marxist-Leninist basic documents, to study the proceedings of the congresses of the Comintern or of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or to read the memoirs of leaders of the world Communist movement would know that these men do not reason in the muddled manner that McGovern ascribes to them. As an enthusiastic apologist for Henry Wallace's Communist-dominated Progressive Party, McGovern should have known better. Since he was a trained historian and hence presumably capable of intelligent evaluation of the available evidence, one can perhaps assume that he did know better. The theme song of his maiden speech to the Senate, in that case, was simply an ingenious attempt to deceive his colleagues and the American people.

Fortunately, we don't have to speculate about Khrushchev's reasons for supporting the Castro regime in Cuba. He expounded them with admirable clarity in his memoirs!

"The fate of Cuba and the maintenance of Soviet prestige in that part of the world preoccupied me even when I was busy conducting the affairs of state in Moscow and traveling to the other fraternal countries. While I was on an official visit to Bulgaria, for instance, one thought kept hammering away at my brain: what will happen if we lose Cuba? I knew it would have been a terrible blow to Marxism-Leninism. It would gravely diminish our stature throughout the world, but especially in Latin America. If Cuba fell, other Latin American countries would reject us, claiming that for all our might the Soviet Union hadn't been able to do anything for Cuba except make empty protests to the United Nations."³ It was for this reason, Khrushchev states, that he came to the decision to install offensive missiles in Cuba.

In this analysis, there is not the slightest suggestion that the Soviets feared that the Alliance for Progress would make Communist advances impossible in Latin America. There is nothing about having Cuba serve as a gadfly. There is no suggestion that Communist successes in Latin America will depend on the prevalence of hunger, misery and want.

Having regaled the Senate with his penetrating psychological insights into Premier Khrushchev's inner thoughts on the Cuban situation, McGovern proceeded to expound one of those simplified versions of historical processes that came to him so readily.

He asserted that Castro "climbed to power over the carcass of a decadent political and social system which he shrewdly exploited, but which he did not create." The implication was that the way to prevent new Castros from seizing power elsewhere was to reform or revolutionize this "decadent political and social system."

The implication, however, is one which every Marxist-Leninist would recognize as containing an elementary fallacy. The success of any revolution

depends on the interaction between subjective and objective factors. The subjective factors are, in essence, the will, the discipline, the courage and the strategic capabilities of the Communist Party and revolutionary forces it leads. The objective factors are underlying social conditions which large sectors of the population consider intolerable and which motivate them to support, or at the very least acquiesce in, revolutionary change. Thus, even these objective factors are at least as much psychological as they are economic and material.

In the specific case of Latin America, the policies advanced by such leftwing advisers and agency administrators of President Kennedy as McGovern created a massive swing toward the left with a corresponding strengthening of the Communist movement. This occurred because the incessant demands of the self-styled "peaceful revolutionaries" for drastic social and economic change had multiple adverse effects. They stimulated an immense flight of native capital from Latin America, thus creating unemployment and unstable economic conditions. They encouraged internal revolutionary and subversive forces.

Thus, Brazil, which accounts for half of the population of South America, drifted from independent radical misrule to government by a crypto-Communist administration. During the Kennedy Administration, a raging, rampant inflation was expropriating the Brazilian middle classes and driving large elements of the population toward revolutionary solutions of despair. The Brazilian military leadership was keenly aware of the fact that the nation was drifting toward irreversible catastrophe. As long as President Kennedy was in power and his Latin American policy was dominated by Socialists and irresponsible independent radicals, however, the hands of the Brazilian generals were tied. They feared that, if they tried to save their country from Communist takeover, the United States would exert its massive power to thwart their attempt.

Then President Kennedy was assassinated. Ironically, the assassin was a Marxist-Leninist, a man who had attempted to renounce his American citizenship to become a Soviet subject, and who, disillusioned with life in the U.S.S.R., had become captivated by the revolutionary extremism of the Trotskyist-Communists. Yet Oswald's dreadful act untied the hands of the Brazilian military. Within a few weeks, the generals took power; drove the Communists and their fellow travellers into exile, prison or hiding; re-established national confidence and turned Brazil toward a period of unparalleled prosperity and growth, in which the revolutionary danger subsided.

Senator McGovern called the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba "a tragic mistake," and added that the United States "had no more legal right to undertake air cover or any other military aggression against Cuba than the Russians would have in invading Turkey."

This dogmatic pronouncement ignored the Monroe Doctrine and showed total ignorance of the collective decisions of the American Republics concerning Communist penetration of the Continent taken at the Inter-American Conferences in Rio de Janeiro shortly after World War II and in Bogota in 1948. However, one of Senator McGovern's most salient traits is that he never allows ignorance to blunt the edge of dogmatism.

After praising the Brazilian Communist leader, Francisco Juliao, and piously suggesting that both Juliao and Castro might have "indirectly performed some service," he expressed gratification over the fact that the Bay of Pigs invasion, ordered by President Kennedy and supported by American planes and warships, had been "a miserable flop." ⁴

Reverting to the Cuban problem three months later, McGovern expressed alarm that, if the United States engineered the overthrow of the Castro dictatorship, the private property which the bearded dictator had confiscated might be restored to its rightful owners.

After stating that the Cuban exiles had nothing in common but "a hatred of Castro," McGovern asked: "...how much of Castro's changes will they, or we, accept? Do we accept the expropriation of the sugar and cattle lands? The seizure of the oil refineries? The land reforms? The educational reforms? Can we see beyond the Castro revolution to the conditions that would exist in a Cuba without Castro?" ⁵

This short speech was one of many in which McGovern revealed the hatred he felt for the institutions of private property and free enterprise. The expropriation of the sugar and cattle lands had dispossessed highly efficient corporations in the first instance and modern, progressive farmers in the second. The result was that Cuba was rationing meat for the first time in decades and had reduced her sugar industry to chaos. Yet these were socialist moves and, for that reason, McGovern was visibly dismayed at the prospect that, if the Cuban people threw Castro out, they might restore agriculture to private enterprise.

The sugar and cattle lands had been primarily Cuban-owned. Thus, the percentage of the Cuban sugar crop crushed in Cuban-owned mills rose from 22.4% in 1939 to 62.1% in 1958, the last peaceful year before Castro took power. Statistics of this sort cast some light on the period of Batista domination in Cuba. Caricatured by McGovern as a reactionary regime which was subservient to the great American corporations, Batista's dictatorship was actually nationalistic, oriented toward social welfare legislation, supported by the trade union movement and strongly pro-labor.

McGovern asked with alarm: Do we accept "the seizure of the oil refineries?" These were foreign-owned, largely by American corporations. The implication was that McGovern considered their confiscation a forward step, one which should not be

reversed. This, despite the fact that the plight of the Cuban oil refining industry under socialization had hastened petroleum rationing and the collapse of modern transportation.

McGovern also asked rhetorically whether the United States accepted what he called the "land reforms" and the "educational reforms?" The so-called land reforms had collectivized agriculture, at an appalling cost in lowered food production, and had deprived the peasants of their economic freedom. The "educational reforms" involved essentially the transformation of the school system into a vehicle for Communist propaganda and the massive lowering of educational standards.

The fact that McGovern could call these measures "reforms" and that he could feel dismay at the possibility that they might be swept away by a future and more enlightened Cuban government again illustrated the depth of his revolutionary commitment. These McGovern speeches, delivered at a time when any presidential ambitions he may have harbored must have seemed remote and uncertain, suggest that he is not merely a radical, but a revolutionary. They suggest that he is not concerned with fundamental reforms in the structure of American society, but with revolutionary changes which would sweep away the freedom and diversity that is such a vital part of our national heritage.

Returning to the Cuban issue in his *Playboy* interview, McGovern reiterated the theme that he had first sounded back in 1963.

"I don't know why we ever broke relations with Cuba," he claimed. "It was a mistake for the Eisenhower Administration to do it . . ." McGovern then voiced his fear that the United States might be in what he called "a counterrevolutionary position in Latin America." He added: ". . . I do hope that our policy would not be simply to support anti-Castro movements. It must be identified with the efforts of more enlightened groups to change the social structure." ⁵

Thus, by 1970, McGovern had learned that it was unwise to blurt out his support for "peaceful revolution." He had learned to use sociological circumlocutions and to talk about "enlightened groups" and changing "the social structure."

The meaning, however, was the same. The McGovern record on Cuba reveals deep and abiding concern lest the steps taken by the Castro regime to socialize the Cuban economy and bend the island into a totalitarian economic mold be reversed. The record shows that, in Cuba at least, McGovern supports the expropriation of foreign corporations without compensation; the confiscation of private farms, whether foreign-owned or native-owned; the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of public education into a vehicle for state-imposed revolutionary propaganda. The implications for the United States, should McGovern ever become President, are both self-evident

and alarming.

(1) George McGovern, *A Time of War/A Time of Peace* (New York: Random House, 1968).

(2) *Congressional Record*, March 15, 1963, 43444. Emphasis supplied.

(3) Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970), 493. The Russians also considered the strategic advantages of having a base within 90 miles of U.S. shores. William R. Kintner, "The Issues as Viewed by McGovern," *Saturday Review of Literature*, November 23, 1968, 54.

(4) *Congressional Record*, "Castro Fixation," 4345.

(5) *Playboy* interview. Emphasis in the original.

8

THE COMPANY HE KEEPS — MEN WHO BACK MCGOVERN

Walter Reuther, the militant and dynamic leader of the United Auto Workers, was once accused of using guilt by association to condemn a man. He replied approximately as follows:

"When I see a bird which quacks like a duck, waddles like a duck, swims like a duck, looks like a duck and associates exclusively with ducks, I conclude that it is a duck."

A man cannot be judged entirely by the company he keeps, by the character and ideology of his closest associates, by the sort of people who endorse his candidacy and who work heart and soul to realize his ambitions.

Yet these associations provide vital clues to character, to ideology and to underlying purposes. When highly sophisticated revolutionary politicians, such as Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, endorsed the campaign of George McGovern for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency, it was a reasonable assumption that they had calculated that a McGovern victory would contribute toward the transformation of the United States into a Communist society. When a man of the radical background of Frank Mankiewicz contributes his brains, his time and his energy to putting Senator McGovern in the White House, it seems a reasonable assumption that he believes that McGovern as President would be the engine or catalyst of revolutionary social change.

This does not imply that McGovern is a Communist. It does imply that intelligent and experienced revolutionary leaders have probably come to the conclusion that the election of McGovern would contribute to bringing this country much closer to a revolutionary Socialist or Communist order.

FRANK MANKIEWICZ

A California journalist and lawyer, Frank Fabian

Mankiewicz was Senator Robert F. Kennedy's press secretary when the latter was assassinated. He switched to McGovern and served as public relations director during the brief and ill-starred 1968 campaign of the South Dakota Senator for the Democratic nomination.

During the stormy Chicago Democratic Convention in an atmosphere of violent clashes between revolutionary demonstrators and the Chicago police, Abraham Ribicoff, the Connecticut Senator who was to make the nominating speech for McGovern, asked Mankiewicz what he should say. The latter advised him to throw away any prepared address he had and talk about the police action. Ribicoff obliged.

"With George McGovern as President," he said, "we would not have to have such Gestapo tactics in the streets of Chicago. With George McGovern, we would not have to have the National Guard."¹

This divisive utterance evoked a roar of applause from the leftwing element among the delegates and audience. Red with rage, Mayor Daley shouted what lip readers later claimed was "Fuck you." Ribicoff's intemperate denunciation of the Chicago police and his unconscionable comparison of their overreaction to extreme provocation with Himmler's Gestapo was presumably designed to further a takeover of the Convention by the radical element. Its effect was to make the split in the Democratic Party deeper and more irrevocable than before. Senator Ribicoff's denunciation of the Chicago police probably did more than any single incident to convince tens of millions of television viewers that the Democratic Party was hopelessly incapable of keeping order even in its own house and that a once great political movement was massively penetrated by forces which favored disorder and revolution. Thus, Mankiewicz may have made an almost decisive contribution to the election of Richard M. Nixon.

If so, was this intended or unintentional? The prima facie answer would be that Mankiewicz and McGovern had no motive in wishing to see the Democratic Party ousted from the White House and a Republican President installed there. Yet, if the fundamental purpose was to transform the Democratic Party into a radical-to-revolutionary vehicle, this would have been the unavoidable price of that transformation. The defeat of Hubert Humphrey made it possible for McGovern and his radicals to transform the entire structure of the Party to make it the vehicle of the social philosophy they desire to impose upon the United States. Splits with the great city machines, friction with the trade unions, elimination of seasoned professional politicians and powerful mayors such as Richard Daley of Chicago from the delegate list to national conventions, all these were inescapable costs of that political revolution.

These splitting tactics might well bring the Democratic Party down to defeat. With reasonably good

luck, however, the revolutionary element would emerge from that defeat in control of the Party machinery.

During the 1972 contest, Mankiewicz advanced rapidly to become McGovern's national campaign director. He was reportedly slated to take over the chairmanship of the Democratic Party after November. Mankiewicz's position of present and future power as chief policy adviser and Democratic Party boss in the McGovern operation make his career and philosophy matters of concern to the American people.

MANKIEWICZ -- PEACE CORPS REVOLUTIONARY

Frank Mankiewicz was the first Peace Corps representative to Peru and was later advanced to be director of Latin American Peace Corps operations when President Johnson appointed his predecessor, Jack Vaughn, U.S. Ambassador to Panama.

In an autobiographical work revealingly entitled The Making of an Un-American, leftwing activist Paul Cowan reminisces about old times in the Peace Corps with Mankiewicz.³

Mankiewicz and Harris Wofford, another senior Peace Corps official, made a determined effort to incorporate "the ideas and convictions" of the New Left into the Peace Corps. Accordingly, they flew Tom Hayden, the revolutionary leader of the ultraleft Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to Washington for a long meeting in which they urged him to head a Peace Corps project in Peru.

Hayden had been a severe critic of the Peace Corps program because he did not consider it revolutionary. After talking to Mankiewicz and Wofford, he changed his mind.

"They told me that I could run my region any way I wanted," Hayden told friends. "Oh, of course, they're convinced that there won't be any revolution in that part of the world for at least a hundred years. But they say they want me to go ahead and and try to make one."⁴

Hayden turned down the Peace Corps job because he believed his work as a revolutionary was in the United States, not Peru. However, the job offer to Hayden had the desired effect of informing thousands of grimy little SDS subversives that it was open sesame for Reds in the Mankiewicz bailiwick.

As Cowan put it, "Within a few weeks, thousands of people on the New Left knew that the Peace Corps had offered a job to the most controversial young white radical in the country."⁵

Who was this "controversial young white radical?" In 1962, Hayden and a small group of leftist college students organized the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) on the basis of Hayden's "Port Huron Statement," a document which was a mixture of Leninism and Anarchism. Breaking with its parent

organization, the League for Industrial Democracy, the SDS welcomed Stalinist, Trotskyist and Maoist Communists into its ranks. "We are working to build a guerrilla force in an urban environment," its National Secretary, Gregory Calvert, would explain in 1967. "We are actively organizing sedition."⁶

Frank Mankiewicz was in the Peace Corps during 1955-64, serving as its Latin American director for the last two years of that period. The way in which Tom Hayden would have run his Peruvian Peace Corps project under Latin American Director Mankiewicz can perhaps be gleaned from some of his subsequent activities.

Hayden was present in Newark at the time of the bloody riots which shook that city in 1967 and was questioned by police, but not arrested. Shortly thereafter, Hayden took a delegation of Newark SDS militants to Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, to confer with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong representatives. On his return, Hayden wrote about the lessons of the Newark struggle for the leftist New York Review of Books.

"The role of organized violence is now being carefully considered," he stated. "During a riot, for instance, a conscious guerrilla can participate in pulling police away from the path of people engaged in attacking stores. He can create disorder in new areas the police think are secure. He can carry the torch, if not (to) all the people, to white neighborhoods and downtown business districts. If necessary, he can shoot to kill."⁶

This article had not yet been written at the time Mankiewicz sought to bring Hayden into the Peace Corps as a project director with a free hand to "try to make . . . revolution." But Hayden's revolutionary philosophy was explicit and on the record. Had he accepted the offer, his conduct in Peru as a U.S. Government official would have been predictable.

Mankiewicz met Paul Cowan, a self-described "gawky Jew" with a face "thickly covered with acne,"⁷ and decided that this was just the sort of man the United States needed to represent her abroad. He assured Cowan that his mission was with the Peace Corps.⁸ Cowan found the idea of enlisting in the ranks of this idealistic organization far from unattractive, since: "I had to get out of New York anyway. Old Man Draft had finally trapped me."⁹ Paul Cowan's attitude toward his native land, which he may well have confided to his fellow "revolutionary," Mankiewicz, (since he would blurt it out in his autobiography), evidently did not seem a reason for his disqualification to the latter. "I fight myself, my class, and my country every fucking day," Cowan revealed.¹⁰

As Peace Corps trainees, Cowan and his wife were regarded with mixed feelings because of their New Left background. However, both "were especially protected by Mankiewicz."¹¹ Other New Left elements who had infiltrated into the Peace Corps

were ecstatic about the way Peace Corpsmen had crossed back and forth between "enemy lines" in the Dominican Republic. This referred to a Communist-supported uprising against the Dominican Government. The Johnson Administration supported the legitimate regime with American troops. Naturally, the Peace Corpsmen did not cross enemy lines to aid the forces of their own country. Their purpose was to attend to the Communist and other insurgent wounded.¹²

In Ecuador, Cowan was prominent in a protest by Peace Corpsmen against American participation in the Vietnam War. When the radicals involved in this venture were told that, if they abused their status as United States Government employees to attack its foreign policies, they would lose their jobs, some hastily withdrew from the protest movement. The reason was they realized that the Peace Corps was their only protection against being drafted and perhaps actually being sent into combat.¹³

Since its earliest days, according to former Ram- parts writer Cowan, Mankiewicz had been trying to shape the Peace Corps into a "more tolerant, better financed version of the angry, charismatic organizations to its left like SNCC and the Free Speech Movement. From the perspective of the New Left, they seemed remarkably effective."¹⁴

In a paper entitled "The Peace Corps A Revolutionary Force," Mankiewicz wrote: "...our mission is essentially revolutionary. The ultimate aim of community development is nothing less than a complete change, reversal - or a revolution, if you wish - in the social and economic patterns of the countries to which we are accredited...We talk about development - but the pure economic and physical development of countries will be conducted eventually by the countries themselves, with United States assistance or without it. But the political and social development of the country can only come through the infusion of a kind of revolutionary spirit such as the Peace Corps represents..."¹⁵

Mankiewicz thought that Corpsmen were participants in an "international sit-in." He lashed out at Latin American schools which taught Indian pupils that their native tongues and dialects were contemptible. Under such conditions, he contended, "it is idle to build a school where 20 or more of these children go through that experience and claim that we've done Peace Corps work. That would simply be contributing to the preservation of a system that cannot last and must not last. That is why community development is essentially a revolutionary process..."¹⁶

Mankiewicz's indignation at schools which taught Latin American children to reject their Indian native tongues seems to have been merely the pretext for his revolutionary appeal. If schools were inadequate and teachers were tactless, Peace Corpsmen could have been urged to try persuasion. Moreover, whether the local Indian idioms should have been

used in the schools or Spanish substituted was not the open-and-shut issue that Mankiewicz seemed to think. Ireland has revived her ancient language, one not structured for modern science, to her cost. Thus, an Irish Jesuit priest recently blamed the 15-point I.Q. gap between Irish and English children on enforced bilingualism in Ireland.¹⁷

Mankiewicz's message had little to do with educational techniques or how to help the Latin American people constructively. The message was that the Peace Corps need not work to build schools for impoverished and illiterate Latin American children. Instead, it should devote its energies to the destruction of "a system that cannot last and must not last," that is to say, to the smashing of the societies and governments to which they were accredited. Mankiewicz and others of his type apparently had no moral scruples about spending public funds to destroy free institutions and subvert friendly governments. Nor did they have scruples about putting on the payroll of the American Government people dedicated to the destruction of American society, such as Hayden, and people who gloried in the title of Un-American, such as Cowan.

Responsible officials of the Peace Corps and decent men of good will such as Brent Ashabanner, who volunteered because they wanted to help better the living conditions and education of the people in the countries to which they were assigned, naturally did their utmost to eliminate the destructive, revolutionary element. This applied to Mankiewicz in particular. His operations constituted "high-handed meddling in the political processes of sovereign nations. They might even be said to lay the Peace Corps open to charges of a new form of arrogant United States imperialism." The reason this intervention in Latin American affairs did not provoke an international scandal, Ashabanner believed, was that Mankiewicz and his New Left subversives were ineffective. Had they been more competent, "indignant Latin American political officials" would have "summarily order(ed) the Peace Corps out of their areas."¹⁸

Mankiewicz understandably favored hiring for Peace Corps work young college graduates with a revolutionary background, who had few skills they could teach the people to whom they were assigned beyond those of revolutionary agitation and organization. Fortunately, John Alexander, a former boxer, a man of outstanding intelligence, an economist and a foreign-aid program planner of wide international experience, was promoted to head Peace Corps program planning. Alexander believed the Peace Corps should do a constructive job. He urged that the so-called "BA generalists," people with a liberal arts bachelor's degree and few other qualifications, be either trained in some useful task or eliminated. He wanted Peace Corpsmen who had basic manual skills, preferably a rural background, practical experience in organization and working

with people, and fluent command of the relevant foreign languages.

"What a fine and modest thing the Peace Corps was in the beginning," Alexander wrote Ashabraner. "Volunteers would go out and work at a job... They would live and work with the people and learn about them, and the people would learn something about Americans. That's all Kennedy said the Peace Corps was: a way to give help where it was needed and increase understanding."¹⁹

Men like Alexander were understandably disgusted with types like Mankiewicz and his recruits from the New Left. They had little use for men who joined the Peace Corps because they were draft dodgers and they despised people like Paul Cowan who could boast about fighting their country "every fucking day."

Mankiewicz finally left the Peace Corps, "taking with him his driving determination to pack as many volunteers as possible into Latin America for revolutionary purposes..."²⁰ With the elimination of Mankiewicz, the Peace Corps managed to get rid of much of the riffraff, the draft dodgers and cowards, the revolutionaries and the subversives.

This is the Peace Corps background of Senator McGovern's 1972 national campaign director. That McGovern should advance a man like Mankiewicz to the most important policy position in his campaign organization speaks volumes concerning the South Dakotan's attitude toward American traditions, institutions and ideals.

JERRY RUBIN AND ABBIE HOFFMAN

People who are impressed with Senator McGovern's slow speech, his prim smile, his somewhat soporific manner and his high moral tone find it impossible to believe that he is really a radical. Yet his presidential aspirations have been endorsed by Yippie and Zippie leaders Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin.²¹

The Yippies, or Youth International Party, have been involved in almost every violent, revolutionary demonstration in the United States in recent years. Hoffman and Rubin, together with Bobby Seale, President of the Black Panthers, were arrested for conspiracy to riot during the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention. After a long and disorderly trial, they were acquitted. As Suzanne Labin, a prescient foreign observer of the American scene, wrote recently:

"The Yippies call themselves revolutionary anarchists. They are the ones who turn most readily to obscenity as an instrument of social protest, following the illustrious example of Aristophanes who had recruited some ruffians to pour liquid manure on some theatre seats."²² These Yippies paint their foreheads with their favorite four-letter words and

claim that 'after spraying children with napalm, nothing is obscene.' Jerry Rubin has just published In Praise of Nothingness, a sort of metaphysically pretentious yelping against reason, which is described as the vile weapon of the bourgeoisie, while everything that degrades and mutilates reason is sublime, beginning with Jerry Rubin himself."²³

The first indication the authorities had that there would be revolutionary riots in Chicago in 1968 was a statement by Jerry Rubin in February: "Even if Chicago does not burn, the mass paranoia and guilt of the government will force them to bring thousands of troops, and the more troops the better the theatre."²⁴

Jerry Rubin is not just a joke. A talented public relations man, he has grasped the fact that revolution can be sold by mixing it with rock music, sex and dope. In his The Prophetic Minority, he wrote:

"We have put all America on the alert. We have mixed young people, music, sex, drugs, revolt, and treason together. What other combination would be as effective?...What we need is a new generation of obnoxious people, a new generation of bizarre, unbalanced, irrational people, obsessed with sex, angry, irreligious, infantile, and crazy. People who burn their draft cards... people who attract young people with music, and hold them with marijuana and LSD... people who proudly wave the Vietcong flag..."²⁵

In his book, Do It, this peripatetic non-student agitator, who tried to stop troop trains in California, urged children to leave their homes and burn down their schools.

Here is a man who boasts of having propagandized for treason, who hails Americans who burn their draft cards and "proudly wave" the enemy flag, who approves of peddling LSD to youth, and who exhorts children to burn down their schools.

Why should an immoralist, a nihilist revolutionary and a propagandist for hard narcotics and treason be in the McGovern camp? What are people of this sort doing in support of any candidate for the presidential nomination of what was once the party of Thomas Jefferson? What evils and calamities do they expect to bring down on this country by installing Senator McGovern in the White House? And if Senator McGovern is, as he claims to be, a political leader who believes in American institutions of freedom and democracy, why has he not repudiated the support of these unsavory people? I don't profess to know the answers to any of these questions.

(1) William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart - An Informal History of America in the 1960's (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 386.

(2) New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1967.

(3) Ibid, 80. Emphasis supplied.

(4) Ibid, 80.

(5) Quoted in Eugene H. Methvin, The Riot Makers, (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1970), 27.

- (6) August 24, 1967. Methvin, Riot, 50. Emphasis supplied.
- (7) Cowan, Un-American, 3.
- (8) Ibid, 84.
- (9) Ibid, 76.
- (10) Ibid, 77.
- (11) Ibid, 223.
- (12) Ibid, 80-81.
- (13) Cowan admits to being a draft dodger, but is strangely sensitive about being thought a coward. He tells his readers that, in almost any other period of history, he would have wished to emulate Ernest Hemingway and prove his "manhood" in battle. Readers who wish to believe this are, of course, free to do so.
- (14) Ibid, 82. SNCC was the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. It was as "non-violent" as the SDS was "democratic." On one occasion, its chairman, H. "Rap" Brown, screamed at his audience, "You gotta stop looting and start shooting." Or, as Stokely Carmichael told a SNCC fund-raising banquet, "We have to move from Molotov cocktails to dynamite." Methvin, Riot, 75.
- (15) Brent Ashabranner, A Moment in History: The First Ten Years of the Peace Corps (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971), 166.
- (16) Cowan, Un-American, 82.
- (17) J. Macnamara, Bilingualism and Primary Education (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966).
- (18) Ashabranner, Moment, 167-168.
- (19) Ibid, 171.
- (20) Ibid, 250.
- (21) The endorsement was reported in the New York Times and in Challenge, May 18, 1972, p. 16.
- (22) If one is going to be classical, it might be added that Jerry Rubin has a good deal in common with Diogenes, the Cynic, whose followers emulated the dog (from which cynic derives) in that they urinated, shat and copulated in public. They denounced government and society as instruments of oppression and lived like animals with uncut hair and untrimmed beards.
- (23) Suzanne Labin, Hippies, Drugs and Promiscuity (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1972), 209-210.
- (24) Methvin, Riot, 233.
- (25) Labin, Hippies, 206.

9

THE GLOBAL STRATEGY OF RETREAT

Senator McGovern's attitude toward the Soviet Union sometimes seems to be complex and to have fluctuated considerably over the years. There have been occasions when he rose on the Senate floor to voice his moral disapproval of certain aspects of Soviet conduct or to express his repudiation of Communism as a form of political tyranny. These utterances, however, may simply be window-dressing for

the folks back home. They are seldom, if ever, linked to any recommended course of action which would seriously hamper the Soviet Union in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. The exception, again, is Senator McGovern's support for Israel.

A good example of these anti-Communist speeches, which may well have done him yeoman service among South Dakota voters, is McGovern's comments on August 20, 1959, concerning the forthcoming visit to the United States of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev:

"Mr. Speaker, we are soon to be visited by one of the most powerful men in modern history -- Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. It is of the utmost importance that while we are greeting Khrushchev, we also maintain our perspective on world affairs.

"I agree with President Eisenhower that Khrushchev should be treated courteously, but I know the President does not want us to close our eyes to the menacing threat of communism. . .

"Mr. Khrushchev is the same ruthless dictator who ordered Russian tanks to smash the Hungarian freedom movement. He is the same tyrant who presides over a godless tyranny that no true American can ever tolerate. . .

"It is far better that we talk to Khrushchev than that we get into a nuclear war with him, but peace cannot be built simply on well-publicized trips between Moscow and Washington." ¹

Twelve years later, McGovern would view Communism and Soviet ambitions in much more relaxed terms.

Communism was just "another economic system that doesn't happen to fit my view of how society ought to be organized, but I'm willing to live in a world of diversity and I think we can get along with the Communists. If people want to be organized under a Communist system, we've got to accept the fact that this is their judgment to make." ²

The "godless tyranny" under a "ruthless dictator" had become just "another economic system." The reason for the change wasn't that the Soviet political system had mellowed and softened between the era of Khrushchev, whom McGovern had denounced, and that of Breshnev. On the contrary, Khrushchev had denounced Stalin and exposed his policies of tyranny and genocide. His successor would go far toward rehabilitating Stalin. Khrushchev had opened the Siberian prison camps and released their political victims. The Breshnev regime was engaged in sending political dissenters to labor camps, where they were beaten and starved, and were injected with mind-destroying chemicals.

McGovern's statement that "if people want to be organized under a Communist system, we've got to accept the fact that this is their judgment to make" was in diametric contradiction to his earlier assertion that the U.S.S.R. was "a godless tyranny that no true American can ever tolerate. . . No people

had ever voted democratically for a Communist form of government. Once subjected to Communist dictatorship, no people had ever been given the opportunity to reject it by democratic means. To assert that we have to accept the fact that Communist regimes exist and have to deal with them as they are was political realism. To represent them as governments freely chosen by their people was mendacious propaganda.

In the same 1971 interview, Senator McGovern gave several other indications that he no longer believed Communism to be something "no true American can ever tolerate." His new attitude seemed to be one of benign neutrality. Asked whether President Nixon had "an anti-communist ideologue's view of history," McGovern replied, "it may very well be that he's clinging to his old prejudices . . ."

The Playboy interviewer asked him: "Wouldn't it be against our interests to let the Russians expand wherever their ambitions take them?"

McGovern wasn't willing to go that far.

"Well, we can't ignore big-power expansionism, our own or anyone else's," he replied. "We've got to press them for greater restraint and, at the same time, we must restrain ourselves."

The cold war, it seemed, had been due to a misunderstanding on both sides. The United States and the Soviets had been equally guilty of expansionism. The Soviet conquest and subjugation of eastern Europe, its support of totalitarian revolutionary movements throughout the world which suppressed democracy and individual freedom, all the tragic events of the quarter of a century of conflict that had followed VJ Day were ignored, disregarded, treated as if they had never occurred.

In discussing Soviet expansionist ambitions, McGovern reverted to the standard Moscow-approved analysis which had beguiled Henry Wallace and his Communists some 23 years previously. According to this, the Soviet Union had never been an aggressor; its expansion was motivated entirely by considerations of security; those who accused her of seeking world hegemony were madmen. McGovern emphasized that "we're going to have to abandon our paranoia about Russia's ambition to dominate the world."

The source of this "paranoid" conception was the teachings of Lenin, the supreme authority on all political matters in the Soviet Union. Of course, Lenin's ideal was not Russian world domination, but Communist world domination. In practice, however, the two goals were the same.

"The Soviets are interested in a security zone to protect them from another invasion from the West, from revived German militarism, and they see American policy in western Europe as reviving German militarism and building a nuclear cordon around them. I've always felt that's the real reason they wanted a cushion of Communist states on their western border, from Poland to the Mediterranean."

Thus, Senator McGovern imperceptibly changed his basic position in the same interview. He was no longer saying that both the United States and Soviet Russia were at fault. Rather, the American policy of surrounding the U.S.S.R. with a "nuclear cordon" and seemingly "reviving German militarism" had provoked the Russians into purely defensive action. We were the aggressors, according to this distorted interpretation of recent world history.

What Senator McGovern was trying to sell his audience of Playboy readers differed only in detail from the official Soviet propaganda version. It seemed odd that any honest and reasonably competent historian could have asserted that American aid in the revival of "German militarism" had provoked the Soviets into the defensive reply of swallowing up the once independent states of the Balkans and the Danubian area. The simplest answer to this was that the Russians took over Eastern Europe immediately after World War II. At that time, Germany was completely demilitarized; there was no thought of rearming her in Washington, and the United States had not established a so-called nuclear cordon anywhere.

RETREAT IN ASIA

McGovern's foreign policy recommendations, as elucidated in the Playboy interview, involved furthering Soviet and Communist global ambitions. He counselled abandonment of Formosa and South Vietnam to the Communists. He favored American economic aid to the Marxist regime in Chile, which was engaged in confiscating American investments. Our entire policy in Latin America was wrong and always had been wrong, since we protected big corporations and reactionary dictatorships rather than the interests of the people. With the important exception of his defense of Israel, there was practically nothing here that could have displeased the Kremlin.

"The best way to ensure our national security," McGovern urged, "is to improve relations with the Kremlin in every area we can." Certainly a negotiated arms limitation with the Soviet Union could be a giant step toward world peace. But this presupposed hard bargaining with the Russians, not the unilateral cut of \$30 to \$40 billions in the American military budget which McGovern urged in his Playboy interview. "The most outrageous single factor in American politics today, if you leave Vietnam aside," McGovern said, "is that we continue to waste billions of dollars on nonessential military gadgets . . ."

McGovern's policy recommendation on Taiwan was to abandon our commitment to this ally of 25 years standing and let the Chinese Communists take over the island:

"If I were President, I would be prepared to recognize Peking as the sole and legitimate government of China, leaving the future status of Taiwan to be resolved peacefully by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait."

What if the Chinese Communists attempted to take Taiwan by force? McGovern was asked.

He didn't think "Peking would do that." McGovern was confident that the Mao regime would pursue a peaceful course, a confidence that seemed strangely misplaced in the light of Chinese past acts of aggression against Korea, Tibet and India.

"I can't envisage a situation in which the mainland Chinese would move in there and start massacring people on Taiwan."

This seemed a remarkable lack of imaginative capacity on the part of the South Dakota Senator. According to Soviet estimates, which were substantially in agreement with those of American intelligence experts, the People's Republic of China had exterminated about 25 million of its subjects during the first quarter century of its existence. This frightful human toll had not been merely the cost of civil war and the revolutionary seizure of power. On the contrary, genocide on a huge scale had continued into the 1960's. The Mao regime ranked with those of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin as having slaughtered more of its own citizens than any other government in the history of the human race. Yet McGovern was confident that it would choose peaceful means of taking over Taiwan and would not exterminate its political enemies once it had seized power there.

In Vietnam and Taiwan, the McGovern solution was to withdraw American support as quickly as possible, leaving both regimes to sink or swim. In both instances, the United States could make "an offer of asylum" to those who believed their lives would be forfeit once the Communists took power. This was designed to sound as if only a few political leaders were involved. Since hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese were already on carefully prepared Communist death lists at the time McGovern gave his interview, his offer of asylum might have involved more than a million people. There is little reason to suppose that Congress would have approved a sudden Oriental immigration on that scale. However, it is possible that the McGovern offer was merely a political gambit, not meant to be taken seriously. There was little in the Senator's record to suggest that he had great concern about the victims of Communist genocide.

REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

The McGovern policy for Latin America was the old "peaceful revolution" bill of goods that he had attempted with so little success to sell during the

days when he headed the Food for Peace agency. The Senator no longer talked about peaceful revolutions, but used the more circuitous phrase of supporting "the efforts of enlightened groups to change the social structure." The "enlightened groups" seemed to be the same socialist revolutionaries whose objectives he had supported in the past.

He was asked how the United States should deal with Marxist government in Chile under the leadership of Salvador Allende.

"If that government moves to address itself to fundamental economic and social problems, it will justify American assistance." McGovern replied. He added that he didn't "think it's our concern that Chile elected — and it appeared to be a legitimate election — a Marxist government."

Perhaps it was not our concern, in the sense that the United States had no right under international law to intervene in Chile, nor was the Nixon Administration planning any such intervention. But that was not the issue. The issue was whether American taxpayers should support a government which was confiscating American enterprises without adequate compensation, which was headed toward a socialist system repugnant to the American people, and which was fomenting class war and illegal expropriations in the countryside. Since, Chile's problems were caused primarily by the policies of economic wrecking pursued by its Marxist government, the case for American economic aid seemed weak.

The fact that the Chilean government had confiscated large American corporate interests, thus penalizing tens of thousands of American stockholders, did not bother the Senator. He was asked about this:

"PLAYBOY: Do you feel we have no commitment to protect the economic interests of American corporations overseas?"

"McGOVERN: No, I don't think we do. When American corporations go abroad, they have to take the risks implicit in the local political situation."

The Senator had evidently forgotten that some of these American companies had made multi-million-dollar direct investments in countries like Cuba and Chile partly because the United States Government had urged them to do so as a means of bringing Latin America into the modern age economically and technologically. He had also evidently forgotten that they had risked their stockholders' money on the basis of assurances by the United States that their legitimate interests would be protected abroad, just as those of other American nationals were protected.

These considerations had little effect on McGovern's thinking because of his deeply ingrained hostility toward business and private enterprise. His characterization of American policy toward Latin America, like so many of his other ideas, was a rehash of Marxist and Communist propaganda. "We have always intervened in Latin America," he told

Playboy, "but, unfortunately, on the side of dictators and of American corporations, which have been content largely with what resources they could withdraw rather than with raising the living standards of the people."⁴

This sweeping condemnation of American policy was remote from the facts. It would be difficult to find a single reputable historian concerned with the area who would not have rejected McGovern's assertions out of hand. The United States had intervened, directly or indirectly, to oust such rightwing or "reactionary" regimes as those of Machado in Cuba, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and Peron in Argentina. McGovern's glib assertions to the contrary could only be characterized as falsehoods.

Nor were American corporations concerned only with exploiting the areas in which they operated. The work of United Fruit in raising the entire level of peasant agriculture in Central America was only one of many examples which could have been adduced to refute the assertions of the South Dakota Senator.

There was nothing new in these ideas. McGovern's attacks on American "intervention" and support of reactionary regimes and rapacious corporations was a theme song of Communist propaganda. As for his policy recommendations, they were, for the most part, tendentious justifications for American surrender to the demands of Moscow, Peking and their satellites.

One could understand Senator Eugene McCarthy's point when he said that a McGovern speech was like a Chinese dinner because both left you empty.

PRAISING THE VIET CONG

If McGovern was somewhat more circumspect than back in the old days when he had supported Henry Wallace and his Communist-dominated Progressive Party, he was still occasionally naive enough to blurt out what he really thought and felt.

Asked whether he sympathized "with the aspirations of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies," McGovern replied that he did. His specific answer was:

"In that they're striving for national independence, yes. Their position is more legitimate than that of General Thieu, who is really a creature of French and American power."⁵

In short, McGovern's sympathies were with the enemy to the extent that they were nationalists. He then proceeded to add that they were in fact fighters for national independence and that the South Vietnamese were not.

McGovern undoubtedly knew that Ho Chi Minh, whom he once compared with George Washington, had been an international agent of the Kremlin for most of his adult life. He also knew that small Communist states are hardly ever allowed the luxury of

national independence. They are generally dominated either by Moscow or Peking. They enjoy just about as much national independence as Czechoslovakia does. If the Vietnamese wanted national independence, the only way to get it was to defeat the Communists.

McGovern continued with the thought that he could "scarcely condone the terror the Viet Cong and Hanoi have adopted as a military tactic . . ." Here was an enemy who went into peaceful villages with death lists, who disembowelled school teachers and buried alive or crucified citizens who opposed Communism. One might have thought that even McGovern would have condemned this savage method of waging war. But he did not. The furthest he was willing to go in criticizing the Communist forces fighting the United States was that he could scarcely approve of the moral outrages they perpetrated.

McGovern then proceeded to try to prove that American participation in the defense of South Vietnam was an act of hypocrisy. He did this by a chain of reasoning that did little credit to his training as a high school debater.

"The moment Eisenhower said Ho Chi Minh was the choice of 80 percent of the Vietnamese," McGovern declared, "we made ourselves into hypocrites by claiming we were there to advance self-determination. We were there for precisely the opposite reason, which was to prevent the overwhelming sentiment of the country from bringing into power what we felt was a Communist government."

Nothing better illustrates Senator McGovern's lack of intellectual integrity than this paragraph. What Eisenhower had said was that most people who knew the Indochinese situation agreed that, if elections had been held at the time the French were fighting the Viet Cong, "possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai."⁶

Note that the election Eisenhower was talking about had nothing to do with the present democratically elected government of South Vietnam. It referred to a choice between Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai. The latter was the former Emperor of Annam. He was also a fat-boy playboy whom the French had installed as their puppet. Eisenhower commented mildly that Bao Dai "chose to spend the bulk of his time in the spas of Europe rather than in his own land leading his armies against those of Communism."⁷ I can recall asking a State Department expert on Southeast Asia at the time for his appraisal of Bao Dai. The official replied that "considering the fact that Bao Dai had spent such a large part of his life in Hong Kong whorehouses, he was doing about as well as could be expected."

The fact that Eisenhower believed that Ho could have beaten Bao Dai in free elections some time in the 1950's did not prove that Ho would have been the people's choice 20 years later, against a differ-

ent sort of South Vietnamese government, and in the light of the atrocities and ruthless massacre of civilians which Ho's savage followers had subsequently perpetrated.

If McGovern had had any real interest in "self-determination" and "the overwhelming sentiment" of the Vietnamese people, he might have alluded to what happened when the French negotiated peace with the Communists on the basis of partition of the country. When this occurred back in 1954, a quarter of a million refugees had to be evacuated from the northern part of the country with the aid of the U.S. Navy.⁸ These 250,000 human beings preferred losing everything they couldn't carry on their backs to falling into the hands of the Communists. The number of refugees moving from the free South to the Communist North, by contrast, was only a few hundred people. As Lenin once wisely observed, "People vote with their feet." Moreover, in the great North Vietnamese offensive of 1972, correspondents agreed that the invaders received virtually no support from the civilian population.

These facts did not prevent McGovern from echoing the standard Communist propaganda refrain that Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Cong were the overwhelming choice of the people of both North and South Vietnam. He concluded that America was using "all our military might to keep the unpopular anti-Communist government in power." He then proceeded with the somewhat hysterical judgment that "the whole Vietnam intervention by the United States is a criminal, immoral, senseless, undeclared, unconstitutional catastrophe. . ."⁹

On the Vietnam issue, Senator McGovern had two favorite debating points. The first was the assertion, based on a distortion of what Eisenhower had once said, that the Communists were the overwhelming choice of some 80% of the Vietnamese people. If this were really so, why had they never held free elections in North Vietnam? The second point was that the struggle was a civil war, therefore a conflict in which the United States had no business intervening.

In contrasting civil wars with international wars, McGovern, as usual, simplified matters, reducing them almost to an agitator's level. In an age of international ideological conflict, almost every war between contending powers takes on some of the aspects of a civil war. Correspondingly, every civil war has characteristics of international war. The reason for this is that loyalty cuts across national frontiers and becomes to a large extent ideological. International aggression by Communist forces is supported by Red fifth columns within the country attacked. If no such fifth column exists, the Kremlin tends to postpone the act of aggression as premature. As Henry Kissinger recently put the matter: "When there is ideological conflict, political loyalties no longer coincide with political boundar-

ies. Conflicts among states merge with divisions within nations: the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy begins to disappear."¹⁰

THE ISSUE OF VIETNAMIZATION

McGovern's favorite theme song in trying to get the United States out of Vietnam and overthrow the Thieu regime was that the latter was unpopular and had no base of support other than American weapons. "That Government has no dependable political base other than the American military presence," he informed the Senate on February 6, 1970, "and it will never be accepted by its challengers in South Vietnam or in Hanoi." He added that "there can be no settlement of the Vietnam struggle until some kind of provisional coalition government assumes control in Saigon."¹¹

The "challengers" who would never accept the Thieu regime were, of course, the Communist enemy, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. The proposal for a coalition government was coupled with exhortation for the elimination of the leaders of the South Vietnamese regime. In other words, it was the standard McGovern recipe for an American Asian foreign policy: Abandon our commitments; desert our allies; accept the Communist demands in toto.

In advancing toward this objective, McGovern alleged much concern for the undemocratic characteristics of the South Vietnamese government. In the speech just quoted, he cited the New York Times to the effect that the Thieu-Ky "dictatorship" had shown its "harsh and oppressive character" by arresting fifteen more student leaders at Saigon University. What was the offense of these students? They had merely called an illicit, and presumably clandestine, meeting, at which they had sung "anti-war songs."

If the Vietnamese struggle was a civil war, as McGovern insisted, it was not remarkable that students who met in secret to sing "anti-war" (read pro-Communist) songs should have been arrested. Abraham Lincoln was much more drastic in his suppression of the pro-Confederate Fifth Column in the North during our own Civil War.

Back in 1967, McGovern wrote a letter to the New Republic in which he branded as "ostriches" those who believed "that it is practical and desirable to win support for an unrepresentative regime in South Vietnam (the recent elections notwithstanding) by bombing North Vietnam." The "owls," birds with the wisdom of McGovern, considered that "sending our bombers within seconds of the Chinese frontier" risked "provoking World War III." The owls also thought that, if outside intervention was needed to settle the "family quarrel" in Vietnam, it should be under United Nations, and

not U.S., auspices!

We need waste little breath in pointing out that bombing close to the Chinese border did not risk Chinese intervention and World War III for the simple reason that the Chinese knew they would be annihilated in any such venture. Nor is it necessary to devote much space to demonstrating that turning the Vietnamese conflict over to the United Nations was just another way of giving the Communist enemy what it wanted.

Having proved to his own satisfaction, by endlessly asserting it to be true, that the South Vietnamese regime had no popular support except American military power, McGovern proceeded to oppose the Nixon policy of Vietnamization. People who took his arguments at face value and who believed his claim that he was a man of principle and conscience may have been somewhat astonished at this position.

After all, McGovern had asserted that the Vietnamese should be left to fight out their own "family quarrel." And if the Thieu regime was as "oppressive and unrepresentative" as he alleged, if it rested solely on American military power, one would have expected him to welcome Vietnamization, which would withdraw most of that American power and might thus lead to the regime's reform or extinction.

McGovern, however, came out flatly against Vietnamization regardless of whether or not it worked. He opposed it as "immoral and self-defeating." It was "repugnant for us to create a client group of Vietnamese generals in Saigon and then give them our murderous technology to turn against their own people."

By "their own people" McGovern evidently meant the Communist Fifth Column. Even so, his statement was false. When the North Vietnamese launched their great 1972 spring offensive, they discovered that the Viet Cong, on which they had pinned high hopes, scarcely existed. They had practically no support left in the South. McGovern's incessant reiteration that the South Vietnamese government was a tyranny which rested solely upon American military backing no more mirrored reality than the "big lies" to which Hitler and Goebbels had resorted a generation previously.

McGovern's allegation that it was immoral for the United States to supply the South Vietnamese government with modern weapons seemed scarcely credible in view of the fact that the invading North Vietnamese enemy was superbly equipped with modern Russian arms. To have disarmed our ally on the eve of that invasion may have been an appealing solution to Senator McGovern, but, to most Americans and to most other fair-minded people, it would have seemed a despicable act of betrayal of an ally.

In this speech, McGovern let the cat out of the bag. He revealed what really disturbed him, what he

really wanted.

"The Thieu-Ky regime is no closer to American ideals than its challenger – the National Liberation front," he asserted. "Indeed, self-determination and independence are probably far stronger among the Vietnamese guerrillas and the supporters (sic) than within the Saigon government camp."¹²

In other words, the real issue was not one of democracy or international morality or any other of the lofty ideals which McGovern proclaimed on the floor of the Senate. The real issue was that, in McGovern's mind, the guerillas represented progress and nationalism in South Vietnam. He wanted the Communist guerillas to win and to take over the entire country

ATTACK ON GERMAN POLICY

On November 12, 1963, almost a fortnight before the assassination of President Kennedy, McGovern rose on the floor of the Senate to launch a bitter and uncalled for attack on the venerable Chancellor of Germany, Konrad Adenauer. The occasion was a request by Adenauer that the United States Government refrain from selling surplus wheat to the Soviet Union unless Moscow agreed to tear down the Berlin Wall.

Before proceeding with the McGovern story, a few words of background. Although he was 85 years old and somewhat difficult to deal with, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was almost universally respected by Western leaders. His greatest achievement had been to blot out the heritage of Nazism and turn Germany into a modern democracy and a staunch ally of the West. President Kennedy considered Adenauer a greater man than De Gaulle because he believed the French leader's vision was narrowly nationalistic, while that of the German Chancellor was continental.

From the beginning of his Administration, President Kennedy had searched for the possibility of a detente with the Soviet Union, involving a broad spectrum of negotiations designed to terminate the cold war and to banish the threat of nuclear holocaust. This quest did not make the President an apologist for Soviet crimes against humanity. When Khrushchev had his East German puppet Communist regime divide Berlin in half by the Wall, making it impossible for residents of the Communist area to join their families in the free zone, President Kennedy denounced the move and spoke eloquently of "the wall of shame."

Kennedy's first efforts to negotiate a general settlement were rebuffed by the Russians. Then, in the late fall of 1962, came the Cuban missile crisis with the "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation of the two nuclear giants. The American preponderance of military power was so overwhelming that Khrushchev

- (8) Ibid, 370.
- (9) *Playboy* interview, 62.
- (10) Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (New York: Norton, 1969), 55.
- (11) *Congressional Record*, 2728.
- (12) *Congressional Record*, 2729.
- (13) As Kissinger put it (*American Foreign Policy*, 37), "The many overtures of the Kennedy administration were rebuffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not in fact favorable for a test of strength.
- (14) The refusal to ship U.S. food to Franco Spain immediately after World War II had this adverse effect.
- (15) *Congressional Record*, November 12, 1963, 21552.

10

THE BATTLE TO DISARM AMERICA

In the course of his long career in the House and the Senate, McGovern has earned the reputation of being an implacable opponent of adequate American defense. He has provided detailed blueprints for slashing military appropriations. These proposals for the emasculation of United States military power are coupled with McGovern demands for the withdrawal of the American military presence from Vietnam and the drastic reduction of the U.S. troop presence in Europe. He has very little use for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"I've been watching those guys make mistakes for the last 25 years," he said. "I can't wait to have a crack at them."¹

What the McGovern plan involves is the impairment of American military power to such an extent as to yield world hegemony to the Soviet Union. Specifically, the South Dakota Senator proposes to dismantle our 54 Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and to cut the long-range bomber force from somewhat over 500 to 200 planes. This reduced force would confront the 200 heavy and 750 refuelable medium bombers of the Soviet Air Force. He would immediately halt all construction of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, stop the development of the B-1 bomber, and end further installation of multiple offensive warheads (MIRV's), which constitute America's greatest area of superiority in the nuclear armaments field. He proposes to scrap three Army divisions and one Marine division and to withdraw 170,000 of the 300,000 American troops currently stationed in

Europe. Where the Navy is concerned, McGovern would eliminate ten of our 16 giant aircraft carriers, since he considers the carrier vulnerable and obsolete.

"He would take all these steps," the unusually well-informed columnist Jeffrey Hart writes, "regardless of what the Soviet Union might do and, despite the fact that in every category of weapon mentioned, the Soviet effort has been to expand rapidly rather than to retrench."²

The long lead-time between new weapons conception and new weapons production makes it imperative that the United States keep research and development activity at a high, sustained pace at least equal to that of the Soviet Union. The alternative is not merely military inferiority, but a continuously widening chasm. Our weapons arsenal would become progressively obsolete as newer Soviet weapons went into production. Despite this, McGovern has proposed that the United States cut military research and development to below \$5 billion as against the \$10 billion which the U.S.S.R. spends in the same category. This would guarantee the Soviet Union a more than two-to-one advantage in new weapons research and development.

McGOVERN ON ISRAEL

Like almost all other major presidential candidates during the past quarter of a century, Senator McGovern is verbally committed to support Israel and take measures to ensure her survival. Unlike these other presidential candidates, however, McGovern has proposed drastic cuts in American defense budgets which would give the Soviet Union overwhelming military superiority.

This fact has caused American Jews, who have overwhelmingly supported the liberal wing of the Democratic Party in the past, to ask whether a McGovern electoral victory would not signal the extinction of Israel as an independent nation. As for the Israelis, they have learned from hard experience that verbal support, without adequate military backing, is worthless in the modern world of international power politics.

"The Middle East is more important than Vietnam in terms of both our security and our traditions," McGovern said in his *Playboy* interview. "... I think Israel won't be fully secure until the United States guarantees its existence. Israel is the one free state we have in the Middle East. It represents democratic ideals, and I don't know of another country in the world that has the confidence and support of its own people to the degree that Israel has. I would be prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure its survival."

On various occasions, columnist Joseph Alsop points out, McGovern has come out for the internationalization of Jerusalem and has equivocated on selling Phantom jets to Israel. Senator Ribicoff,

the great admirer of the Bad Lands revolutionary, suggests that McGovern has "a lot to learn about Israel." Whether he is a slow learner or whether he trims his principles to please different power groups is a matter of opinion.

Richard Stearns, the young man who held the powerful position of McGovern manager in the non-primary states during the struggle for the Democratic nomination, reflected the anti-Israeli attitude of radical McGovern backers. During the Six-Day War, according to the Joseph Alsop column of July 7, 1972, Stearns signed a couple of "the standard, oily, anti-Israel appeals that in those days united Arabs, professional Arabists, New Leftists and oil investors."

The fact that McGovern doubletalks on Israel and places anti-Israeli radicals in key positions has created a sense of deep unease among Jewish voters. American Jewish leaders have predicted that the McGovern candidacy may swing the majority of Jewish voters from their traditional Democratic and liberal-to-radical allegiance into the Nixon camp. A Gallup poll reported on July 16, 1972 that eight of ten Jews voted against Nixon in 1968, but today four out of ten support him.

McGovern urged on the floor of the Senate that the United States sell warplanes to Israel. However, he proposed that Israel be barred from flying American-supplied Phantom jets over Arab territory!

As columnist Paul Greenberg put it, this proposal "all by itself sums up the Senator's grasp of modern warfare, geopolitical realities and even the geography of the Middle East. (Confining a modern jet to Israeli airspace is like using a 747 to establish a suburban commuter service.)

"But that was before the Senator campaigned in New York, a state where the Arab vote is not overwhelming. In New York, he promised to have those Phantoms delivered to Israel within a week after his inauguration." ³

McGovern argued that Israel should return, not all of the territory she seized during the Six Days War, but "much" of that territory. This demand was not based on moralistic grounds, but on the consideration that, if the Israelis wanted to create a Jewish state, they should get rid of territory with large resident Arab populations.

It was interesting that McGovern spoke out fairly sharply on a matter concerning which other American politicians preferred to remain silent, probably because of fear that they might be charged with anti-Semitism. I allude to the fact that substantial numbers of American Jewish revolutionaries have taken the side of the Arab terrorists against their own people.

In a speech to the American-Israel Public Affairs Society and the Jewish Community Council in Washington, D.C., on April 29, 1971, McGovern called this truancy one of the "pathetic symptoms of national frustration" over the Vietnam war. He

saw it as "a total rejection of international responsibility" or a "severe impairment of judgment and a doctrinaire grasping of every political position which bears the revolutionary label."

This "thoughtless approach to political thought" was exemplified by the emergence of a minority of young people, "including young Jews, who have turned their back on support for Israel because they find that posture inconsistent with some philosophies of the new left.

"I understand that here in Washington, for example, on the campuses of George Washington and American Universities, and on the other American campuses, leftist students, including Jewish students, distribute anti-Israel propaganda of the Palestine Liberation Front, El Fatah, and other Arab militants who supposedly carry the banner of third world revolutionaries. . . ." ⁴

The comment of the Socialist Workers Party was that, in these quoted paragraphs, McGovern "betrays his contempt for the thousands of young people who have learned from the Vietnam war the importance of supporting revolutionary struggles around the world against U.S. aggression." ⁵

The real point was a somewhat different one. The revolutionary movement sided with the Arab guerrillas and opposed Israel as a matter of principle. Experts in *Realpolitik* point out that the Soviets have cleverly used the Arab-Israeli conflict to gain power in the Arab world and perhaps eventual control of the vast oil resources of the area. This is quite true. However, it overlooks two facts. The first is that the Soviet Union and the Communist International consistently opposed Zionism and Israel from the days of Lenin to the present with the one significant and brief exception of the immediate post-World War II years. The second is that Red China, which has little influence in the Arab world and no expectations of controlling the oil resources of that region, is even more implacably anti-Israeli than the Soviet Union.

The fundamental reason for opposition is the Marxist-Leninist world view of a predestined seizure of power by the oppressed workers and peasants of the world, joined by the impoverished colonial and semicolonial peoples, against the existing capitalist order. The superior intelligence, education, technological and scientific mastery, ambition, drive and know-how of the Israelis makes it quite impossible to consider them as part of this world coalition of the oppressed. Certainly, they cannot be so considered in comparison with their inept and impoverished Arab neighbors. Moreover, the strong individualism of the Jews tends to make them unsuitable subjects of Communist systems. Their rebellious attitudes toward authority and their love of individual freedom make them seem unruly citizens of totalitarian countries and bad security risks.

When charged with logical inconsistency in advocating both support of Israel and American withdrawal

drawal from South Vietnam, McGovern's reply has been that the former is a viable democracy, whereas the latter is not. Even if this is true, it has little to do with the parallel role of the two countries in a conflict for mastery by two incompatible world power systems. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir seemed more realistic when, during a recent visit to the United States, she urged American Jews to support the Administration's active policy in Vietnam as cognate to the struggle for Israel's survival.

While McGovern has Israeli sympathies, the coalition of forces which has formed around him has a much more ambiguous attitude. These forces are comparable to the popular front movements of Western Europe and their triumph probably means transforming the Democratic Party into a leftwing opposition of that general sort. Should this development take place, it is fairly predictable that the Democratic Party's traditional support of Israel would slowly wane.

On the basis of past American Jewish political behavior, which has consistently been far to the left of what Jewish group interests and socioeconomic status dictate, a good deal of support for McGovern can be anticipated.⁶ Yet this support is illogical in terms of the crisis in which Israel finds herself and the strong commitment of most American Jews to Israeli survival.

The difference between McGovern's attitude toward Israel and that of Nixon is secondary. The really critical difference is that President Nixon is committed to defense policies which will give America more weight in Middle Eastern affairs than she today possesses. The proposed defense policies of candidate McGovern would, on the other hand, reduce American influence to that of a magnitude of the second order.

It is true that Senator McGovern has proposed that the United States show her commitment to Israel by keeping two giant carriers in the Mediterranean at all times. However, with the carrier force reduced from sixteen to six ships in accordance with McGovern's proposals, naval experts believe that that deployment would leave the United States vulnerable. Moreover, Soviet strategic policy will be based, not primarily on the location of American warships, but on the fighting strength of the United States.

Senator McGovern would drastically reduce new shipbuilding for the Navy, thus mothballing the naval modernization program which has been proceeding apace during the Nixon Administration. In his *Playboy* interview, he proposed "a cut of 30 to 40 billion dollars in the military sector . . ." This would not be negotiated against similar cuts by the Russians. It would be a unilateral American action. The deep slashes to which McGovern is pledged in new weapons development, in fundamental defense research, in naval modernization and in strategic air defenses would condemn the United States to the

role of a second-class power. It seems safe to predict that, under these circumstances, Moscow's word would be law in the Middle East and Israel would face national extinction.

McGOVERN VERSUS AMERICAN DEFENSE

One of the ominous aspects of McGovern's record on American defense is that his recommendations have not been responsive to thaws in Soviet-American relations or to other changes in the international situation. They have been consistent ever since he joined the Senate nine years ago. To give the entire record would be tedious. A few highlights will serve to show that his advocacy of American unilateral disarmament has been consistent and invariant, that it has had no perceptible relationship to the world political situation.

In 1963, McGovern proposed that defense procurement and defense research and development be slashed by 10 per cent.

In 1964, he offered an amendment to delete billions from the authorization to develop a new advanced bomber to replace existing aircraft in the 1970's. The record does not show that he proposed slashes in American defense in 1965, but, in the following year, he tried to defeat the entire Military Assistance and Sales Act, to cut defense research expenditure, and to eliminate appropriations for long lead-time items for the Nike-X missile system.

In 1968, McGovern tried to kill the Sentinel ABM system, to eliminate funds for fast deployment logistic ships, and to cut Navy and Air Force funds by an additional 10 percent. In 1969, he tried to eliminate three-quarters of the appropriation for the new B-1 bomber and made a few similar contributions to the security of his country. In 1970, he voted to deny the President power to act "to protect the lives of U.S. armed forces wherever deployed" and opposed an amendment requiring the United States to insist on release of all prisoners of war before making peace with North Vietnam. In that same year, he tried to prevent military aid to Greece and Cambodia and to limit such assistance to Thailand and South Vietnam. It was a busy year for the Senator!

McGovern's 1971 contributions to national defense included proposals to eliminate the Navy's F-14 jet fighter, its Project Sanguine submarine communications system, the ABM system and a Navy guarantee to Lockheed. He tried to delay MIRV conversion by putting all funds in escrow and voted to reduce American troops stationed in Europe to 150,000 men, about half the total. McGovern voted against a \$381 million pay raise for American servicemen and voted to slash \$15 billion from the Defense budget.⁷ His 1972 record has

not been compiled to date, but it is consistent with his past.

Senator McGovern's reply to critics of his defense record is that the United States already has enough nuclear weapons to kill the entire combined population of the Soviet Union and China several times over. The answer is that American defense policy is not geared toward the objective of transforming Russian and Chinese cities into the "pyramids of skulls" in which Timurlenk delighted, nor is it designed to wipe out the human race.

Limited wars and the weaponry needed to win them are the keys to military power in the present age. Military power in turn is the key to political power. Cutting the American military budget approximately in half, eliminating most new weapons research and development, scrapping strategic air and nuclear weapons, phasing out naval modernization, sharply reducing American troop strength and bringing most U.S. forces home from their farflung battle and occupation stations, all this means the subordination of American power and influence to that of the Soviet Union throughout the world.

This program of military dismantlement is of a piece with McGovern's foreign policy proposals to allow Communist forces to take power on their own terms in Vietnam and Taiwan, to pull key divisions out of Europe, to support Communist-controlled revolutionary terrorist movements against the White states of southern Africa, and to support "peaceful revolutions" in Latin America and elsewhere in the world.

Perhaps the underlying McGovern assumption is that his foreign policy is so far left in its purposes and strategy that conflict with the Soviet Union will become wildly improbable. If this is the implication, then the McGovern strategy presupposes such enormous strides toward socialization at home and abandonment of the Free World abroad as to threaten the future of Western Civilization.

* * * *

The McGovern phenomenon may be more than just another presidential election. It may herald a decisive transformation of the Democratic Party. By shrewd political organization and maneuvering, McGovern and Mankiewicz are changing that party from a loyal opposition into a revolutionary opposition. The basic strategy was to impose rules which denied duly elected delegates their seats if they happened to be White and male, which gave delegates' badges to hordes of radicalized Blacks, women and young people who had never been elected by anyone, and which eliminated the restraints and seasoned judgment supplied by oldline professionals in the craft of American politics.

As a result of this transformation, it looks from this vantage point in time as if the McGovern rev-

olution may transform the Democratic Party into something common enough in Europe, but happily rare in Anglo-Saxon countries. That is to say, it may become a popular front organization, one in which Communists have a powerful and recognized voice and in which there is no movement of any consequence to eliminate them as anti-democratic elements.

Whether this transformation will succeed or will fragment the Democratic Party to such an extent that it ceases to be a powerful force in American political life only the future can tell.

An even more fundamental question is whether George McGovern will realize his lifelong ambition to become President of the United States. *Prima facie*, this seems impossible.

"Begging is better than bombing," McGovern told South Carolina delegates to the Democratic National Convention. "I would go to Hanoi and beg if I thought that would release the boys one day earlier."

In a speech to the Heritage Group on June 30, 1972, Vice President Agnew commented on this pronouncement with that withering contempt of which he is past master:

"I find this an incredible admission by a man who would lead the American people. It expresses a philosophy so callow and short-sighted as to be repugnant to the tradition of a free people."

"Neville Chamberlain, an apostle of appeasement 35 years ago, had an umbrella as his symbol. But even Neville Chamberlain did not carry a beggar's cup to Munich — as George McGovern proposes to carry to Hanoi."

One cannot conceive of Washington, Jefferson or Lincoln, or, for that matter, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon so far forgetting the dignity of his office as to travel to an enemy capital in the role of beggar. But, for that matter, one cannot imagine any of these leaders calling an elderly woman "a horse's ass" and glorying in that act of defiance. A McGovern electoral victory would symbolize the same sort of American moral decline as the narcotics addicts, revolutionaries and the riffraff element with whom McGovern so earnestly pleaded from his hotel during one of the more nauseating phases of the '72 Democratic National Convention.

"In McGovernism," Vice President Agnew observed, "we find the seeds of the downfall of our great republic." Fred Cristopherson, the retired editor of the Sioux Falls Argus-Leader, South Dakota's most influential newspaper, and a veteran McGovern watcher of 25 years standing, recently declared:

"George is so far left that, if elected President, he would constitute a clear and present danger to the American form of government."

In order to help avert the catastrophe, this book was written.

- (1) Richard J. Levine, "What McGovern Would Do to Defense," Wall Street Journal, June 28, 1972, 16.
- (2) Jeffrey Hart, "McGovern's Defense Proposals," King Features Syndicate, June 4, 1972.
- (3) Paul Greenberg, "Don't Underestimate Sen. McGovern," Palm Beach Times, July 7, 1972.
- (4) Quoted in Miller, Everything.
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) Nathaniel Weyl, The Jew in American Politics (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1968).
- (7) RNC Research Division, Senator George McGovern: National Security Votes 1963-1972, mimeographed, unpaginated.

About The Author.....



A political scientist, historian and newspaper columnist, Nathaniel Weyl did his undergraduate work at Haverford and Columbia and his postgraduate work at the London School of Economics. After serving as an economist and executive in the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, he resigned to devote his energies to full-time writing.

A contributor to such periodicals as U.S. News & World Report, National Review and Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Weyl has also written about a dozen books. Of these, *Red Star Over Cuba* sold over 300,000 copies and was translated into Spanish, Portuguese and German. Other titles include *The Geography of Intellect* (1963), *The Jew in American Politics* (1968) and *Traitor's End: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Movement in Southern Africa* (1970).

Mr. Weyl is chairman of the board of trustees of the International Foundation for Gifted Children. The search for first-hand information for his many books has taken him to 50 countries on five continents. When he is not travelling, he lives in Florida with his wife and twin sons.