United States Senate

ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP
WASHINGTON, DC 20510  June 23, 1989
#8 yh

U.S. Senate Arms Control Observer Group

June 24 - 30, 1989

Saturday, June 24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6:30 a.m.</td>
<td>lv. Andrews AFB (breakfast served)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:35 p.m.</td>
<td>ar. Shannon, Ireland Refuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:05 p.m.</td>
<td>lv. Shannon (dinner served)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>10:00 p.m.</em></td>
<td>ar. Geneva, Switzerland (met by Ambassador Joseph Carlton Petrone, U.S. Representative to the United Nations and other International Organizations and Ambassador Richard R. Burt, Head of Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Officer: Mark Biedlingmaier, NST Congressional Liaison Officer

Office telephone: 011-41-22-7-99-04-15
Home telephone: 011-41-22-28-33-07

Hotel: Beau Rivage telephone: 011-41-22-7-31-02-21

Per diem: $132 + $50 = $182 single: $125 double: $166

Sunday, June 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6:30-8:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Buffet dinner hosted by U.S. Ambassador Petrone and Ambassador Burt for the Codel at Residence Frontenex (entire delegation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Monday June 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>START Delegation Overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30-11:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Defense and Space Overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30 p.m.</td>
<td>Working luncheon with Senators and U.S. Negotiators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working luncheon with Senate staff and Deputy Negotiators at U.S. Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:00-7:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Reception for Soviet negotiators and Codel hosted by the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks at the U.S. Mission (entire delegation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tuesday, June 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00 a.m.</td>
<td>briefing by Ambassador Max L. Friedersdorf, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament (Chemical Weapons) Plenary or Conference on Disarmament overview with Ambassador Max Friedersdorf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00 Noon</td>
<td>Lunch hosted by Ambassador Paul Joacham von Stulpnagel, Ambassador from the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament for Senators and key Ambassadors of other western countries on the Conference on Disarmament (Chemical Weapons) focusing on the conduct of private chemical suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Meeting with U.S. Negotiators to the Bilateral Discussions with the Soviet Union on Nuclear Testing TTBT/PNET at U.S. Mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Airport closes at 10:00 p.m. which necessitates the early morning departure.*
Tuesday, June 27 (cont.)

4:00 p.m.  Informal discussion with U.S. Negotiators and Soviet Negotiators at U.S. Mission
5:30 p.m.  Press conference at U.S. Mission, Room 135
8:00 p.m.  Dinner hosted by Codel for U.S. and Soviet Negotiators and their spouses at Auberge du Dully (Senators and spouses)

Wednesday, June 28

10:00 a.m.  Iv. Geneva
11:20 a.m.  ar. Vienna, Austria
            Ambassador: Henry A. Grunwald
            Control Officer: CFE Political Counselor Janet Andres
            office telephone: 011-43-222-36-31-52
            home telephone: 011-43-222-533-09-28
            Hotel: Imperial, 16 Kaerntner Ring, telephone: 011-43-222-50-11-00
            per diem: $118 + $50 = $168  single: $130  double: $190
1:00 p.m.  Working lunch for Codel hosted by Ambassador Maresca and CSBM Delegation at the Ambassador’s Residence
afternoon  Meetings with U.S. Delegation to the CSBM (Conference on Security and Confidence-Building Measures) for overview
8:00 p.m.  Buffet dinner hosted by Ambassador Grunwald for senior Austrian officials and Codel (entire delegation)

Thursday, June 29

9:30-11:30 a.m. Meeting with U.S. Delegation to the CFE Negotiations (Conventional Force Reduction Talks) for an overview of recent proposals in Embassy Conference Room
12:00 Noon  lunch hosted by Codel for Warsaw Pact Ambassadors and American Ambassadors (Senators only)
2:30 p.m.  Meeting with NATO/Allied Delegation for reaction to U.S. and Soviet proposals for reductions of troops and conventional weapons in NATO Building
5:00 p.m.  Press conference at hotel
6:00-8:00 p.m. U.S. Ambassador to CFE Negotiations hosts reception for Codel and heads of Allied delegations and spouses to the CFE and CSBM Negotiations (entire del.)
8:30 p.m.  Dinner hosted by Codel for U.S. Negotiators and Allied Negotiators (entire del.)

Friday, June 30

10:00 a.m.  Iv. Vienna (brunch served)
12:00 Noon  ar. Keflavik, Iceland
            Refuel
1:00 p.m.  Members meet with Cdr U.S. Forces
2:00 p.m.  Iv. Keflavik (lunch served)
4:00 p.m.  ar. Andrews AFB
DELEGATION LIST

SENATORS
Senator Claiborne Pell, Co-Chairman (D-Rhode Island)
  Mrs. Nuala Pell
Senator Ted Stevens, Co-Chairman (R-Alaska)
Senator Richard G. Lugar, Co-Chairman (R-Indiana)
Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah)
  Mrs. Kathleen Garn
Senator Dale Bumpers (D-Arkansas)
Senator Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vermont)
Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Maryland)
  Mrs. Christine Sarbanes
Senator John W. Warner (R-Virginia)
Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan)
Senator Don Nickles (R-Oklahoma)
  Mrs. Linda Nickles

U.S. SENATE STAFF (in alphabetical order)
Mira R. Baratta, Staff, Office of the Republican Leader
Robert G. Bell, Staff, Arms Control Observer Group
Greg Chapados, Staff, Arms Control Observer Group
Monica Chavez, Secretary of the Delegation
Geryld B. Christianson, Staff, Arms Control Observer Group
C. Richard D’Amato, Staff, Arms Control Observer Group
Scott Harris, Office of the Majority Leader
Yvonne L. Hopkins, Assistant Director, Office of Interparliamentary Services
Kenneth Myers, Staff, Arms Control Observer Group
Sarah Sewall, Staff, Office of the Majority Leader
David Smith, Staff, Office of the Republican Leader
Sally Walsh, Assistant, Office of Interparliamentary Services

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Lt. Col. Gary Bourne, U.S. Army Senate Liaison Office
Maj. (Dr.) John Reilly, U.S. Army Medical Corps
SSgt. Isaiah Daniels, U.S. Army
SSgt. Jeffrey Strayer, U.S. Army
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B. Defense and Space Talks
C. Nuclear Testing Negotiations
D. Chemical Weapons Negotiations - Conference on Disarmament
E. Conventional Forces in Europe Talks (CFE)
F. Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures
G. Biographies and Delegation Lists for Geneva and Vienna
June 23, 1988

To: Members, U.S. Senate Arms Control Observer Group

From: Observer Group Staff

Subj: Background Materials for your Official Visit to Geneva and Vienna, June 24-30, 1989

The United States is currently participating in numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the areas of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Defense and Space Talks, Chemical Weapons, and Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva, and European Conventional Forces and Confidence Building Measures in Vienna. The schedule of our visit is designed to provide you with an in-depth exposure to the issues being negotiated in all of these talks. In addition, it will afford you opportunities to converse in a confidential setting with our negotiating teams and to meet and exchange views with our allied country negotiators in the multilateral talks as well as with Soviet and Warsaw Pact representatives.

The staff has discussed the background and purposes of the Observer Group with our negotiators and they are very anxious to develop a working relationship and begin the process of a long-term exchange of views with you.

This overview memo provides in an unclassified form a short summary of the status of each negotiation at the time of departure, with the following tabs providing more detail. We will keep you advised during the trip of any new developments in Washington as the trip progresses.

You will note that we have set aside time for press conferences in both Geneva and Vienna, as we have learned from past visits of the Group that press interest in the views of the Group has been consistently high. The press conference format has served as a preferred alternative to a deluge of individual interview requests. The staff is also prepared to keep you in touch with your offices in the United States in the event that you wish to issue any statements for release during the trip.

This briefing book provides selected materials to acquaint you with both the history and the latest public information available concerning each negotiation. The staff also has available additional resource materials, which are listed in the Table of contents.
U.S.-Soviet START negotiations in Geneva

The U.S. Soviet Strategic Arms Reductions Talks began in 1982, and the current round under the Bush administration officially opened on Monday, June 19, 1989. The companion Defense and Space Talks, initiated in 1985, also resumed on that date. The head of the U.S. delegation is Ambassador Richard Burt (he is also the U.S. chief negotiator for START) and his Soviet counterpart is Ambassador-at-Large Yu. K. Nazarkin.

When the last round of negotiations concluded under the Reagan Administration in November, 1988, the two sides were working from a common or "joint draft treaty text" (JDT) in which unresolved issues included the broad areas of:

- verification;
- sublimits on the allowed number of warheads as between sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs);
- the status of mobile ICBMs;
- counting rules for air-launched cruise missiles against an already agreed-upon overall allowed ceiling of 6000 warheads for all strategic delivery systems; and
- whether to include sea-launched cruise missiles in the treaty.

Since the Bush Administration took office, a review of the text and open issues has been underway. According to public accounts, not all decisions as to the U.S. negotiating position on the open issues have yet been made, although the administration will continue to work off the JDT as a matter of negotiating practice.

See Tab B, for an outline of the standing position of the two sides, a summary of the latest developments reported up to departure time. Biographies and a complete list of the members of the respective delegations can be found at TAB G.

Defense and Space Talks (D&S)

In the Washington Summit Joint Statement, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev instructed their negotiators in Geneva to work toward a Defense and Space agreement that would have the same legal status as a START treaty, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding documents. The United States presented a draft D&S treaty on January 22, 1988. The Soviet position is that a Defense and Space agreement should be comprised of the relevant text of the Joint Summit Statement and should not be a treaty. The Soviets continue to insist that a D&S agreement should be linked to a START treaty, and they have tabled a draft protocol in the START
talks. Furthermore, they refuse to develop a Joint Draft Text (the usual tool of negotiations).

The U.S. objective in these negotiations is to enhance stability by negotiating a transition from an offensive-oriented deterrent to one more reliant on defenses in a cooperative and predictable manner. When the talks adjourned, the Soviet position was to restrict the U.S. SDI program by binding the U.S. to provisions more narrow than the U.S. "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Geneva Multilateral Conference to Ban Chemical Weapons

The most important issue before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is that of a multilateral ban on chemical weapons. It would apply essentially the same type of ban on production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as was done regarding biological weapons and toxins in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. At present, the main international ban to chemical weapons use is the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which bans their use in war, but not production and stockpiling.

Vice President Bush tabled a draft treaty in 1984 calling for a comprehensive global ban with extensive verification procedures. In the years since, progress has been made on a number of key issues, and there is agreement in principle on the basis approach a ban would take. Verification remains the greatest challenge to completing a treaty, but an equally important and difficult task will be to expand the treaty to nations not participating in the current talks and thereby create a truly global ban.

Beyond the basic ban, all chemical weapons production facilities and stockpiles would be declared and then destroyed within ten years. There would be international on-site inspection teams within six months of entry into force. Relevant chemical industries would be monitored, and challenge inspections would be possible.

The current session began June 13 and will run till the end of August. A number of issues will be discussed, such as how to handle challenge inspections as well as regular inspections of declared facilities, but major progress in this round is unlikely.

Background materials on the chemical weapons ban negotiations can be found at TAB D.

U.S. - Soviet Nuclear Testing Talks

Ambassador Paul Robinson will reopen negotiation with the Soviets
this week to work out protocols on verifications to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). He is scheduled to meet with his Soviet counterpart on Monday, and the first plenary is scheduled for Wednesday.

When Ambassador Robinson wrapped up the preceding round of these negotiations late last year, a text of the PNET protocol had been completed and was referred to the American and Soviet governments. Less progress had been made on the (TTBT) protocol. In this round, the delegation is to work towards completion of the PNET protocol and resume work on the TTBT protocol. It is the Administrations plan not to initial the PNET protocol until completion of the TTBT protocol in order to make sure that both documents are consistent.

A background memo on the treaties and issues associated with these negotiations can be found at TAB C.

Conventional Forces Negotiations in Vienna

Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe - The CFE negotiations are a successor to the 15-year talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe. MBFR was officially terminated effective with the initiation of CFE on March 6 of this year. Although CFE is generally perceived as a bloc-to-bloc negotiation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the talks, at French insistence, are officially a negotiation among these 23 nations.

The key objective for CFE established in the mandate is "to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability of launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action."

The CFE mandate states that the subject of the negotiation shall be "the conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, of the participants based on land within the territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." It specifically excludes nuclear weapons, naval forces and chemical weapons from coverage in these negotiations. Finally, the mandate commits the CFE participants to "an effective and strict verification regime which, among other things, will include on-site inspections as a matter of right and exchanges of information."

Negotiation on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) - This multilateral negotiation is a follow-on to the Stockholm
Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The participants agreed to drop the disarmament aspect of the negotiations since disarmament (or, more accurately, reductions) is now being addressed in the CFE talks. This leaves the conference free to focus exclusively on confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).

The basic strategy of NATO in these negotiations has been to build incrementally on the provisions agreed to in the Stockholm Accord. The Warsaw Pact's strategy has been to try to revisit proposals which NATO rejected in Stockholm, including provisions to restrict naval operations. TAB E includes a copy of each side's opening proposal. A third "bloc" in these negotiations is comprised of the 12 neutral and non-aligned nations. This group has its own agenda, but it worked effectively with the NATO side in Stockholm to define many of the middle ground outcomes eventually incorporated in the Stockholm Accord.
STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

LOCATION: Geneva, Switzerland

BEGAN: 1982

PARTICIPANTS: United States and Soviet Union

OBJECTIVE (U.S.): To achieve reductions in a way that reduces the risk of war by enhancing strategic stability in an effectively verifiable way. Seeks a 50% reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, to be carried out in a phased manner achieving equal intermediate ceilings by agreed dates over seven years from the date the treaty comes into force.

SCOPE: Limitations on warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and on strategic heavy bombers. Whether to include sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) is in dispute.

REPRESENTATIVES:
U.S.: Ambassador Richard R. Burt (Overall U.S. NST head)
Soviet: Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin (Overall Soviet NST head)
Ambassador L. A. Masterkov
United States Senate
ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 23, 1988

To: Members, U.S. Senate Arms Control Observer Group

From: Observer Group Staff

Subj: Public Reports on the Latest Developments in Regard to START and Defense

(a) New Verification procedures. On June 17, 1989 it was disclosed at a Pentagon briefing that the United States intended to shift its stand on treaty monitoring in a significant manner, so that some verification measures to monitor Soviet strategic forces would be developed and put into place before the completion of the treaty and before Senate review of it. Officials were reported in the New York Times and Washington Post as saying that this new approach might help overcome verification disputes and thus speed the completion of the treaty. Officials were reported to be uncertain whether Soviet compliance with provisions in the treaty text and no longer in dispute could actually be verified, and thus desire to practice on-site inspection to reduce this uncertainty. The approach would be reciprocal, they said, allowing Soviets new intrusive rights on American soil in return.

In particular, the Post reported that Administration officials said trial inspections of Soviet mobile missiles, silo-based missiles and stored missiles could provide information that would enable the Administration to "improve" the treaty provisions "before we get to the end" of the negotiations. In addition, officials indicated the Administration was considering proposing an exchange of strategic weapons data with the Soviets. Goals of this initiative would include learning how to constrain Soviet missiles that are being stored, and verify limits on mobile land-based missiles. The menu of specific monitoring measures that could be subject to the pre-ratification exercises had, however, not been finally decided upon. Instead, the administration was said to have made the decision only "in principle."

In previous treaties, verification measures or inspections were not put into effect until after Senate ratification had occurred. according to the New York Times.

Officials were reported as indicating they did not know when the proposal would be made to the Soviets. However, spokesman Fitzwater did say that, in general, it was "unlikely" there would be changes proposed to the text left over from the Reagan negotiations during the "first sessions" of the negotiations.
(b) June 15 National Security Council meeting: major new departures from Reagan treaty text not yet agreed upon. Reports arising from a NSC review of the START negotiating position chaired by the President on June 15 indicated that no new decisions, such as modifying the Reagan proposed ban on all mobile missiles had yet been made. According to the New York Times, Bush had "decided against any fundamental changes in the U.S. negotiating stand, though some important modifications may be made." The Times and Post both reported, however, that the Joint Chiefs had proposed a change to the counting rule for air-launched cruise missiles that would significantly close the gap between the U.S. and Soviet positions.

(c) Mobile Missile Program. In a meeting with Congressional leaders on June 20, President Bush announced a plan to shift an additional $947 million to the Midgetman mobile missile program over the next three years. Additionally, the President said he would abandon the U.S. call for a ban on mobile missiles if Congress approves both the Midgetman and the mobile MX systems as he proposed in April. Reports indicated that Congressional leaders had told the Administration that the two missiles might be in trouble if the arms control position was not altered. Representative Les Aspin suggested that the administration could marshal support for the programs if it stressed that both are essential for negotiating leverage at the START talks.

(d) Defense and Space Talks (D&S) - At the Washington Summit in December of 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev instructed their negotiators in Geneva to work toward a Defense and Space agreement that would have the same legal status as a START treaty, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding documents (this was recorded in the Joint Summit Statement). The United States tabled a draft D&S treaty on January 22, 1988. While the Soviets refused to negotiate on the basis of the U.S. tabled draft treaty, work has gone forward to develop a text on the basis of an associated protocol tabled by the U.S. prior to the May, 1988 Moscow summit meeting.

The U.S. objective in these negotiations is to enhance stability by negotiating a transition from an offensive-oriented deterrent to one more reliant on defenses in a cooperative and predictable manner. When the talks began in 1985, the Soviet position was to restrict the U.S. SDI program by binding the U.S. to provisions more narrow than the U.S. "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. However, there are recent indications that they would be prepared to accept the narrow interpretation. For instance, at the Baker-Shevardnadze Ministerial meeting in Moscow, in May of 1989, the Soviets reportedly offered to dismantle the disputed radar facility at Krasnoyarsk if the U.S. would agree to join them in observing the "narrow" interpretation.
DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS (D&S)

LOCATION: Geneva, Switzerland

BEGAN: 1985

PARTICIPANTS: United States and Soviet Union

OBJECTIVE (U.S.): To enhance stability by negotiating a transition from an offensive-oriented deterrent to one more reliant on defenses, in a cooperative and predictable manner.

REPRESENTATIVES:
U.S.: Ambassador Henry F. Cooper
Soviet: Ambassador Yu I. Kuznetsov
Defense and Space Talks

In the December 10, 1987, Summit Joint Statement after the Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev instructed their negotiators in Geneva to work toward a Defense and Space agreement that would commit the sides to:

-- Observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.

-- Begin intensive discussions on strategic stability not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action.

-- Discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the US-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

-- Record the agreement in a mutually satisfactory manner. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements.

On January 15, 1988, the Soviets tabled their version of a proposed Defense and Space agreement in the form of a protocol to the START Treaty. This document was not fully consistent with the Washington Summit Joint Statement and included previously held Soviet positions that remain unacceptable. It embodied the longstanding Soviet linkage of reductions in strategic offensive arms to unacceptable limits on development and testing in the US SDI program.
Such Soviet positions are clearly intended to cripple the US SDI program while the Soviets press ahead with a strategic defense program of their own. On the eve of the Washington Summit, General Secretary Gorbachev said, "Practically, the Soviet Union is doing all that the United States is doing, and I guess we are engaged in research, basic research, which relates to these aspects which are covered by the SDI of the United States." Thus, Gorbachev finally confirmed that the Soviets have research programs on advanced strategic defense technologies that are similar to the US SDI program — a fact the Soviets had been denying for years. The US will continue to reject the Soviets' attempts to restrict US rights to conduct SDI research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

On January 22, 1988, the United States tabled a draft Defense and Space Treaty which included the language from the Washington Summit Joint Statement and sought to build on those elements of agreement reached in Washington. The U.S. draft treaty would help to provide a jointly managed, predictable, and stable basis for the development and testing of advanced defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, and for deployment of such defenses if they prove feasible. Our draft treaty would help both sides move toward a safer and more stable world — one with reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on the increasing contribution of effective strategic defenses against ballistic missile attack.

At the Moscow Summit, May 29—June 1, 1988, both sides reiterated their earlier instructions to their Geneva negotiators, asking them to complete the D&S Agreement, and also noted progress on an associated Protocol.

In late September, 1988, at their fifth meeting since the Washington Summit, Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze exchanged views and instructed their Delegations "to intensify their efforts in preparing the Joint Draft Text of the separate agreement and its associated Protocol", as was done during the INF negotiations and as is being done now in the START negotiations.

The US has five areas of substantive disagreement with the Soviets in the Defense and Space Talks:

- First, the US believes that an agreement for reductions in strategic arsenals should stand on its own merits, and not be linked to unacceptable limits on SDI research, development, and testing. The Soviets seek a treaty text, unacceptable to the US, which would
permit them to suspend implementation of negotiated START reductions -- and even begin increasing their strategic offensive forces -- if the United States were to take certain actions to move toward deploying strategic defenses. Indeed, the Soviet Union continues to object even to certain types of research.

-- Second, and closely related, we disagree with the Soviets about activities permitted during the non-withdrawal period. Throughout the negotiations, the US has consistently sought to preserve its full research, development, and testing rights under the ABM Treaty. The phrase "research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty" in the Washington Summit Joint Statement is consistent with the longstanding US position that the so-called "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty is fully justified. Based on their official statements in Washington, Geneva, and Moscow, the Soviets have demonstrated they clearly understand how the US interprets the language agreed to in the Washington Summit Joint Statement. Indeed, they had consistently rejected such language prior to the Washington Summit.

-- Third, the sides have not resolved the issue of what occurs at the end of the non-withdrawal period. At the Summit, the President and General Secretary agreed that each side had the right to choose its own course of action including the right to deploy strategic defenses after the non-withdrawal period. The context of their Summit discussion makes clear this right refers to the deployment of defenses after the non-withdrawal period. However, the Soviets have subsequently taken the position that at the end of the non-withdrawal period the Parties' withdrawal rights under the ABM Treaty would be reestablished.

-- Fourth, the Washington Summit Joint Statement instructs the negotiators to work toward an agreement that would commit the sides not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. The Soviets favor a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. The US views the non-withdrawal commitment differently -- that neither side would withdraw to deploy or to acquire capabilities for strategic defenses. The US insists that we must retain certain internationally recognized withdrawal rights in the event that a side's supreme interests are jeopardized, and termination and suspension rights in the event the treaty is materially breached. Such supreme interest provisions have been a part of every bilateral US/USSR treaty; they are designed to protect the sovereign rights of the Parties.

-- Fifth, the US has made it clear that conclusion of the Defense and Space treaty, and any other future strategic arms control agreement with the Soviets, is contingent on the Soviets' rectification of their ABM Treaty violations, in particular, the Soviets would have to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar, a serious violation of a central element of the Treaty.
There is no reason why a Defense and Space Treaty Joint Draft Text cannot be developed in Geneva in accordance with the directives given both sides. The next step is to merge the US and Soviet draft texts into a single Joint Draft Text. Such a Joint Draft Text would form the basis for intensive negotiations on unresolved issues. The Soviets continue to block the completion of a Joint Draft Text of the Treaty itself, despite the agreement by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to direct the negotiators to do so.

There has been some progress in the preparation of the associated Protocol during the current round of negotiations in Geneva. However, the sides' basic objectives in seeking confidence-building measures contained in the Protocol differ sharply. The U.S. version of this Protocol provides voluntary for and reciprocal exchanges of data and other measures to ensure predictability in the nature, pace and scope of the strategic defense activities of each side. This would enhance future predictability and confidence in the overall U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. The Soviet version of the Protocol provides for mandatory verification measures to insure compliance with the so-called "narrow interpretation" of the ABM Treaty and is not consistent with instructions from the Washington Summit Joint Statement to "discuss ways to insure predictability."
NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS (NTT)

LOCATION: Geneva, Switzerland

BEGAN: November 9, 1987

PARTICIPANTS: United States and Soviet Union

OBJECTIVE: To agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible for the United States to ratify the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed then to proceed with discussions on further intermediate step-by-step limitations on nuclear testing as warranted by reductions in existing nuclear weapons and a lesser reliance on nuclear weapons for our deterrence.

SCOPE: Verification for Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and further nuclear testing limitations.

U.S. and SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES:
U.S.: Ambassador Paul Robinson
Soviet: Ambassador Palenyk
MEMORANDUM

TO: Members, Senate Arms Control Observer Group

FROM: Observer Group Staff

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Testing Treaties Negotiations

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), signed by President Nixon in 1974, restricted underground nuclear weapons tests to an explosive yield of 150 kilotons. The specified entry into force was delayed until March 31, 1976, and the treaty was not submitted to the Senate by the President pending negotiation of a companion treaty covering peaceful nuclear explosions. The second treaty was deemed necessary to prevent either side from using so-called "peaceful" explosions to gain weapons information which would be denied by the ceiling on the size of nuclear weapons tests. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) was signed by President Ford in 1976, and he transmitted the two treaties to the Senate late in his term. The PNET bans any nuclear explosion having a yield above 150 kilotons. It would require on-site inspection by the other party in the case of any group of smaller explosions with an aggregate yield above 150 kilotons. The treaty also prohibits any group of explosions with an aggregate yield exceeding 1-1/2 megatons under any circumstances.

In 1977, the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings and ordered the TTBT and PNET Treaties reported favorably, but reporting was delayed pending completion of action on, and reporting of, the Panama Canal Treaties so the two testing treaties would not precede the Panama treaties on the calendar. In mid-1978, the Administration concluded that a push to gain Senate consent to ratification of the TTBT and PNET could stir up a fight which would jeopardize the prospects for a complete ban. Accordingly, the Committee voted to reconsider the vote of approval and to put the treaties on the Committee calendar.

The Reagan Administration opposed ratification of the two treaties on the grounds that the verification provisions of the TTBT needed improvement. On July 25, 1985 the U.S. and USSR began technical expert meetings in Geneva to discuss a broad range of issues relating to nuclear testing. A total of six
rounds were held, and the series concluded in July 1987. In effect, the United States was pressing its case for direct, on-site monitoring to reinforce the TTBt and PNET, and the Soviets were more interested in discussing seismic monitoring of a comprehensive ban.

In the fall of 1986, as President Reagan left for the Reykjavik summit, a Conference Committee was considering different nuclear testing provisions contained in each chamber’s version of the Defense authorization bill. The House provision would have bound the United States to a one-year moratorium on nuclear tests over one kiloton under certain conditions. The Senate’s version called for ratification of the TTBt and PNET and resumption of talks on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB).

To break the impasse on the Defense bill and to leave the President free to deal with General Secretary Gorbachev, a compromise was reached. The Conference Committee accepted the Senate provision in exchange for presidential assurances. The President agreed to ...

"... make ratification of these treaties a first order of business for the Congress, with an appropriate reservation to the treaties that would ensure they would not take effect until they are effectively verifiable. I will work with the Senate in drafting this reservation.

"Second, I intend to inform the General Secretary in Reykjavik that, once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties have been ratified, I will propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing."

At a Foreign Relations Committee markup on February 19, 1987, the Committee, by voice vote, ordered the treaties reported with a reservation on verification and a declaration supporting the President’s commitment to "immediate negotiations" on further testing restraints following TTBt and PNET notification.

At the same time, the Committee voted to report favorably a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that:

"(l) The President should seek to expand upon article II of the TTBt with an agreement including provisions for direct, accurate yield measurements taken at the site of
all appropriate nuclear detonations, or equivalent enhanced verification methods;

"(2) The President should communicate to General Secretary Gorbachev that the United States is committed to the TTBT and PNET and that it desires an agreement for effective verification in 1987."

The verification reservation adopted by the Committee incorporated language proposed by the executive branch following staff-level consultation, but did not provide for a dual ratification scheme insisted upon by the Administration. Under the Administration proposal, the Senate would consent to ratification subject to achievement of new verification agreements and would have to advise and consent to the new agreements before the TTBT and PNET could enter into force. The Committee-adopted reservation called for a presidential certification regarding any new verification agreements in lieu of the dual ratification. The reservation was as follows:

"The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests is subject to the condition that the President shall not proceed with ratification of this treaty until he has certified to the Senate that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has concluded with the United States additional Agreements expanding upon the obligations stated in Article II of the Treaty of Limitation of Underground Weapons Tests, including provisions for direct, accurate yield measurements taken at the site of all appropriate nuclear detonations, so that the limitations and obligations of these treaties, inter alia the 150-kiloton limit, are effectively verifiable."

Meanwhile, the technical discussion on nuclear testing issues continued in Geneva. In September, after the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting, the following joint statement was released:

"The U.S. and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons
and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the US-USSR Treaties of 1974 and 1976, the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached."

The Nuclear Testing Talks began in November 1987 with the goal of achieving new verification protocols to two treaties.

In the course of the negotiations, agreement was worked out for two joint verification experiments to afford the two sides to demonstrate and observe the application of verification techniques favored by each side. The Soviets prefer seismic verification, and the Administration has been pressing for acceptance of a hydrodynamic measuring system, known as CORRTEX. The first experiment was conducted by the U.S. with a large Soviet team present in mid-August 1988 at the Nevada Test Site. The second experiment was conducted in mid-September by the Soviet side at Semipalatinsk, with a large U.S. contingent present.

The two sides have expressed the hope that the two experiments will open the way to completion of the two protocols. Substantial work was done on the PNET protocol before the experiments but the Soviets insisted upon waiting until after the experiments for the major work on the TTBT protocol.

Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issued a joint statement following the ministerial meetings in September 1988 which included the following section on nuclear testing:

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister welcomed completion of the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) at the nuclear test sites of the U.S. and the USSR, which demonstrated an unprecedented degree of cooperation and openness on verification of nuclear testing limitations. They directed negotiators to finish the new verification protocol for the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which is nearly complete, and the new verification protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. They agreed to work for the earliest submission of these documents for ratification, and to continue stage-by-stage negotiations toward the objectives specified by the leaders at the Washington and Moscow summits.

Ambassador Paul Robinson will reopen negotiations with the Soviets this week. He is scheduled to meet with his Soviet
counterpart on Monday, and the first plenary is scheduled for Wednesday.

When Ambassador Robinson wrapped up the preceding round of these negotiations late last year, a text of the PNET protocol had been completed and was referred to the American and Soviet governments. Less progress had been made on the TTBT protocol. In this round, the delegation is to work toward completion of the PNET protocol and resume work on the TTBT protocol. It is the Administration's plan not to initial the PNET protocol until completion of the TTBT protocol in order to make sure that both documents are consistent.

**ISSUES**

--- Has the negotiating team received complete guidance from the Administration? If so, what are the instructions? If not, what guidelines are they using and do they expect new instructions to be forthcoming?

--- What are the key differences between the current U.S. and Soviet proposals? Is it true that the U.S. is insisting on hydrodynamic measurement on all tests over a minimum yield while the Soviets feel this method should only be used on selected tests of much higher yields? How will these differences be resolved?

--- What are our priorities? Do we want to conclude work on the PNET protocol then move on to TTBT, or will the work be done simultaneously?

--- What is the time table for completing the protocols? What are the main challenges to achieving that time table?
Nuclear Testing Talks and JVE

The United States and the Soviet Union agreed at the Ministerial of September, 1987, to begin full-scale negotiations in a single forum. The objective of these negotiations is to reach agreement on effective verification measures which will make possible the ratification of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976.

During 1988, two marathon rounds of negotiations were completed which moved the two sides close to accomplishing this objective. A short Round I was held in late 1987 to begin work on the Joint Verification Experiment in which each side would conduct a nuclear test at its site, with the other side bringing verification instruments based on the hydrodynamic method to measure directly the yields of the tests. In Round II, lasting from February 15 until June 28, a 191 page JVE Agreement with 37 Technical Annexes was negotiated and signed at the Moscow Summit on May 31. The JVE was successfully completed according to plan. The explosion in the U.S. took place on August 17 at the Nevada Test Site. The explosion in the Soviet Union took place on September 14 at the Semipalatinsk Test Site. The experiments demonstrated the non-intrusiveness, effectiveness and accuracy of the hydrodynamic measurement method (CORRTEX) for verifying the TTBT and PNET.

Also in Round II, parallel negotiations began on the new protocols to the TTBT and PNET. Both the U.S. and Soviet sides tabled draft versions of the protocols, and, as a first priority, began work on merging the two texts for the PNET. Following a two month break for conducting the JVE, Round III resumed on August 29 and ended on December 15. An unbracketed text for the PNET was completed ad ref and taken back to capitals for review.

The work for Round IV, which will begin on June 26, 1989, will focus on completing the TTBT so that the TTBT and PNET and their new protocols can be submitted together to the Senate for its advice and consent to the President on ratification.
MEMORANDUM

To: Members, Senate Arms Control Observer Group
From: Observer Group Staff
Subject: Chemical Weapons Issues

Background

In 1925, at the Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms, the United States proposed a prohibition on the export of gases for use in war, and the French proposed a ban on the use of poisonous gas. At Poland’s suggestion, the prohibition was extended to bacteriological weapons. The Geneva Protocol was the result. It bans the use in war of chemical and biological weapons, but not the production or stockpiling of such weapons. The Committee on Foreign Relations favorably reported the treaty in 1926, but the Senate did not act on it in that period.

In the post-World War II period, there were a number of discussions of the possibility of multilateral chemical and biological weapons bans, but no significant progress was made until the late 1960s. In 1969, President Nixon announced that he would resubmit the protocol to the Senate. He reaffirmed U.S. renunciation of first use of lethal chemical weapons, as well as incapacitating chemicals. The President also unconditionally renounced all biological methods of warfare and directed the Pentagon to plan for the destruction of all stocks. In 1970, the President resubmitted the protocol with a reservation that the United States could retaliate in kind against a chemical weapons attack. He also declared that the protocol would not apply to the use in war of riot-control agents and herbicides. The Committee on Foreign Relations disagreed with the narrow coverage and deferred action. In 1971, the Soviets accepted the U.S. view that a ban on biological weapons presented less intractable problems and should not be held up awaiting agreement on a chemical weapons ban. As a result, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was
negotiated quickly, opened for signature and submitted to the Senate in 1972. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee deferred action pending resolution of the United States commitment under the Geneva Protocol.

In 1974, the Ford Administration reopened the issue, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said that the President, while reaffirming the scope of the protocol was prepared, "to renounce as a matter of national policy: (1) first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within the U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters; (2) first use of riot-control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives...." Moreover, Dr. Ikle testified, "The President, under an earlier directive still in force, must approve in advance any use of riot-control agents and chemical herbicides in war." With that and related understandings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously two days later to report the convention and the protocol favorably. Four days later, the Senate approved the protocol and the convention unanimously.

Recent Developments

In recent years, there have been a number of allegations of chemical and biological weapons use. The United States used riot-control agents and herbicides in Vietnam, but denied charges it had used lethal chemicals or biological agents. In the mid 1960's, Egypt was charged with using chemical weapons with Soviet help in the Yemen civil war. President Reagan found that the Soviet Union supplied North Vietnam with chemical weapons and toxins which were used in Laos and Cambodia. The U.S. in 1988 determined that the Soviet Union maintains an active offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of the 1972 BWC. The United States charged that the Soviets used chemical weapons and toxins in Afghanistan. The Ethiopian government was suspected of using chemicals against rebels in 1980. The Ethiopian government was suspected of using chemicals against rebels in 1980. In the course of the Iran-Iraq war, there were repeated instances of chemical weapons use, and, last year, Iraq used chemical weapons against its Kurdish minority. Last month, the Soviets used chemical weapons to quell demonstrators in the Republic of Georgia.

The horror of the repeated use of these weapons by Iraq brought on renewed, worldwide attention to the chemical weapons problem. In response, the Senate and the House, but not the Congress, passed legislation imposing sanctions on Iraq.

The concern was exacerbated by reports that the ability to make chemical weapons was spreading. Libya's development of a chemical weapons capability has had widespread repercussions,
especially in those nations with companies which may have helped.

In recent months, there have been a number of allegations of involvement of commercial concerns, particularly some in Western Europe in helping nations such as Iraq and Libya in the development of chemical weapons. On February 15, following heated public controversy over the possible involvement of West German firms in the building of the new Libyan facility, the German government confirmed that it had received numerous warnings about the Libyan effort. At the same time, the Cabinet approved legislation for a "drastic tightening" of export controls.

The Director of Central Intelligence, The Honorable William Webster, told the Committee on Foreign Relations in February:

"Chemical weapons proliferation is part of the disturbing trend of weapons development in Third World countries. Currently, we believe that as many as 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons. And we expect this trend to continue, despite ongoing multilateral efforts to stop their proliferation."

With regard to biological weapons, he said:

"We are concerned that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been breached. At least 10 countries are working to produce both previously known and futuristic biological weapons. Biological warfare agents -- including toxins -- are more potent than the most deadly chemical warfare agents, and provide the broadest area coverage per pound of payload of any weapon system."

He also told the Committee:

"Finally, by the year 2000, at least 15 developing countries will be producing their own ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles convey important new political and military status to those who acquire them. Many countries where these missiles are being developed are in the Middle East."

The obvious interest in chemical and biological weapons in the developing world, the evidence of willingness of some nations to use such weapons, and the relative ease and economy with which such weapons can be made were all factors in a developing sense of urgency that led President Mitterand to host the January Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. A total of 149 nations were represented at the conference, and 99 foreign ministers or their representatives addressed the conference. At its conclusion, the conference condemned the use of chemical weapons in violation of
international law, reaffirmed support for the Geneva Protocol, and urged completion of a ban on chemical weapons.

The Geneva Negotiations

Negotiations have been in process toward a chemical weapons ban, which would apply essentially the same prohibition to chemical weapons as was done regarding biological weapons in the 1972 convention. The Conference on Disarmament, the forum for the chemical weapons ban negotiation, reconvened on June 13th and will continue in session until late August. To date, the Administration has not issued detailed instructions to the American delegation regarding goals for this round.

Vice President Bush tabled a draft treaty in 1984 calling for a comprehensive global ban with extensive verification procedures. In the years since, progress has been made on a number of key issues, and there is agreement in principle on the basic approach a ban would take. Verification remains the greatest challenge to completing a treaty, but an equally difficult task will be to expand the treaty to non-participants and create a truly global ban.

Beyond the basic ban, all chemical weapons production facilities and stockpiles would be declared and then destroyed within 10 years. There would be international on-site inspection teams within six months of entry into force. Relevant chemical industries would be monitored, and challenge inspections would be provided for.

President Bush said last fall, "If I'm elected President, if I'm remembered for anything, it would be this: a complete and total ban on chemical weapons."

Legislation

Senator Pell and more than 30 cosponsors have a bill pending, S. 195, which would impose unilateral sanctions and call for multinational sanctions against users of chemical and biological weapons, seek a ban on transfers of missiles which could carry such weapons, encourage more effective supplier cooperation, and seek greater U.N. involvement.

Senator Dole and Senator Helms have introduced legislation, S. 8 and S. 238 respectively, to impose sanctions on companies which export chemical and biological weapons material and technology to proscribed destinations.
CFE Summary Paper

1. **CFE Rounds:** Round I - 9 March to 23 March 1989  
   Round II - 5 May to 13 July 1989

2. **CFE Ambassadors:** U.S. - Stephen J. Ledogar  
   U.S.S.R. - Oleg A. Gvinevskiy

3. **Summary of proposals.**

   NATO. On 9 March, NATO tabled a proposal that focused on three issues: key equipment items, stationed forces, and a rule to limit the ability of a single country to dominate Europe (i.e. sufficiency rule). The NATO proposal calls for limiting tanks, artillery, and armored troop carriers (ATC) to equal levels on both sides below current NATO levels in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region. These equipment items would be further restricted by limiting the quantity that could be in active units in sub-zones 2, 3, and 4 of the overall region. In addition, the quantity of these items that any one country could station in active units in other countries in the region are limited so that the total residual equipment, in these three categories, held by any one country does not exceed 30 percent of the ATTU total.

   Once it became apparent that the East had bought the general NATO approach to the CFE negotiations, President Bush proposed a NATO framework for negotiating aircraft, helicopters, and U.S.-Soviet manpower which provides a solid basis for progress in Vienna.

   The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). While the WTO early on discussed six categories for treaty limitation (the three NATO ones, plus strike aircraft, helicopters, and military manpower, it was slow to provide details. As details emerged, it became clear that the WTO had accepted the general NATO approach to the CFE negotiations. Its tank and ATC numbers mirrored NATO's, and its artillery figures (although higher) were compatible to NATO's when adjusted for definitional differences. In addition, the WTO proposals contained provisions for stationed force limits and sufficiency rules along similar lines to the NATO proposal. The major difference is that the WTO proposal contained the additional categories of combat strike aircraft belonging to frontal aviation, helicopters, and manpower. Until President Bush tabled his initiative at the NATO Summit, the West had no real negotiating defense against these one-sided proposals.

   The information contained in the tabs outlined in the following provide more detail on the CFE proposals.
a. Tab A contains a chart comparing the East-West proposals and the President’s initiative. Although the first three categories contain similar numbers, there are still differences in counting rules and definitions to be resolved in Vienna. In the other three areas, aircraft is likely to be the most difficult issue to negotiate.

b. Tab B contains a chart on stationed forces limits. Under the NATO proposal, mostly Soviet forces would be effected. Under the Eastern counter-proposal, both NATO and Soviet equipment would be effected since the Eastern proposal includes all equipment, both in storage and in active units. The President’s initiative would balance U.S. and Soviet stationed manpower. The East is countering by arguing that all stationed manpower should be balanced.

c. Tab C reflects the current proposals on sufficiency rules, which would limit any one country’s key equipment holdings to a limited percentage of the total. Resolution of differences between these proposals are largely tied to the resolution of other outstanding issues (definitions, sub-zone issues, etc.).

d. Tab D contains a map that reflect NATO’s sub-zone proposal. The key points on this issue is that the NATO sub-zones address only that equipment that is in active units. While the NATO proposal limits overall equipment holdings, in both active units and stored equipment in the ATTU region, it only attempts to regulate that equipment that is in active units. This is a point of contention with the East.

e. Tab E contains a map that reflects the Eastern sub-zone proposal. The envisions a rear zone and a forward zone. Within the forward zone, the East is proposing sub-limits for the central region.

### Eastern Sub-Zone Proposal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Rear</th>
<th>Forward</th>
<th>Central Sub-Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>8,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>7,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100mm &amp; up)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATCS</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>570,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Additional measures will later be added to these proposals to deal with verification, non-circumvention, and stability issues.
During the NATO Summit meeting on May 29, the President asked the Allies to join in tabling the most far-reaching Western conventional arms control proposal ever offered in the post-war era.

In his May 12 speech at Texas A&M, the President announced a policy of moving beyond containment to integrate the Soviet Union into the community of nations. He promised that constructive Soviet actions would be matched, step by step, with measures of our own. In March of this year members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact began Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in Vienna regarding the conventional forces fielded by both sides on land from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Eastern states have in the past two weeks provided vital new details about their CFE proposal, clarifying the Warsaw Pact's position.

The President concluded that the recent Warsaw Pact steps showed that the East has moved toward the concept and framework of the Western CFE approach. This includes the objective of eliminating the capability for both surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive action, as well as the Alliance's focus on equipment and its commitment to effective verification of an agreement. In view of these new opportunities for progress, the President today urged his NATO colleagues to join in a four-point proposal to bring the Vienna negotiations to a speedy conclusion.

The President is proposing:

-- First, that the members of the Alliance lock in Eastern acceptance of the proposed Western limits on key portions of their ground forces. This includes ceilings on numbers of tanks (20,000 for each side), armored troop carriers (28,000 for each side), and artillery pieces (from 16,500 to 24,000 for each side, depending on the resolution of definitional questions). Equipment reduced would be destroyed. This provision would oblige the East to destroy tens of thousands of weapon systems and eliminate its preponderance in these important components of military strength.
Second, that the West expand its proposal to extend, for the first time, the concept of conventional arms control to all land-based combat aircraft and helicopters (attack and assault/transport) in the Atlantic to the Urals area. Each side would be obliged to reduce its holdings to a level 15 percent below the current NATO total. All reduced equipment would be destroyed. Again, although both sides would take significant cuts, the East would lose its current preponderance in these forces.

Third, that the United States take a 20 percent cut in combat manpower in U.S. stationed forces with a resulting ceiling in U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-Urals zone of approximately 275,000 each. This manpower ceiling will require the Soviets to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe by about 325,000. Withdrawn soldiers and airmen on both sides would be demobilized.

Fourth, that both sides accelerate their timetable for reaching a CFE agreement along the above lines and for implementing the required reductions. The Soviet Union has referred to a target date of 1997 as its goal; we would like to reach an agreement within six months to a year and accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

The United States has asked its allies to join in preparing this proposal for presentation in Vienna at the earliest possible date. As the Soviet Union and its allies indicate their readiness to change their national priorities and reduce their enormous military establishments, the United States and its allies are prepared to help realize their long-standing hope for a secure and less militarized Europe.
NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
IN EUROPE

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK,
FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, ICELAND, ITALY,
LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, TURKEY,
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America

- Recalling that the adoption of the Stockholm Document in September 1986
  was a politically significant achievement and that its measures are an
  important step in efforts aimed at reducing the risk of military confrontation
  in Europe,

- Encouraged by the satisfactory implementation of these measures thus far,

- Determined to build upon and expand the results achieved at the Stockholm
  Conference and to carry forward the dynamic process of confidence building,

- Stressing the complementary nature within the framework of the CSCE
  process of negotiations on further confidence- and security-building measures
  and negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe,

- Determined

- to create greater transparency about military organization;

- to create greater transparency and predictability about military
  activities;

- to improve contacts and communications between the participating
  States;

- And determined, in the forthcoming negotiations, to promote an exchange
  of views on military policy,
In conformity with the Madrid Mandate 1983 as confirmed by the CSCE Review Meeting in Vienna 1989, propose confidence- and security-building measures including the following:

I. TRANSPARENCY ABOUT MILITARY ORGANIZATION

These measures are designed to create more openness and confidence about the military force disposition of each participating State. This will be achieved by regular exchanges of information on forces on land in the zone and on major weapons deployment programmes. The information exchanged will be subject to evaluation.

**Measure 1: Exchange of military information**

Participating States will exchange information concerning military organization, manpower and equipment in the zone. This will include annual information on:

- land forces command organization in the zone;
- the designation of major ground units, down to and below divisional level;
- the normal peacetime locations of these units;
- the personnel strength of these units;
- the major weapons systems and equipment belonging to these units;
- land-based air units and their aircraft strength.

It will also include immediate notification of:

- the relocation in the zone of major ground units as specified above from one normal peacetime location to another;
- the calling up of a significant number of reservists.

**Measure 2: Information exchange on major conventional weapon deployment programmes**

Each participating State will inform the others of those major conventional weapon systems and equipment specified in measure 1 which it intends to introduce into service with its armed forces in the CDE zone in a specified period.
Measure 3: Establishment of a random evaluation system

In order to evaluate the information provided under measures 1 and 2, participating States will establish a random evaluation system in which:

- they will have the right to conduct a number of pre-announced visits to normal peacetime locations specified under measure 1;
- these visits, of a limited duration, will be carried out by personnel already accredited to the host State or designated by the visiting State;
- evaluators will be allowed to observe major weapon systems and equipment;
- appropriate arrangements for the evaluation visit will be made by the host State, whose representatives will accompany the evaluation teams at all times.

II. TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

These measures will build upon those agreed in Stockholm by refining them in order to enhance openness and produce greater predictability of military activities.

Measure 4: Enhanced information in the annual calendar

Participating States will provide in their annual calendars more information, and in greater detail, about future military activities. This will include the designation, number and type of ground units down to divisional level scheduled to take part in notifiable military activities in the zone.

Measure 5: Enhanced information in notification

To improve the notification concerning military activities, participating States will communicate more information, and in greater detail, about the engagement of their armed forces as well as their major weapon systems and equipment in such ground-force activities.

Measure 6: Improvements to observation modalities

Participating States will facilitate observation by organizing more detailed briefings, providing better maps and allowing more observation equipment to be used. Furthermore, in order to improve the observers'
opportunities to assess the scope and scale of the activity, the participating States are encouraged to provide an aerial survey of the area of the activity. Moreover, the duration of the observation programme will be improved.

**Measure 7: Lowering of the observation threshold**

Participating States will invite observers to notified activities whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 13,000 or if more than 300 tanks participate in it.

**Measure 8: Improvement to inspection modalities**

Participating States will adopt measures for a substantial improvement of the inspection which include:
- increasing the number of passive inspections;
- shortening the period between the inspection request and access of the inspectors to the specified area;
- permitting, on request by inspectors, an aerial survey before the commencement of the inspection;
- improving the equipment and communications facilities that the inspecting team will be permitted to use;
- improving the briefings to inspectors.

**Measure 9: Lowering the thresholds for longer notice of larger-scale activities**

Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 50,000 troops unless they have been the object of communication stipulated in the Stockholm Document.

**III. CONTACTS AND COMMUNICATION**

These measures are designed to increase the knowledge about the military capabilities of the participating States by developing communications and military contacts.

**Measure 10: Improved access for accredited personnel dealing with military matters**

In order to implement the principle of greater openness in military matters and to enhance mutual confidence, the participating States will facilitate the travel arrangements of accredited personnel dealing
with military matters and assist them in obtaining access to government officials. Restrictions on the activities of accredited personnel in the CDE zone should be reduced.

Measure 11: Development of means of communication

Participating States, while using diplomatic channels for transmitting communications related to agreed measures (calendars, notifications etc.) are encouraged to consider additional arrangements to ensure the speediest possible exchange of information.

Measure 12: Equal treatment of media representatives

Participating States will be encouraged to permit media representatives to attend observed military activities; if media representatives are invited, the host State will admit such representatives from all participating States and treat them without discrimination.

* * * *

EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON MILITARY POLICY

Confidence-building is a dynamic process which is enhanced by the free and frank interchange of ideas designed to reduce misunderstanding and misrepresentation of military capabilities. To this end, participating States will, in the forthcoming negotiations, avail themselves of the following opportunities:

- to discuss issues concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Document;

- to discuss, in a seminar setting, military doctrine in relation to the posture and structure of conventional forces in the zone, including inter alia:

  - exchanging information on their annual military spending;
  - exchanging information on the training of their armed forces, including references to military manuals;
  - seeking clarification of developments giving rise to uncertainty, such as changes in the number and pattern of notified military activities.
BIOPGRAPHICAL SKETCH

NAME: Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, Jr. (Hank)

TITLE: Chief Negotiator, Defense and Space Group, Nuclear and Space Arms Talks with the Soviet Union (NST)

DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH: 8 November 1916 Augusta, Georgia

FAMILY: Wife: Barbara Daughters: Laura, Cynthia Son: Scott

ADDRESS: Residence: 7103 Holyrood Drive McLean, VA 22101


TELEPHONE: Residence: (703) 790-5798

Business: (202) 547-6245

EDUCATION: BS (Mechanical Engineering) Clemson University, 1958

MS (Mechanical Engineering) Clemson University, 1960

PhD (Mechanical Engineering) New York University, 1964

POSITIONS: 1987- Chief Negotiator, Defense and Space Group, NST, Geneva

1985-1987 Deputy Negotiator, Defense and Space Group, NST, Geneva

1983-1985 Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

1982-1983 Deputy Director, Nuclear Effects Division, R&D Associates

1980-1982 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research, Development, and Logistics)

1972-1980 Member Senior Technical Staff & Program Manager, R&D Associates

1967-1972 Scientific Advisor, Air Force Weapons Laboratory

1964-1967 Project Officer (1st Lt) Air Force Weapons Laboratory

1960-1964 Member of Technical Staff, Bell Telephone Laboratories

1958-1960 Instructor, Clemson University
Yuriy Konstantinovich NAZARKIN
(Phonetic: nahZARkin)

Chief, Soviet Delegation to the
Conference on Disarmament
(since February 1987)

Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador

Before taking his current post, Yuriy Nazarkin had been chief of the Questions on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy and Space Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry since mid-1986. He attended the meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Washington in September 1987. In October he led a group of delegates from the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to the Shikhany Chemical Proving Ground to display Soviet chemical munitions and demonstrate their destruction. The following month he headed a Soviet delegation to the US chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. He has participated in bilateral discussions on chemical weapons with the United Kingdom and Ireland and in meetings with the United States on the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

As a counselor in the International Organizations Department of the Foreign Ministry from at least 1973 until mid-1980, and then as a deputy chief from 1980 until 1986, Nazarkin participated in several arms control forums. From 1976 until 1980, he attended the US-USSR bilateral talks on chemical warfare, held in Geneva. He has also attended numerous UN General Assembly sessions. Nazarkin was involved in the CD and its predecessors from at least 1967 until 1985 and was deputy head of the Soviet delegation during 1973-85 (except for one session in 1981). He has attended two UN World Disarmament Campaign regional conferences—one in Leningrad (1984) and the other in Cairo (1985).

Nazarkin was born on 12 March 1932. He speaks English well. He received a Certificate of Merit from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (legislature) in 1982. In 1985 Nazarkin was one of two editors of a book on the role of international organizations in disarmament. He is married.

11 May 1988
Disarmament specialist Lem Masterkov has headed the Soviet START group at rounds VIII and IX at the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva since May 1987. Because of his position, he accompanied Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Washington in September to continue working out a possible START treaty. He participated in the 1987 Washington Summit. Before taking over the START group Masterkov had been a member of the INF group at rounds I-IV and had headed that group since the spring 1986 (fifth) round.

In addition to the nuclear and space arms talks, Masterkov has participated in many other US-Soviet arms control negotiations. He has been:
• Adviser at SALT I sessions three (1970) and six (1971-72).
• Member of the support team at SALT I session seven (1972).
• Adviser at all SALT II sessions (1972-79).
• Executive secretary of the Soviet delegation at SALT II session nine (1978-79).
• Delegate to the US-Soviet preliminary exchanges on TNF (October-November 1980).
• Delegate to rounds I-VI of the INF talks (1981-83).

Masterkov was acting head of the Disarmament Section of the International Organizations Department of the Foreign Ministry from 1979 until the Ministry was reorganized in June 1986. He now works in the Ministry’s Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Administration, headed by Viktor Karpov.

Masterkov was born on 26 March 1929.